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Abstract
The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs) are paraconsistent logics which permit us to internalize
the concepts of consistency or inconsistency inside our object language, introducing new operators
to talk about them, and allowing us, in principle, to logically separate the notions of contradictori-
ness and of inconsistency.  We present the formal definitions of these logics in the context of Gen-
eral Abstract Logics, argue that they in fact represent the majority of all paraconsistent logics ex-
isting up to this point, if not the most exceptional ones, and we single out a subclass of them called
C-systems, as the LFIs that are built over the positive basis of some given consistent logic.  Given
precise characterizations of some received logical principles, we point out that the gist of paracon-
sistent logic lies in the Principle of Explosion, rather than in the Principle of Non-Contradiction,
and we also sharply distinguish these two from the Principle of Non-Triviality, considering the next
various weaker formulations of explosion, and investigating their interrelations.  Subsequently, we pres-
ent the syntactical formulations of some of the main C-systems based on classical logic, showing how
several well-known logics in the literature can be recast as such a kind of C-systems, and care-
fully study their properties and shortcomings, showing for instance how they can be used to faith-
fully reproduce all classical inferences, despite being themselves only fragments of classical logic,
and venturing some comments on their algebraic counterparts.  We also define a particular subclass
of the C-systems, the dC-systems, as the ones in which the new operators of consistency and incon-
sistency can be dispensed.  A survey of some general methods adequate to provide these logics with
suitable interpretations, both in terms of valuation semantics and of possible-translations semantics,
is to be found in a follow-up, the paper [42].  This study is intended both to fully present and char-
acterize, from scratch, the field into which it inserts, hinting of course to the connections with other
studies by several authors, as well as to set some open problems, and to point to a few directions of
continuation, establishing on the way a unifying theoretical framework for further investigation for
researchers involved with the foundations of paraconsistent logic.
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1  THOU SHALT NOT TRIVIALIZE!
On account of the classical principle of [non-]contradiction, a proposition
and its negation cannot be both simultaneously true; thanks to this, it is
not possible that a theory which is valid under the philosophical (or logi-
cal) point of view includes internal contradictions.  To suppose the con-
trary would seemingly constitute a philosophical error.
—Newton C. A. da Costa, [46], p. 6–7, 1958.
In the dawn of the XXI century, debates on the statute of contradiction in logic, phi-
losophy and mathematics are still likely to raise the most diverse and animated sen-
timents.  And this is an old story, whose first dramatic strokes can be traced back to
authors as early as Aristotle (for the defense of non-contradiction), or Heraclitus (for
the contrary position).  Be that as it may, the fact is that in the beginning of the last
century essentially the same dispute was still taking place, this time contraposing Rus-
sell to Meinong.  And so it could still proceed, for centuries, if only the philosophical
aspects of the dispute were touched.  Even on more technical grounds, logicians of
caliber, such as Alfred Tarski, would eventually speculate about that (cf. [106]):
I do not think that our attitude towards an inconsistent theory would change even if we
decided for some reason to weaken our system of logic so as to deprive ourselves of
the possibility of deriving every sentence from any two contradictory sentences.  It seems
to me that the real reason of our attitude is a different one: We know (if only intuitively)
that an inconsistent theory must contain false sentences; and we are not inclined to regard
as acceptable any theory which has been shown to contain such sentences.
Against such suspicions, the philosopher Wittgenstein, who had devoted almost half
of his late work to the philosophy of mathematics and used to refer to it as his ‘main
contribution’ (cf. the entry Mathematics, in [63]), would have had something to say.
Indeed, he often felt puzzled about ‘the superstitious fear and awe of mathematicians in
face of contradiction’ (cf. [109], Ap.III–17), and asked himself: ‘Contradiction.
Why just this one spectre?  This is surely much suspect.’ (id., IV–56).  His point was
that ‘it is one thing to use a mathematical technique consisting in the avoidance of
contradiction, and another thing to philosophize against contradiction in mathematics’
(id., IV–55), and that it was necessary to remove the ‘metaphysical thorn’ stuck here
(id., VII–12).  In this respect, the philosopher described his own objective as precisely
that of altering the attitude of mathematicians concerning contradictions (id., III–82).
The above passage from da Costa’s [46] could also be directed upon criticizing a
position such as the above one of Tarski.  The presupposition to be challenged here, of
course, is that of an inconsistent theory obligatorily containing false sentences.  Thus, if
models may be described of structures in which some (but not all) contradictory sen-
tences are simultaneously true, we will have a technical point against such suspici-
ons of impossibility or implausibility of maintaining contradictory sentences insi-
de of some theory and still being able to perform reasonable inferences from that, ins-
tead of being able to derive arbitrarily other sentences.  This is sure to make a point
in conferring to the task of studying the behavior of contradictory yet non-trivial the-
ories —the task of paraconsistency— some respectability.  And it is indeed possi-
ble to assign models for inconsistent non-trivial theories, even if these were to be
regarded by some as epistemologically puzzling, or ontologically perplexing!  Obtai-
ning models and understanding their role is certainly an extraordinarily important
mathematical enterprise: Enourmous efforts from the most brilliant minds and more3
than twenty centuries were required until mathematicians would allow themselves to
consider models in which, given a straight line S and a point P outside of it, one
could draw not just one line, but infinite, or no parallel lines to S passing through P,
as in the well-known case of non-Euclidean geometries.  In the present case, then, the
problem will not be that of validating falsities, but that of extending our notion of truth
(an idea further explored, for instance, in [28]).
At that same decisive moment, in the first half of the last century, there were in
fact these other people like Lukasiewicz or Vasiliev who were soon proposing re-
lativizations of the idea of non-contradiction, offering formal interpretations to formal
systems in which this idea did not hold, and in which contradictions could make
sense.  And in between the 40s and the 60s the world would finally be watching the
birth of the first real operative systems of paraconsistent logic (cf. Jaskowski’s [67],
Nelson’s [86], and da Costa’s [49]).  But the paleontology of paraconsistent logic will
not be our main subject here —for that we prefer to redirect the reader to some of the
following articles [6], [59], [55], and those in section 1 of [95], plus the book [26].
1.1  Contradictory theories do exist.  Be them a consequence of the only correct de-
scription of a contradictory world (as assumed in [90]), be them just a temporary state
of our knowledge, or again the outcome of a particular language that we have cho-
sen to describe the world, the result of conflicting observational criteria, superposi-
tions of worldviews, or simply, in science, because they result from the best theories
available at a given moment (cf. [14]), contradictions are presumably unavoidable
in our theories.  Even if contradictory theories were to appear only by mistake, or
perhaps by some Janus-like crooked behavior of their proposers, it is hard to see,
given for instance results such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, how contradic-
tions could be prevented from even being taken into consideration.  So it should be
clear that the point here is not about the existence of contradictory theories, but about
what we should do with them!  Should these theories be allowed to explode and de-
rive anything else, as in classical logic, or rather should we try to substitute the un-
derlying logic, in (potentially) critical situations, in order to still be able to draw (if
only temporarily, if you want) reasonable conclusions from those theories?
At this point it is interesting to consider the following motto set down by Newton
da Costa, one of the founders of modern paraconsistent logic (cf. [47]):
From the syntactical-semantical standpoint, every mathematical theory is admissible,
unless it is trivial.
Da Costa designated that motto ‘Principle of Tolerance in Mathematics’, in analogy to
the ‘syntactical’ principle proposed before by Carnap (cf. [35], p.52).  According to
this, the dividing line in between systems worthy of investigation and those that do not
‘make a difference’ (cf. [55]), nor convey any information (cf. [14]), should be drawn
around non-triviality, rather than in the vicinity of non-contradictoriness.  This will
give us the first key to paraconsistency: if there are no contradictions around, then
everything is under control, once we are inside of a consistent environment; but if
contradictions are allowed, non-triviality should be the aim —but then what we
must control is the explosive character of our underlying logic.  Indeed, inside of a
consistent logic we know that contradictions are dangerous in a theory precisely becau-
se they will give sufficient reason for this theory to explode, deducing anything else!4
So, given a logic whose language includes a negation symbol ¬ , let’s call contra-
dictory a theory from which some formula A and its negation ¬ A can be derived by
way of the underlying logic.  Let’s also call a theory trivial if any formula B can be
derived from it by way of the underlying logic, and call a theory explosive if the
addition to it of any contradiction A and ¬ A is sufficient to make it trivial.  The un-
derlying logic, in its own right, will also be called contradictory, trivial, or explo-
sive if, respectively, all of the theories about which it can talk are contradictory, triv-
ial, or explosive.  To be sure, any trivial theory / logic will also turn to be contradictory,
whenever there is a negation available (anything is derived from it, in particular all
pairs of formulas of the form A and ¬ A).  Inside classical or intuitionistic logic, and,
in a general way, inside any ‘consistent’ logic (this will be defined in what follows),
the contradictory and the trivial theories simply coincide, by way of their explosive
character.  Paraconsistent logics were then proposed to be the logics to underlie
those contradictory theories which were still to be kept non-trivial, and what those
logics must of course effect to such an end is weakening or annulling the explosive
character of these theories.
1  So, all at once, paraconsistency comes and provides
a sharp distinction in between the logical notions of contradictoriness, explosiveness,
and triviality.
Anyone working as a knowledge engineer, assembling and managing knowledge
databases, will be perfectly aware that gathering inconsistent information is the rule
rather than the exception.  And again, either if you assume, by some sort of methodo-
logical requirement, inconsistent theories to be problematic (cf. [14]) or not (cf. [90]),
this does not prevent you from also assuming them to be, in general, quite informati-
ve, and wanting to reason from them in a sensible way.  Consider, for instance, this
very simple situation (cf. [40]) in which you ask two people, in the due course of
an investigation, a ‘yes-no’ question such as ‘Does Dick live in Arizona?’, so that
what will result will be exacly one of the three following different possible scena-
rios: they might both say ‘yes’, they might both say ‘no’, or else one of them might
say ‘yes’ while the other says ‘no’.  Now, it happens that in neither situation you
may be sure about where Dick really lives (unless you trust some of the interviewees
more than the other), but only in the last scenario, where an inconsistency appe-
ars, are you sure to have received wrong information from one of your sources!
Our next point is that also the logical notions of inconsistency and of contradic-
toriness can and should be distinguished in a purely abstract way.  Distinctions have
already been proposed, in the literature, among the notions of paradoxical and of
antinomical theories (cf., for instance, Arruda’s [6], p.3, or da Costa’s [51], p.194), the
paradoxical ones being identified with those theories in which inconsistencies could
occur without necessarily leading to trivialization, and the antinomical ones identi-
fied with those in which any occurring contradiction turns out to be fatal, as in the
case of Russell’s antinomy in naive set theory.  Let us, here, insist on this distinction
for a moment and stretch it a bit further.  One first difficulty to be confronted with is
that of some English technical terms: It is such a pity that techniques and results such
as Hilbert’s witch-hunt programme in search of a Widerspruchfreiheitbeweis for Arith-
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metic were to be eventually translated into the search for a ‘consistency proof’, given
that what it literally means is something much more precise, namely a ‘proof of
freedom from contradictions’!  More often than not, German language indeed shows
itself to be exceedingly precise, so that we should rather stick here to the literal mea-
ning of Widerspruchfreiheit as non-contradictoriness, and associate inconsistency, if
we may, with something like the term Unbeständigkeit (or any other synonym of
Inkonsistenz together perhaps with some terms opposed to Beschaffenheit and to
Widerstandsfähigkeit).  Now, antinomies will be related to the presence of ‘strong’
contradictions —those with explosive behavior—, while paradoxes will be related
to the presence of inconsistencies, which do not necessarily depend on negation, such
as in the case of the well-known Curry’s paradox (cf. [45]).  Let us try to summarize
this whole story in a picture (maybe you do not agree on our choice of names, but we
beg you to stick to our terminology for the moment):
The above distinctions, of course, are more illustrative than formal (nothing pre-
vents you, for instance, from thinking of Russell’s antinomy as something not as
destructive as it was, if you just change the underlying logic of its theory so as to
make it only paradoxical, but the distinction between antinomies as involving the
notion of strong negation, on the one hand, and inconsistencies, on the other hand,
as something more general and in principle independent of negation, should be taken
more seriously).
Now, whatever an inconsistency might mean, be it more general or not than a sim-
ple contradiction, we may certainly presuppose that a contradiction is at least an exam-
ple of an inconsistency, be it the only possible one or not.  Traditionally, as we ha-
ve noted a few paragraphs above, the contradictoriness of a given theory / logic was to
be identified with the fact that it derives at least some pairs of formulas of the form A
and ¬ A, while inconsistency was usually talked about as a model-theoretic pro-
perty to be guaranteed so that our theories can make sense and talk about ‘real exis-
ting structures’.  Of course, any trivial theory / logic, thus, given our assumption above
that contradictions entail inconsistencies, will also be both contradictory and incon-
sistent.  Now, if explosiveness does not hold, as we shall see, in the scope of para-
consistent logics, there is in principle no reason to suppose that the converse would
also be the case, and that a contradiction would always lead to trivialization.  How to
reconcile these concepts then?  Da Costa’s idea, when proposing his first para-
consistent calculi (cf. [49]), was that the ‘consistency’ and the ‘classic-like beha-
vior’ (he called that ‘well-behavior’) of a given formula, as a sufficient requisite to
guarantee its explosive character, could be represented as simply another formula of
its underlying logic (he chose, for his first calculus, C1, to represent the consistency
of a formula A by the formula ¬ (A∧¬ A), and referred to this last formula —to be
intuitively read as saying that ‘it is not the case that both A and ¬ A are true’—, as a
realization of the ‘Principle of Non-Contradiction’, conventions that we will here, in
general, not follow —neither will we follow, necessarily, the identification of con-
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sistency with ‘classic-like behavior’).  In fact, our proposal here, inspired by da Cos-
ta’s idea, is exactly that of introducing consistency as a primitive notion of our logics:
the paraconsistent logics which internalize the notion of consistency so as to introdu-
ce it already at the object level will be called logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs).
And, given a consistent logic L, the LFIs which extend the positive basis of L will be
said to constitute C-systems based on L.  Our main aim in this paper, besides making
all the above definitions and their multiple shades and interrelations entirely clear,
will be that of studying a large class of C-systems based on classical logic (of which
the calculi Cn of da Costa will be but very particular examples).
On what concerns this story about regarding consistency as a primitive notion, the
status of points, lines and planes in geometry may immediately be thought of, but
the case of (imaginary) complex numbers seems to make an even better comparison:
even if we do not know what they are, and may even suspect there is little sense in
insisting on which way they can exist in the ‘real’ world, the most important aspect
is that it is possible to calculate with them.  Girolamo Cardano, who first had the idea
of computing with such numbers, seems to have seen this point clearly —he failed,
however, to acknowledge the importance of this; in 1545 he wrote in his Ars Magna
(cf. [87]):
Dismissing mental tortures, and multiplying  15 5 − +  by  15 5 − − , we obtain 25− (− 15).
Therefore the product is 40.  …and thus far does arithmetical subtlety go, of which this, the
extreme, is, as we have said, so subtle that it is useless.
His discovery, that one could operate with a mathematical concept independent of
what our intuition would say and that usefulness (or something else) could be a gui-
ding criterion for accepting or rejecting experimentation with mathematical objects,
definitely contributed to the proof of the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra by C. F.
Gauss in 1799, before which complex numbers were not fully accepted.
To make matters clear, the basic idea behind the internalization of consistency
inside our logics will be, in general, accomplished by the addition of a unary con-
nective expressing consistency (and usually also another connective to express in-
consistency), plus the following important assumption, that consistency is exactly
what a theory might be lacking in order to deliver triviality when exposed to a con-
tradiction.
2  Recapitulating: as we said before, triviality entails contradictoriness (if a
negation is present), and contradictoriness entails inconsistency (or, to be more pre-
cise, contradictoriness entails ‘non-consistency’, for it may happen, as we will see, that
consistency and inconsistency are not exactly dual in some of our logics, if we take
both notions as primitive); now we just add to this the assumption that contradictori-
ness plus consistency implies triviality!  We are in fact introducing, in this way, a no-
vel definition of consistency, more fine-grained than the usual model-theoretic one:
for a large class of logics (see FACT 2.14(ii)) it will turn out that consistency may
be identified with the presence of both non-contradictoriness and explosive features.
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intuition on the matter.  As he put it, ‘in some cases we have to do with a system of hypotheses which, if
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Now, non-contradictoriness will be a necessary but no more a sufficient requi-
rement for us to prove consistency.  In the case of explosive logics, of course, the
concepts of non-contradictoriness and non-triviality will coincide, so that non-contra-
dictoriness and consistency are also to be identified.  Paraconsistent logics are situated
exactly in that terra incognita which lays in between non-explosive logics and trivial
ones, and they comprehend exactly those logics which are both non-explosive and non-
trivial (examples of such logics are provided by the whole of the literature on paracon-
sistent logics)!  So, again, consistency divides the logical space in between consistent
(and so, explosive and non-contradictory) logics, and inconsistent ones, and these
last ones may, at their turn, be either paraconsistent (and so, non-explosive, and pos-
sibly even contradictory), or trivial.
1.2  Paraconsistent, but not contradictory!  In fact, there is another point that we
want to stress here, for it seems that much confusion has been unnecessarily raised
around it.  In general, paraconsistent logics do not validate contradictions or invali-
date anything like the ‘Principle of Non-Contradiction’ (though there are a few that
do).  Most paraconsistent logics, actually, are just fragments of some other given
consistent logic (such as some version of classical logic, or else some normal modal
logic), so that they cannot, in any case, be contradictory!  However, a good way of
making this whole point much less ambiguous (even though still open to dispute,
but now on a different level) is by considering formal definitions of those so-called
(meta)logical principles.
Let us say that a logic respects the Principle of Non-Contradiction, (PNC), if it is
non-contradictory, according to our previous definitions, that is, if it has non-con-
tradictory theories, that is, theories in which no contradictory pair of formulas A and
¬ A may be inferred.  Let us also say that a logic respects the Principle of Non-Tri-
viality, (PNT), (a realization of da Costa’s Principle of Tolerance inside of the logi-
cal space) if it is non-trivial, thus possessing non-trivial theories, and say that a logic
respects the Principle of Explosion, or Pseudo-Scotus, (PPS), if it is explosive, that
is, if all of its theories explode when in contact with a contradiction.  It is clear now
that all paraconsistent logics, by their very nature, must disrespect (PPS), aiming to
retain (PNT), but it is also clear that they cannot disrespect (PNC) as long as they
are defined as fragments of other logics that do respect (PPS)!  The gist and legacy
of paraconsistent logic indeed lies in showing that logics may be constructed in which
the Principle of Pseudo-Scotus is controlled in its power, and this has ‘in principle’
nothing to do with the validity or not of the Principle of Non-Contradiction as we
understand it.  Yet a few logics exist which are not only paraconsistent, but that in
fact disrespect (PNC).  Such logics are usually put forward in order to formalize some
dialectical principles, and are accordingly known as dialectical logics.  Being able to
infer contradictions, however, such dialectical logics cannot be fragments of any
consistent logic, and in order to avoid trivialization they should also usually assume,
for instance, the failure of Uniform Substitution, at least when applied to some spe-
cific formulas, such as the contradictions that those logics can infer (or else any other
contradiction, and thus any other formula, would be inferable).  Much weaker ver-
sions of the Principle of Non-Contradiction have nevertheless been considered in the
literature, as for instance the following one, deriving from semantical approaches
to the matter: a logic is said to respect the Principle of Non-Contradiction, second8
form, (PNC2), if it has non-trivial models for pairs of contradictory formulas.  But
then, of course, every model for the falsification of (PPS), that is, every model for
a paraconsistent logic, would also satisfy (PNC2), and vice-versa, so that not only
would (PNC2) be unnecessary as a new principle, but there would also be no prin-
ciple dealing specifically with the existence of dialectical logics.  Too bad!  And, of
course, there is a BIG difference in having models for some specific contradictions and
having all models of a given logic validating some contradictory pair of formulas —
this amounts, in the end, to the same difference which exists, in classical logic, in
between contingent formulas, on the one hand, and (tautological or) contradictory
ones, on the other hand…
The above definition of (PNC) will also prevent us from identifying this principle,
inside some arbitrary given logic L, with the validity in L of some particular formula,
such as ¬ (A∧¬ A) (as in da Costa’s first requisite for the construction of his para-
consistent calculi —check the subsection 3.8).  But it is true that such a formula can,
as well as many other formulas, be identified, in some situations, to the expression
of consistency inside of some specific logics, such as da Costa’s C1!  Let us, in general,
say that a theory Γ  is gently explosive when there is always a way of expressing the
consistency of a given formula A by way of formulas which depend only on A, that
is, when there is a (set of) formula(s) constructed using A as their sole variable and
that cannot be added to Γ  together with a contradiction A and ¬ A, unless this leads
to triviality.  A gently explosive logic, then, is exactly a logic having only gently ex-
plosive theories, and we can now formulate (gPPS), a ‘gentle version’ of (PPS), for
a given logic L, asserting that this logic must be gently explosive.  Gently explosive
paraconsistent logics, thus, are precisely those logics that we have above dubbed LFIs,
the logics of formal inconsistency.  In the logics we will be studying in this paper, we
will in general assume that the consistency of each formula A can be expressed by
operators already at their linguistic level, and in the simplest case this will be written
as ◦A, where ‘◦’ is the ‘consistency connective’.  The C-systems (in this paper they
will be supposed to be based on classical logic), will be particular LFIs illustrating
some different ways in which one can go on to axiomatize the behavior of this new
connective.
There are also some other forms of explosion, as the partial one, which does not
trivialize the whole logic, but just part of it (for instance, when a contradiction does
not prove every other formula, but does prove every other negated formula).  We
will let our paraconsistent logics also reject this kind of explosion.  There is ex
falso, which asserts that at least one element should exist in our logics so that eve-
rything follows from it (a kind of falsum, or bottom particle).  There is controllable
explosion, which states that, if not all, at least some of our formulas should lead to
trivialization when taken together with their negations.  And, finally, there is sup-
plementing explosion, which states that our logics should possess, or be able to de-
fine, a supplementing, or strong negation, to the effect that strongly negated propo-
sitions (that we have above called strong contradictions) should explode.  (There are
also all sorts of combinations of these forms of explosions, and perhaps some other
forms still to be uncovered, but these are the ones we will concentrate on, here.)  All
of these alternative forms of explosion can be turned into logical (meta)principles,
and none of these rejects, by their own right, ‘full’ Pseudo-Scotus —all of them,
nonetheless, can still be held even when the Pseudo-Scotus does not hold!  The para-9
consistent logics studied in this paper will, of course, disrespect Pseudo-Scotus, and
in addition to that they will also disrespect the principle regarding partial explosion,
while, in most cases, they will still respect the principles regarding gentle explosion,
ex falso, supplementing explosion, and, often, controllable explosion as well.  This
will be made much clearer in section 2, where this study will be made more precise,
and the interrelations between all of those principles will be more deeply investi-
gated.
1.3  What do you mean?  Let’s now briefly describe the exciting things that await the
reader in the next sections (we will skip section 1 in our description —you are rea-
ding it—, but do not stop here!).
Section 2 is General Abstract Nonsense.  No particular systems of paraconsistent
logic are studied here (though some are mentioned), but most of the definitions and
preprocessed material that you will need to understand the rest are to be found in this
section.  There is nothing for you to lose your appetite —you can actually intensify
it, even if, or especially if, you do not agree with some of our positions.  We first make
clear what we mean by logics, introduced by their consequence relations, and what
we mean by theories based on these logics, and on the way you will also learn what
closed theories and monotonicity mean, and what it means to say that a logic is a frag-
ment or an extension of another logic.  This is just preparatory work.  We then intro-
duce the logical notions of contradictoriness, explosiveness and triviality, concer-
ning theories and logics, and pinpoint some immediate connections between these
notions.  This already takes us to the subsection 2.1, where the first logical (meta)-
principles are introduced, namely the principles of non-contradiction, (PNC), of non-
triviality, (PNT), and of explosion, (PPS) (a.k.a. Pseudo-Scotus, or ex contradictione).
You will even learn a little bit about the (pre-)history of these principles, their inter-
relations, and some confusions about them which lurk around.  Some of their on-
tological aspects are also lightly touched.  The subsection 2.2 brings us to para-
consistent logics, formulated in two equivalent (but not necessarily so) presentati-
ons, one of them saying that they should allow for contradictory non-trivial theori-
es, the other one saying that they must disrespect (PPS).  After you learn what it means
to say that two given formulas / theories are equivalent inside some given logic,
FACT 2.8 will call your attention to the discrimination that paraconsistent logics ought
to make between contradictions: they cannot be all equivalent inside such logics.
Dialectical logics, being those logics disrespecting (PNC), are mentioned to fill the
gaps in the general picture, but they will not be studied here.  In the subsection 2.3
we start talking about finite trivializability, and look at some remarkable examples
of this phenomenon, as for example the one of a logic having bottom particles —
thus respecting a principle that we call ex falso, (ExF)—, and the one of a logic having
strong negations —and respecting a principle we call supplementing explosion, (sPPS).
We also consider some properties of adjunction (and so, of conjunction), and in the end
we draw a map to show the relationships between (PPS), finite trivializability, (ExF) and
(sPPS), noting that no two of these principles are to be necessarily identified (and,
in particular, ex falso does not coincide with ex contradictione).  Pay special attention
to FACT 2.10(ii), in which all non-trivial logics respecting ex falso are shown to have
strong negations.  Subsection 2.4 considers what happens when one says farewell to
(PPS) but still maintains some of the other special forms of explosion exposed be-10
fore and hints are given as to some disadvantages presented by paraconsistent logics
which disrespect all of those principles at once.  Some other misunderstandings about
the construction of paraconsistent logics are discussed, and the difference between
contradictoriness and inconsistency is finally called into scene.  Logics respecting a
so-called principle of gentle explosion, (gPPS), are introduced as the ones in which
consistency can be expressed, and even a finite version of gentle explosion, (fgPPS), is
considered, as a particular case of finite trivialization.  Logics of formal inconsistency,
LFIs, are then defined to be exactly those respecting (gPPS) while disrespecting
(PPS), and the great majority of the LFIs that we will be studying in the following
will actually also respect (fgPPS).  The new definition of consistency that we introduce
is shown, for a given logic, in general to coincide simply with the sum of (PPS) and
(PNT).  Systems of paraconsistent logic known as discussive (or discursive) logics
are shown to be representable as LFIs.  In the subsection 2.5, the principles of partial
explosion, (pPPS), and controllable explosion, (cPPS), are finally introduced.  A boldly
paraconsistent logic is defined as one in which not only (PPS) but also (pPPS) is
disrespected, and we try to concentrate exclusively on such logics.  Classical logic
respects all of the above principles, but for each of those principles, except (PNT),
examples will be explicitly presented, or at least referred to, at some point or another,
of logics disrespecting it.  Multiple connections between those principles are exhibi-
ted not only along these lines but also in the section 3.  In this respect, pay also spe-
cial attention to FACT 2.19 and the comments around it, in the subsection 2.6, which
show that the LFIs are ubiquitous: an enormous subclass of the already known
paraconsistent logics can have its members recast as logics of formal inconsistency.
C-systems are also introduced in this last subsection, and the map of the paraconsis-
tent land presented in the subsection 2.4 gets richer and richer.
Section 3 brings a very careful syntactical study of a large class of C-systems ba-
sed on classical logic.  Each new axiom is justified as it is introduced, and its effects
and counter-effects are exhibited and discussed.  The systems presented are initially
linearly ordered by extension, but soon spread out in many directions.  The remar-
kable unifying character of our approach in terms of LFIs is made clear while most
logics produced by the ‘Brazilian school’ in the last forty years or so are shown
to smoothly fit the general schema and together make up a whole coherent map
of C-land.  Subsection 3.1 presents a kind of minimal paraconsistent logic (for our
purposes), called Cmin and constructed from the positive part of classical logic by the
addition of (the axiom which represents the principle of) excluded middle, plus an
axiom for double negation elimination.  The Deduction Metatheorem holds for this
logic and its extensions, and Cmin is shown to be paraconsistent.  Comparisons are
drawn between Cmin and one of its fragments, da Costa’s Cω , and the facts that no
strong negation, or bottom particle, or finitely trivializable theory, or negated theo-
rem are to be found in these logics are mentioned.  You will also learn that, in these
logics, no two different negated formulas are provably equivalent.  Of course, as
a consequence of these last facts, these logics cannot be LFIs, what to say C-systems,
but the C-systems which will be studied in the following subsections are all extensions
of them.  We make some observations about versions of proof by cases provable
in these logics, by way of excluded middle, and we adjust some of its axioms to
better suit deduction.  A way to turn these logics into classical logic, simply by adding
back the Pseudo-Scotus to them, is also demonstrated.11
In subsection 3.2, we introduce the basic logic of (in)consistency, called bC, by
adding a new axiom to Cmin, and we show how to immediately extract from this
axiom a strong negation and a bottom particle.  We now have ‘◦’, the consistency
connective, at our disposal as a new primitive constructor in our language, realizing
the finite gentle explosion.  The logic bC, which is, in fact, a conservative extension
of Cmin, is shown already to have negated theorems and equivalent negated formulas,
but on the other hand it does not have any provably consistent formulas.  Sufficient
and necessary conditions for a bC-theory to behave classically are presented.  The
axiom defining bC define a kind of restricted Pseudo-Scotus, as obvious.  Some
related restricted forms of reductio ad absurdum which are also present are studied,
and the elimination of double negation shows its purpose in THEOREM 3.13, where
you will learn that some forms of partial trivialization are avoided by all paraconsis-
tent extensions of bC.  Restricted forms of reductio deduction and inference rules
are shown to be present in bC, and some other rules relating contradictions and con-
sistency are exhibited.  No paraconsistent extensions of bC will contain the formula
(A∧¬ A) as a bottom particle (but some other LFIs, such as Jaskowski’s D2 —at
least under some presentations— do have it as a bottom particle).  A formula such as
¬ (A∧¬ A) is also not provable in bC, but can be proved in some of its extensions,
such as the three-valued maximal paraconsistent logics LFI1 and LFI2.
Subsection 3.3 is mostly composed of negative results.  It starts by showing that
not many rules making the interdefinition of connectives possible hold in bC.  The
reader will also learn about the obligatory failure of disjunctive syllogism in vast
extensions of the paraconsistent land, and the failure of ‘full’ contraposition infe-
rence rules in bC and all of its paraconsistent extensions, though some restricted
forms of it had already been shown to hold, in the previous subsection.  The uses of
disjunctive syllogism and of contraposition to derive the Pseudo-Scotus had already
been pointed out a long ago, respectively, by C. I. Lewis (and, much before, by the
‘Pseudo-Scotus’ himself), and by Popper.  Some asymmetries related to negation of
equivalent formulas are pointed out, and as a result it will not be possible to prove
a replacement theorem for bC, which would establish the validity of intersubstituti-
vity of provable equivalents, (IpE), and the same phenomenon will be observed in
most, but not all, of bC’s extensions.  Reasons for all these failures, and possible so-
lutions for them, are discussed.
In subsection 3.4 the problem of adding an inconsistency connective ‘•’ to bC,
intended as dual to ‘◦’, making inconsistency coincide with non-consistency, and
consistency coincide with non-inconsistency, is shown to be not as easy as it may
seem, as a consequence of the last negative results.  Some intermediary logics obtained
in the strive towards the solution of this problem are exhibited, and hints are given
on how this solution should look.  A first solution, adopted, in fact, in the whole
literature, is to make inconsistency equivalent to contradiction, and this is exactly what
the logic Ci, introduced in the subsection 3.5, does.  It will not be the case, how-
ever, that consistency in Ci can be identified with the negation of a conjunction of
contradictory formulas, that is, the consistency of a formula A will not be equivalent
to any formula such as ¬ (A∧¬ A).  New forms of gentle explosion and restricted
contraposition deduction rules are shown to hold in Ci, and provably consistent for-
mulas in Ci are shown to exist.  Indeed, the notable FACT 3.32 shows that provably12
consistent formulas in Ci coincide with the formulas causing controllable explo-
sion in this logic and in all of its extensions.  Some more restricted forms of con-
traposition inference rules introduced by Ci are also exhibited, and the failure of
(IpE) also for this logic is pointed out.  In fact, as we already know that full contra-
position cannot be added to Ci in order to get (IpE), some weaker contraposition
deduction rules which would also do the job are tested, and these are also shown to
lead to collapse into classical logic (see FACT 3.36).  But there still can be a chance of
obtaining (IpE) in extensions of Ci by the addition of even weaker forms of contra-
position deduction rules, as the reader is going to see at the end of subsection 3.7, whe-
re positive results for this are shown for extensions of bC.  The connectives ‘◦’ and
‘•’ have a good behavior inside of Ci, and we show that any formula having them as
the main operator is consistently provable, and that consistency propagates through
negation (and inconsistency back-propagates through negation).  In addition to that,
schemas such as (A→¬¬ A), which are shown not to hold in the general case, are
indeed shown to hold if A has the form ◦B, for some B.  All of this comes either as an
effect or a consequence of the fact that a restricted replacement is valid in Ci, as pro-
ved in the subsection 3.6, to the effect that inconsistency here can be really introdu-
ced, by definition, as non-consistency, or else consistency can be introduced, by
definition, as non-inconsistency.
Subsection 3.7 shows how to compare the previously introduced C-systems with
an extended version of classical logic, eCPL (adding innocuous operators for con-
sistency and inconsistency).  As a result, we can show that the strong negation that
we had defined for bC does not have all properties of classical negation, but an-
other strong negation can be defined in bC, which does have a classical character.  In
Ci these two negations are shown to be equivalent, but the interesting output of a
strong classical negation is making it possible for us to conservatively translate clas-
sical logic inside of all our C-systems (THEOREM 3.46 and comments after THE-
OREM 3.48), so that any classical inference can be faithfully reproduced, up to a
translation, inside of bC or of any of its extensions.  About Ci, we can now prove
that it has some redundant axioms, and the remarkable FACT 3.50, showing that only
consistent or inconsistent formulas can themselves be consistently provable in this lo-
gic, and so these are the only formulas that can cause controllable explosion in Ci.  An
even more remarkable THEOREM 3.51 shows several conditions which cannot be
fulfilled by paraconsistent systems in order to render the proof of full replacement,
(IpE), possible.  But paraconsistent extensions of bC in which (IpE) holds are indeed
shown to exist, the same task remaining open for extensions of Ci.
Subsection 3.8 presents the dC-systems, which are the C-systems in which the
connectives ‘◦’ and ‘•’ can be dispensed, definable from some combination of the
remaining connectives.  The particular combinations chosen by da Costa in the cons-
truction of his calculi Cn are surveyed, and we start concentrating more and more
on general parallels of da Costa’s original requisites for the construction of para-
consistent calculi (which does not mean that we shall feel obliged to obey them ipsis
litteris).  Criticisms on the particular choices made by da Costa and some of their
consequences are surveyed.  Again, in a particular case, that of da Costa’s C1, the
consistency of a formula A is identified, as we have said before, with the formula
¬ (A∧¬ A), and the extension of Ci which makes this identification is called Cil.  This13
system is shown still to suffer some strange asymmetries related to the negations of
equivalent formulas (for instance, ¬ (¬ A∧ A) is not equivalent to ¬ (A∧¬ A)), and
some partial or full solutions to that are discussed at that point and below.  Connec-
tions between our C-systems and relevance or intuitionistic logics are touched.  In
particular, the problem of defining C-systems based on intuitionistic, rather than
classical, logic is touched, but no interesting solutions are presented (because they
seem still not to exist, but perhaps the reader will have the pleasure of finding them
in the future).
In subsection 3.9, dC-systems are put aside for a moment and the addition of
an axiom for the introduction of double negation is considered, together with its con-
sequences.  Arguments, both positive and negative, for the ‘proliferation of incon-
sistencies’ that such an axiom could cause are presented, and rejected.  Subsection
3.10 surveys various ways in which consistency (and inconsistency) can propagate
from simpler to more complex formulas and vice-versa.  One of these forms, perhaps
the most basic one, is illustrated by an extension of Ci, the logic Cia (or else an
extension of Cia, the logic Cila, which was recorded into history under the name
C1), and this logic will be shown to make possible a new and interesting conservati-
ve translation from classical logic inside of it, or any of its extensions.  If all the
reader wants to know about is da Costa’s original calculi Cn, this subsection is the
place (together with some earlier comments in the subsection 3.7), but in that case
be warned: You may miss most of the fun!  Properties of the Cn are surveyed, and
the problem of finding a real deductive limit to this hierarchy is presented together
with its solution, so that the reader can forget once and for all any ideas they may have
had about the logic Cω  having its place as part of this hierarchy.  In particular, the
deductive limit of the Cn, the logic CLim, is shown to constitute an LFI, though we are
not sure if its form of gentle explosion can be made finite.  Again, (IpE) is shown
not to hold for the calculi Cn, so that Lindenbaum-Tarski-like algebraizations for the-
se logics can be forgotten, but the situation for them is actually worse, for it has been
proven that they just cannot define any non-trivial congruence, putting aside also the
possibility of finding Blok-Pigozzi-like algebraizations for them.  But several extensi-
ons of the Cn can indeed fix this last problem, and so we try to concentrate on some
stronger forms of propagation of consistency which will help us with this.  In parti-
cular, the logics C1
+ (later proposed by da Costa and his disciples), as well as five
three-valued logics, P
1, P
2, P
3, LFI1 and LFI2, proposed in several studies, are also
axiomatized and studied as extensions of Ci.  An increasingly detailed and clear map
of the C-systems based on classical logic is being drawn.
In the subsection 3.11, the last five three-valued logics are shown to constitute part
of a much larger family of 8,192 three-valued paraconsistent logics, each of them
proven to be axiomatizable as extensions of Ci containing suitable axioms for pro-
pagation of consistency.  Each of these three-valued logics can also be shown to be
distinct from all of the others, and maximal relative to classical logic, eCPL, sol-
ving one of the main requisites set down by da Costa, to the effect that ‘most rules
and schemas of classical logic’ should be provable in a ‘good’ paraconsistent logic.
We also count how many of those 8,192 logics are in fact dC-systems, and not only
C-systems, and show many connections between them and the other logics presented
before, all of them fragments of some of these three-valued maximal paraconsistent14
logics.  Interestingly, P
1 is shown to be conservatively translatable inside of any of the
other three-valued logics, and all of these are shown to be conservatively translata-
ble inside of LFI1.  (IpE) is proven not to hold in any of these logics, but there are
some other interesting connectives which they can define, as some sort of ‘highly’
classical negation, and congruences which will make possible, in subsection 3.12, the
definition of non-trivial (Blok-Pigozzi) algebraizations of all of these three-valued
logics.  Indeed, the subsection 3.12 surveys positive and negative results regarding
algebraizations of the C-systems.
Section 4 sets some exciting open problems and directions for further research, for
the reader’s recreation.
1.4  Standing on the shoulders of each other.  It would be very unwise of us to pre-
sent this study, which includes a technical survey of its area, without trying to connect
it as much as possible to the rest of the related literature.  But we pledge to have done
our very best to highlight, wherever opportune, some of the relevant papers which
come close or very close to our points, or on which we simply base our study at some
points!  As in the case of the famous legendary caliph who set the books of the
library of Alexandria on fire, we could say that the relevant papers which are not
cited here at some point or another are, in most cases, either blasphemous (meaning
that there is no context here for them to be mentioned), or unnecessary (meaning
that in general you have to go no farther than the bibliography of our bibliography
to learn about them).  Other options would be our total ignorance about such and
such papers at the moment of writing this (about which we thank for any enlighten-
ment that we might receive), or else because we felt it was already well represented by
another publication on the same matter, or because it integrates our list of future
research (that was a good excuse, wasn’t it?).  Or perhaps it was not relevant at all!
(You wouldn’t know that, would you?)  Read the text and judge for yourself.  We just
want to mention in this subsection a few other papers whose structural or methodologi-
cal similarity (or dissimilarity) to some of our themes is most striking —so that we can
better highlight our own originality on some topics, whenever it becomes the case.
Our study in section 2 is totally situated at the level of a general theory of conse-
quence relations, a field sometimes referred to as that of General Abstract Logics
(cf. [111]), or Universal Logic (cf. [19]).  There are a few (rare) papers dealing
with the definitions of the logical principles at a purely logical level.  One of
them is Restall’s [99], where an approach to the matter quite different from ours is
tackled.  Also starting from the definition of logic as determined by its consequence
relation (even though monotonicity is not pressuposed), and assuming from the
start that an adjunctive conjunction is available, the author also requires one sort of
contraposition deduction rule to be valid for all of the negations he considers (some-
thing that, in most logics herein studied, does not hold), and fixes the relevance logic R
in the formulation of most of his results.  Several versions of the ‘law’ of non-
contradiction are then presented, starting from the outright identification of this prin-
ciple with the principle of explosion, passing through the identification of the
principle of non-contradiction with the principle of excluded middle, or with the
validity of the formula ¬ (A∧¬ A), and going up to some sort of difference in degree
between accepting the inference of all propositions at once from some given formula
(A∧¬ A) instead of accepting each at a turn.  It is clear that the outcome of all this
is completely diverse from what we propose here.  Some other studies go so far as to15
also study some of the alternative forms of explosion that we concentrate on here.
This is the case, for instance, for Batens’s [10], and Urbas’s [108].  We are unaware,
however, of any study which has taken these alternative forms as far as we do, and
have studied them in precise and detailed terms.  Such a study is presumed to be
essential to help clarify the foundations, the nature and the reach of paraconsistent
logics.  There have been, for instance, arguments to the effect that the negations of  para-
consistent logics are not (or may not be) negation operators after all (cf. Slater’s [104]
and Béziau’s [23]).  Béziau’s argument amounts to a request for the definition of
some minimal ‘positive properties’ in order to characterize paraconsistent negation
really as constituting a negation operator, instead of something else.  Slater argues for
the inexistence of paraconsistent logics, given that their negation operator is not a
‘contradictory forming functor’, but just a ‘subcontrary forming one’, recovering and
extending an earlier argument from Priest & Routley in [93].  Evidently, the same
argument about not being a contradictory forming functor applies as well to intui-
tionistic negation, or in general to any other negation which does not have a classi-
cal behavior.  Regardless of whether you wish to call such an operator ‘negation’ or
something else, the negations of paraconsistent logics had better be studied under a
less biased perspective, by the investigation of general properties that they can or
cannot display inside paraconsistent logics.  Some good examples of that kind of
critical study may be found not only in the present paper but also in Avron’s [9],
Béziau’s [18], and especially Lenzen’s [70], among others.
In section 3 we investigate C-systems based on classical logic.  In this respect, the
present study has at least one very important ancestor, namely Batens’s [10], where
a general investigation of logics extending the positive classical logic (not all of them
being C-systems!) is presented.  This same author has also presented, elsewhere one
of the best arguments that may be used to support our approach in terms of logics of
formal inconsistency, LFIs.  Criticizing Priest’s logic LP (cf. [90]), Batens insists that:
There simply is no way to express, within this logic, that B is not false or that B behaves
consistently.  (Cf. [13], p.216)
Asserting that ‘paraconsistent negation should not and cannot express rejection’ (id.,
p.223), Batens wants to say that it is not because a negated sentence ¬ B is inferred
from some non-trivial theory of a paraconsistent logic that we can conclude that B
is not also to be inferred from that, i.e. ¬ B does not express the rejection of B.  From
that he will draw several lessons along his article, such as that: (i) the presence of a
strong negation (he writes ‘classical negation’, but this is clearly an extrapolation
—see our note 15, in the subsection 3.7) inside of a paraconsistent logic is not only a
sufficient requisite but also a necessary one to express (classical) rejection; (ii) that
one needs a controllably explosive paraconsistent logic (he calls it ‘non-strictly para-
consistent’) to be able to ‘fully describe classical logic’ (id., p.225); (iii) that the exis-
tence of a bottom particle is also sufficient for the above purposes, for it may define a
strong negation (this appeared in an addenda to the paper).  So, all at once, this author
argues for the validity of three of our alternative explosion principles: (sPPS), (cPPS),
and (ExF).  From these, of course, we already know (see FACT 2.19) that our prin-
ciple (gPPS) will often follow, so that according to his recommendations we are fi-
nally left with LFIs, instead of something like Priest’s logic, which, again according to
Batens, and for the above reasons, ‘fails to capture natural thinking’ (though it was
proposed to such an effect), and does not provide sufficient environment for us to do16
‘paraconsistent mathematics’.  Priest’s response to such criticisms seems to us to be
somewhat of a cheat, for he proposes to introduce such a strong negation using an
ill-defined bottom particle (see note 25, in the subsection 3.10).  The only point
where Batens goes too far to be right seems to be on his argument about paracon-
sistent logics not being adequate to be used on our metalanguage, because we would
be in need of strong negations to complete any consistent description of the world.
But now we know that an LFI would be more than enough to such an end, being able
to fully reproduce all the classical inferences (THEOREM 3.46).  And do remember
that LFIs are especially tailored in order to express the fact that B behaves consis-
tently, attending, thus, to Batens’s requisite above (and also to his praxis, given that
he has already been using in his articles, since long, some symbol to express incon-
sistency in the object language, be it just an abbreviation or some sort of metacon-
nective —check the symbol ‘!’ in [15]).
The very idea of a paraconsistent logic still has, nowadays, as strong defenders as
attackers.  Though, as we know, many attacks are but misunderstandings, many de-
fenses are also poor or unsound.  We hope here to contribute to this debate, in one
way or another, combining as much precision and clarity as we can.  At a more fun-
damental philosophical level, also, paraconsistency has raised diverse excited opin-
ions about the contribution (or damage) it makes to the very notion of rationality.
An author such as Mario Bunge will on the one hand compare the Pseudo-Scotus with
some sort of cancer (cf. [32], p.17), and on the other hand observe that ‘a refined sym-
bolism can hide a brazen irrationalism’ (id., p.23).  He asserts that paraconsistent logic
is non-rational by definition, because ‘it does not include the principle of non-contra-
diction’ (id., p.24).  About this same point other authors will concede similar verdicts,
and yet arrive at different conclusions.  As Gilles-Gaston Granger put it, paraconsis-
tent logics can be seen as a ‘provisory recourse to the irrational’, for maintaining an
indicium of the rational (sic), namely the principle of non-trivialization, while also
maintaining an indicium of the irrational, namely the possible presence of contra-
dictions, to be ‘philosophically justified’ (cf. [65], p.175).  Yet some other authors,
such as Newton da Costa, defended that, according to some pragmatic principles of
reason which ‘seem to be present in all processes of systematization of rational
knowledge’, this same rational knowledge can be said, among other things, to be
both intuitive and discursive, to result from the interaction of the spirit and its envi-
rons, and not to be identifiable with a particular system of logic.  About reason,
on its own turn, he maintained that it is tied to its historical evolution, has its range
of application determinable only pragmatically, and is always expressible by
way of some logic, which, in each case, is supposed to be uniquely determined by
each given context, as being precisely the logic that is most adequate to that context.
To determine the concept of adequacy, finally, da Costa recurs again to pragmatic fac-
tors, such as simplicity, convenience, facility, economy, and so on (cf. [51]).  This is in
fact a very thought-provoking issue, and several other authors have advanced posi-
tions on the relations of paraconsistency and rationality, such as Francisco Miró Que-
sada (in [81] and [80]), Nicholas Rescher (in [98]), Jean-Yves Béziau (in [23]), and
Bobenrieth (in [26]).  The reader is invited to read those authors directly, if this is  their
interest.  We will not venture here any further steps in this slippery slope, for our
aim is much less ambitious.  After reading this comprehensive technical survey, how-
ever, we hope that the reader will feel illuminated enough to risk their own rationally-
based judgements on the matter.17
2  A PARACONSISTENT LOGIC IS A PARACONSISTENT LOGIC IS…
Logic is the chosen resort of clear-headed people, severally convinced of
the complete adequacy of their doctrines.  It is such a pity that they cannot
agree with each other.
—A. N. Whitehead, “Harvard: The Future”, Atlantic Monthly 158, p. 263.
Many a logician will agree that the fundamental notion behind logic is the notion of
‘derivation’, or rather should we say the notion of ‘consequence’.  On that account, in
our common heritage it is to be found the Tarskian notion of a consequence relation.
As usual, given a set For of formulas, we say that ￿⊆℘ (For)× For defines a con-
sequence relation on For if the following clauses hold, for any formulas A and B,
and subsets Γ  and ∆  of For: (formulas and commas at the left-hand side of ￿ de-
note, as usual, sets and unions of sets of formulas)
  (Con1)  A∈Γ   ⇒   Γ  ￿ A (reflexivity)
  (Con2)  (∆  ￿ A and ∆⊆Γ )  ⇒   Γ  ￿ A (monotonicity)
  (Con3)  (∆  ￿ A and Γ , A ￿ B)  ⇒   ∆ , Γ  ￿ B (transitivity)
So, a logic L will here be defined simply as a structure of the form < For, ￿> , con-
taining a set of formulas and a consequence relation defined on this set.  We need not
suppose at this point that the set For should be endowed with any additional structure,
like the usual algebraic one, but we will hereby suppose, for convenience, that For
is built on a denumerable language having ¬  as its (primitive or defined) negation
symbol, and we will also suppose the connectives to be constructing operators on the set
of formulas.  Any set Γ⊆ For is called a theory of L.  A theory Γ  is said to be proper
if Γ≠ For, and a theory Γ  is said to be closed if it contains all of its consequences,
i.e. if the converse of (Con1) holds: Γ  ￿ A  ⇒   A∈Γ .  Whenever we have, in a
given logic, that Γ  ￿ A, for a given theory Γ  and some formula A, we will say that A
is inferred from Γ  (in this logic); if, for all Γ , we have that Γ  ￿ A, that is, if A is
inferred from any given theory, we will say that A is a thesis (of this logic).
Not all known logics respect all the above clauses, or only them.  For instance, those
logics in which (Con2) is either dropped out or substituted by a form of ‘cautious
monotonicity’ are called non-monotonic, and the logics whose consequence relations
are closed under substitution are called structural.  Unless explicitly stated to the con-
trary, we will from now on be working with some fixed arbitrary logic L=< For, ￿> ,
and with some fixed arbitrary theory Γ  of L.  Properties (Con1)–(Con3) will be as-
sumed to hold irrestrictedly, and they will be used in some proofs here and there.
Some interesting and quite immediate consequences from (Con2) and (Con3) which
we shall make use of are the following:
FACT 2.1  The following properties hold for any logic, any given theories Γ  and ∆ ,
and any formulas A and B:
  (i)  Γ , ∆  ￿ / A  ⇒   Γ  ￿ / A;
  (ii)  (Γ  ￿ A and A ￿ B)  ⇒   Γ  ￿ B;
  (iii)  (Γ  ￿ A and Γ , A ￿ B)  ⇒   Γ  ￿ B.
Proof:   (i) follows from (Con2); (ii) and (iii), from (Con3). ￿
Given two logics L1=< For1, ￿1>  and L2=< For2, ￿2> , we will say that L1 is a
linguistic extension of L2 if For2 is a proper subset of For1, and we will say that L118
is a deductive extension of L2 if ￿2 is a proper subset of ￿1.  Finally, if L1 is both a
linguistic and deductive extension of L2, and if the restriction of L1’s consequence
relation ￿1 to the set For2 will make it identical to ￿2 (that is, if For2⊂ For1, and for
any Γ∪ {A}⊆ For2 we have that Γ  ￿1 A ⇔  Γ  ￿2 A) then we will say that L1 is a
conservative extension of L2.  In any of the above cases we can more generally say
that L1 is an extension of L2, or that L2 is a fragment of L1.  These concepts will
be used mainly in the next section, where we will build and compare a number of para-
consistent logics.  Just as a guiding note to the reader, however, we could remark that
usually, but not obligatorily, linguistic extensions are also deductive ones, but it is quite
easy to find in the realm of non-classical logics, on the other hand, deductive fragments
which are not linguistic ones (like intuitionistic logic is a deductive fragment of clas-
sical logic).  Most paraconsistent logics in the literature are also deductive fragments
of classical logic themselves, but the ones we shall be working on here, the C-systems,
are in general deductive fragments only of a conservative extension of classical logic
—by the addition of (explicitly definable) connectives expressing consistency / incon-
sistency).  A particular case of them, the dC-systems, will nevertheless be shown to be
characterizable as deductive fragments of good old classical logic, dispensing its men-
tioned extension.  But these assertions will be made much clearer in the near future.
Let Γ  be a theory of L.  We say that Γ  is contradictory with respect to ¬ , or simply
contradictory, if it is such that, for some formula A, we have Γ  ￿ A and Γ  ￿ ¬ A.
With some abuse of notation, but (hopefully) no risk of misunderstanding, we will
from now on write these sort of sentences in the following way:
∃ A (Γ  ￿ A  and  Γ  ￿ ¬ A). (D1)
For any such formula A we may also say that Γ  is A-contradictory, or simply that A is
contradictory for such a theory Γ  (and such an underlying logic L).  It follows that:
FACT 2.2  For a given theory  Γ : (i) If { A, ¬ A}⊆Γ  then Γ  is A-contradictory.  (ii) If Γ
is both A-contradictory and closed, then { A, ¬ A}⊆Γ .
Proof:   Part (i) comes from (Con1), part (ii) from the very definition of a closed theory. ￿
A theory Γ  is said to be trivial if it is such that:
∀ B (Γ  ￿ B). (D2)
Hence, a trivial theory can make no difference between the formulas of a logic —
all of them may be inferred from it.  Of course, using (Con1) we may notice that
the non-proper theory For is trivial.  We may also immediately conclude that:
FACT 2.3  Contradictoriness is a necessary condition for triviality in a given
theory. (D2) ⇒  (D1)
A theory Γ  is said to be explosive if:
∀ A∀ B (Γ , A, ¬ A ￿ B). (D3)
Thus, a theory is called explosive if it trivializes when exposed to a pair of contra-
dictory formulas.  Evidently:
FACT 2.4  (i) If a theory is trivial, then it is explosive.  (ii) If a theory is contradic-
tory and explosive, then it is trivial. (D2) ⇒  (D3); (D1) and (D3) ⇒  (D2)
Proof:   Use (Con2) in the first part and FACT 2.1(iii) in the second. ￿19
2.1  A question of principles.  Now, remember that talking about a logic is talking
about the inferential behavior of a set of theories.  Accordingly, using the above defi-
nitions, we will now say that a given logic L is contradictory if all of its theories
are contradictory. (D4)
In much the same spirit, we will say that L is trivial, or explosive, if, respectively,
all of its theories are trivial, or explosive. respect. (D5), (D6)
The empty theory may be here regarded as playing an important role, revealing
some intrinsic properties of a given logic, in spite of the behavior of any of its specific
non-empty theories (also called ‘non-logical axioms’).  Indeed:
FACT 2.5  A monotonic logic L is contradictory / trivial / explosive if, and only if, its
empty theory is contradictory / trivial / explosive.
We can now tackle a formal definition for some of the so-called logical princi-
ples (relativized for a given logic L), namely:
PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION (PNC)
L must be non-contradictory:  ∃Γ∀ A (Γ  ￿ / A  or  Γ  ￿ / ¬ A).
PRINCIPLE OF NON-TRIVIALITY (PNT)
L must be non-trivial:  ∃Γ∃ B (Γ  ￿ / B).
PRINCIPLE OF EXPLOSION, or PRINCIPLE OF PSEUDO-SCOTUS
3 (PPS)
L must be explosive:  ∀Γ∀ A∀ B (Γ , A, ¬ A ￿ B).
This last principle is also often referred to as ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet.
The reader will immediately notice that these principles are somewhat interrelated:
FACT 2.6  (i) An explosive logic is contradictory if, and only if, it is trivial.  (ii) A
trivial logic is both contradictory and explosive.  (iii) A logic in which the Principle
of Explosion holds is a trivial one if, and only if, the Principle of Non-Contradiction
fails. (D6) ⇒  [(D4) ⇔  (D5)]; (D5) ⇒  [(D4) and (D6)];
(PPS) ⇒  [not-(PNT) ⇔  not-(PNC)]
Proof:   Just consider FACT 2.4, and the definitions above. ￿
A trivial logic, i.e. a logic in which (PNT) fails, cannot be a very interesting one,
for in such a logic anything could be inferred from anything, and any intended
capability of modeling ‘sensible’ reasoning would then collapse.  Of course, (PPS)
would still hold in such a logic, as well as any other universally quantified sentence
dealing with the behavior of its consequence relation, but this time only because
they would be unfalsifiable!  It is readily comprehensible then that triviality might
have been regarded as the mathematician’s worst nightmare.  Indeed, (PNT) con-
stituted what Hilbert called ‘consistency (or compatibility) principle’, with which
proof his Metamathematical enterprise was crafted to cope.  Well aware of the pre-
ceding fact, and working inside the environment of an explosive logic such as clas-
sical logic, Hilbert transposed the ‘problem of consistency’ (that is, the problem of
non-triviality) to the problem of proving that there were no contradictions among
the axioms of arithmetic and their consequences (this was Hilbert’s Second Problem,
cf. [66]).  By the way, this situation would eventually lead Hilbert to the formulation
of a curious criterion according to which the non-contradictoriness of a mathematical
                                                  
3 Which was made visible by a reedition of a collection of commentaries on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics,
long attributed, in error, to Johannes Duns Scotus (1266-1308), in the twelve books of the Opera Omnia,
1639 (reprint 1968).  The current most plausible conjecture about the authorship of these books will
trace them back to John of Cornwall, around 1350.  See [26] for more on its history.20
object is a necessary and sufficient condition for its very existence.
4  Perhaps he would
have never proposed such a criterion if he had only considered the existence of non-
explosive logics, with or without (PNC), logics in which contradictory theories do
not necessarily lead to trivialization!  The search for such logics would give rise,
much later, to the ‘paraconsistent enterprise’.
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In classical logic, of course, all the three principles above hold, and one could na-
ively speculate from such that they are all ‘equivalent’, in some sense.  Indeed, they
have all been now and again confused in the literature and each one of them has, in
turn, been identified with the ‘Principle of Non-Contradiction’ (and these will not
exhaust all formulations of this last principle that have been proposed here and there).
The emergence of paraconsistent logic, as we shall see, will serve to show that this
equivalence is far from being necessary, for an arbitrary logic L.
2.2  The paraconsistency predicament.  Some decades ago, S. Jaskowski ([67]) and
N. C. A. da Costa ([49]), the founders of paraconsistent logic, proposed, independently,
the study of logics which could accommodate contradictory yet non-trivial theories.
Accordingly, a paraconsistent logic (a denomination which would be coined only in
the seventies, by Miró Quesada) would be initially defined as a logic such that:
∃Γ∃ A∃ B (Γ  ￿ A  and  Γ  ￿ ¬ A  and  Γ  ￿ / B). (PL1)
Attention: This definition says not that (PNC) is not to hold in such a logic, for it
says nothing about all theories of a paraconsistent logic being contradictory, but only
that some of them should be contradictory, and yet non-trivial.  As a consequence,
following our definitions above, the notion of paraconsistent logic has, in principle,
nothing to do with the rejection of the Principle of Non-Contradiction, as it is com-
monly held!  On the other hand, it surely has something to do with the rejection of
explosiveness.  Indeed, consider the following alternative definition of a paracon-
sistent logic, as a logic in which (PPS) fails:
∃Γ∃ A∃ B (Γ , A, ¬ A ￿ / B). (PL2)
Now one may easily check that:
FACT 2.7  (PL1) and (PL2) are equivalent ways of defining a paraconsistent logic,
if its consequence relation is reflexive and transitive.
[(Con1) and (Con3)] ⇒  [(PL1) ⇔  (PL2)]
                                                  
4 Girolamo Saccheri (1667-1733) had already paved the way much before to set non-contradictoriness,
instead of intuitiveness, as a sufficient, other than necessary, criterion for the legitimateness of a mathe-
matical theory (cf. [1]).  The so-called ‘Hilbert’s criterion for existence in mathematics’ seems thus to
constitute a further step in taking this method to its ultimate consequences.
5 Assuming intuitively (cf. [46], p.7) that a contradiction could painlessly be admitted in a given the-
ory if only this theory was not to be trivialized by it, even some years before the actual proposal of his
first paraconsistent systems, da Costa was eventually led to trace the Metamathematical’s problem
about the utility of a formal system back to (PNT).  At that point da Costa was even to suggest that
Hilbert’s criterium for existence in mathematics should be changed, and that existence, in mathema-
tics, should be equated with non-triviality, rather than with non-contradictoriness (cf. [47], p.18).  To be
more precise about this point, da Costa has in fact recovered Quine’s motto ([96], chapter I): ‘to be is to
be the value of a variable’ —from which follows that the ontological commitment of our theories is to
be measured by the domain of its variables—, and then proposed the following modification to it: ‘to
be is to be the value of a variable, in a given language of a given logic’ (cf. [52], and the entry ‘Paracon-
sistency’ in [33]).  This was meant to open space for the appearance of different ontologies based on di-
fferent kinds of logic, analogously to what had happened in the XIX century with the appearance of
different geometries based on different sets of axioms.21
Proof:   To show that (PL1) implies (PL2), use (Con3), or directly FACT 2.1; to show
the converse, use (Con1). ￿
Say that two formulas A and B are equivalent if each one of them can be inferred
from the other, that is:
(A ￿ B)  and  (B ￿ A). (Eq1)
In a similar manner, say that two sets of formulas Γ  and ∆  are equivalent if:
∀ A∈∆  (Γ  ￿ A)  and  ∀ B∈Γ  (∆  ￿ B). (Eq2)
We will alternatively denote these facts by writing, respectively, A ￿|￿ B, and Γ  ￿|￿ ∆ .
Now, an essential trait of a paraconsistent logic is that it does not see all contra-
dictions at the same light —each one is a different story.  Indeed:
FACT 2.8  Given any arbitrary transitive paraconsistent logic, it cannot be the case
that all of its contradictions are equivalent.
Proof:   If, for whatever formulas A and B, we have that {A, ¬ A} ￿|￿ {B, ¬ B},
then any A-contradictory theory, would also be, by transitivity and definition (Eq2),
a B-contradictory theory.  But if a theory infers every pair of contradictory formu-
las, it infers, in particular, any given formula at all, and so it is trivial. ￿
Once again, the reader should note that the existence of a paraconsistent logic L
presupposes only the existence of some non-explosive theories in L; this does not
mean that all theories of L should be non-explosive —and how could they all be so?
(recall FACT 2.4(i))  Moreover, once more according to our proposed definitions, the
reader will soon notice that the great majority of the paraconsistent logics found in the
literature, and all the paraconsistent logics studied in this paper, are non-contradictory
(i.e. ‘consistent’, following the usual model-theoretic connotation of the word).  In par-
ticular, they usually have non-contradictory empty theories, which means, from a proof-
theoretical point of view, that they bring no built-in contradiction in their axioms, and
that their inference rules do not generate contradictions from these axioms.  Even
so, because of their paraconsistent character, they can still be used as underlying
logics to extract some sensible reasoning of some theories that are contradictory
and are still to be kept non-trivial.  This phenomenon is no miracle, and certainly no
sleight of hand, as the reader will understand below, but is obtained from suitable con-
straints on the power of explosiveness, (PPS).  So, all paraconsistent logics which we
will present here are in some sense ‘more conservative’ than classical logic, in the
sense that they will extract less consequences than classical logic would extract from
some given classical theory, or at most the same set of consequences, but never more.
Our paraconsistent logics then (as most paraconsistent logics in the literature) will
not validate any bizarre form of reasoning, and will not extract any contradictory
consequence in the cases where classically there were no such consequences.  It
is nonetheless possible to also build logics which disrespect both (PPS) and (PNC),
and thus might be said to be ‘highly’ non-classical, in a certain sense, once they do
have theses which are not classical theses.  Such logics will constitute a particular
case of paraconsistent logics that are generally dubbed dialectical logics, or logics
of impossible objects, and some specimens of these may be found, for instance, in
[56], [83], [88], and [100].  We will not study these kind of logics here.
We shall, from now on, make use of either one of the above definitions for para-
consistent logic, indistinctly.22
2.3  The trivializing predicament.  Given (PL1), we know that any paraconsistent
logic must possess contradictory non-trivial theories, and from (PL2) we know that
these must be non-explosive.  Evidently, not all theories of a given logic can be such:
we already also know that any trivial theory is both contradictory and explosive, and
every logic has trivial theories (consider, for instance, the non-proper theory For, i.e.
the whole set of formulas).  It is possible, though, and in fact very interesting, to further
explore this no man’s land which lays in between plain non-explosiveness and out-
right explosiveness, if one considers some paraconsistent logics having some suitable
explosive proper theories.  That is what we will do in the following subsections.
A logic L is said to be finitely trivializable when it has finite trivial theories. (D7)
Evidently:
FACT 2.9  If a logic is explosive, then it is finitely trivializable. (D6) ⇒  (D7)
Proof:   All theories of an explosive logic are explosive, in particular the empty one.
Thus, for any A, the finite theory {A, ¬ A} is trivial. ￿
This same fact does not hold for non-explosive logics.  In fact, we will present, in
the following, a few paraconsistent logics which are not finitely trivializable, al-
though these shall, in general, not concern us in this article, for reasons which will
soon be made clear.  Let us first state and study some few more simple definitions.
A logic L has a bottom particle if there is some formula C in L that can, by itself,
trivialize the logic, that is:
∃ C∀Γ∀ B (Γ , C ￿ B). (D8)
We will denote any fixed such particle, when it exists, by ⊥ .  Evidently, no arbitrary
monotonic and transitive logic can have a bottom particle as a thesis, under pain of
turning this logic into a trivial logic —in which, of course, all formulas turn to be
bottom particles.
It is instructive here to remember another formulation of (PPS) which sometimes
shows up in the literature:
PRINCIPLE OF ‘EX FALSO SEQUITUR QUODLIBET’ (ExF)
L must have a bottom particle.
Now, if we are successful in isolating logics that disrespect (PPS) while still re-
specting (ExF) we will show that ex contradictione (sequitur quodlibet) does not
need to be identified with ex falso (sequitur quodlibet), as is quite commonly held.
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We say that a logic L has a top particle if there is some formula C in L that is a
consequence of every one of its theories, no matter what, that is:
∃ C∀Γ  (Γ  ￿ C). (D9)
We will denote any fixed such particle, when it exists, by  .  Evidently, given a
monotonic logic, any of its theses will constitute such a top particle (and logics with
no theses, like Kleene’s three-valued logic, will have no such particles).  Also, given
transitivity and monotonicity, it is easy to see that the addition of a top particle to a
given theory is pretty innocuous, for in that case (Γ ,   ￿ B) if and only if (Γ  ￿ B).
Let L now be some logic, let σ : For→For be a mapping (if For comes equipped
with some additional structure, we will require σ  to be an endomorphism), and let
this mapping be such that σ (A) is to denote a formula which depends only on A.  By
this we shall mean that σ (A) is a formula constructed using but A itself and some
                                                  
6 And yet this separation between these two principles can already be found in the work of the Pseudo-
Scotus (see [26], chapter V, section 2.3).23
purely logical symbols (such as connectives, quantifiers, constants).  In more general
terms, given any sequence of formulas A1, A2, …, An, we will let σ (A1, A2, …, An)
denote a formula which depends only on the formulas of the sequence.  Similarly,
we will let Γ (A1, A2, …, An) denote a set of formulas each of which depends only on
the sequence A1, A2, …, An.  In some situations it will help to assume this σ  to be
a schema, that is, that given any two sequences A1, A2, …, An and B1, B2, …, Bn,
we must have that σ (A1, A2, …, An) will be made identical to σ (B1, B2, …, Bn) if we
only change each Ai for Bi, in σ (A1, A2, …, An) (this means, in some sense, that all
these σ -formulas will share some built-in logical form).  Usually, when saying that
we have a formula, or set of formulas, depending only on some given sequence of for-
mulas, we further presuppose that this dependency is schematic, but this supposition
will in general be not strictly necessary to our purposes.
We say that a logic L has a strong (or supplementing) negation if there is a schema
σ (A), depending only on A, that does not consists, in general, of a bottom particle and
that cannot be added to any theory inferring A without causing its trivialization, that is:
(a) ∃ A such that σ (A) is not a bottom particle, and
(b) ∀ A∀Γ∀ B [Γ , A, σ (A) ￿ B]. (D10)
We will denote the strong negation of a formula A, when it exists, by ~A.
Parallel to the definition of contradictoriness with respect to ¬ , we might now de-
fine a theory Γ  to be contradictory with respect to ~ if it is such that:
∃ A (Γ  ￿ A  and  Γ  ￿ ~A). (D11)
Accordingly, a logic L is said to be contradictory with respect to ~ if all of its theo-
ries are contradictory with respect to ~. (D12)
Here we may of course introduce yet another version of (PPS):
SUPPLEMENTING PRINCIPLE OF EXPLOSION (sPPS)
L must have a strong negation.
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Some immediate consequences of the last definitions are:
FACT 2.10  (i) If a logic has either a bottom particle or a strong negation, then it is
finitely trivializable.  (ii) If a non-trivial logic has a bottom particle, then it admits a
strong negation.  (iii) If a logic is explosive and non-trivial, then it is supplement-
ing explosive. [(D8) or (D10)] ⇒  (D7); [not-(D5) and (D8)] ⇒  (D10);
[(PNT) and (ExF)] ⇒  (sPPS); [(PPS) and (PNT)] ⇒  (sPPS)
Proof:   (i) is obvious.  To prove (ii), define the strong negation ~A of a formula A
by stipulating that, for any theories Γ  and ∆ , we have (a) (Γ , ∆  ￿ ~A) iff (Γ , ∆ , A ￿ ⊥ ),
and (b) (Γ , ∆ , ~A ￿ ⊥ ) iff (Γ , ∆  ￿ A).  By (Con1), we have that (Γ , ~A ￿ ~A), and
so, part (a) will give us (Γ , ~A, A ￿ ⊥ ), choosing ∆ ={~A}.  But ⊥  ￿ B, for any for-
mula B, once ⊥  is a bottom particle.  So, by FACT 2.1(ii), we conclude that (Γ , A,
~A ￿ B), for any B.  Now, to check that such a strong negation, thus defined, cannot
be always a bottom particle, notice that part (b) will give us ￿ A iff ~A ￿ ⊥ , choos-
ing both Γ  and ∆  to be empty.  So, if ~A were a bottom particle, ~A ￿ ⊥  would be
the case, and hence any A would be a thesis of this logic, which is not the case, once
we have supposed it to be non-trivial.
8  To check (iii), just note that a non-trivial ex-
                                                  
7 A strong negation should not be confused with a ‘classical’ one!  Take a look at THEOREM 3.42.
8 In the presence of a convenient implication, for instance, obeying the Deduction Metatheorem (THEO-
REM 3.1) such an ‘implicit’ definition of a strong negation from a bottom particle can be internalized by
the underlying logic as an ‘explicit’ definition (as in the case of intuitionistic logic).  Check also our remarks
about this matter in our discussion of Beth Definability Property, at the end of the subsection 3.12.24
plosive logic will come already equipped with a built-in strong negation, coinciding
with its own primitive negation. ￿
FACT 2.11  Let L be a logic with a strong negation ~.  (i) Every theory which is
contradictory with respect to ~ is explosive.  (ii) A logic is contradictory with re-
spect to ~ if, and only if, it is trivial. (D11) ⇒  (D3); (D12) ⇔  (D5)
A logic L is said to be left-adjunctive if for any two formulas A and B there is a
schema σ (A, B), depending only on A and B, with the following behavior:
(a) ∃ A∃ B such that σ (A, B) is not a bottom particle, and
(b) ∀ A∀ B∀Γ∀ D [Γ , A, B ￿ D  ⇒   Γ , σ (A, B) ￿ D]. (D13)
Such a formula, when it exists, will be denoted by (A∧ B), and the sign ∧  will be called
a left-adjunctive conjunction (but it will not necessarily have, of course, all proper-
ties of a classical conjunction).  Similarly, a logic L is said to be left-disadjunctive
if there is a schema σ (A, B), depending only on A and B, such that (D12) is some-
what inverted, that is:
(a) ∃ A∃ B such that σ (A, B) is not a top particle, and
(b) ∀ A∀ B∀Γ∀ D [Γ , σ (A, B) ￿ D  ⇒   Γ , A, B ￿ D]. (D14)
In general, whenever there is no risk of misunderstanding, we might also denote this
formula, when it exists, by A∧ B, and we will accordingly call ∧  a left-disadjunctive
conjunction.  Now, one should be aware of the fact that, in principle, a logic can
have just one of these conjunctions, or it can have both a left-adjunctive and a left-
disadjunctive conjunction without the two of them coinciding.
To convince themselves of the naturalness of these definitions and the comments
we made about them, we invite the reader to consider the following two more ‘con-
crete’ properties of conjunction:
(a) ∃ A∃ B such that A∧ B is not a bottom particle, and
(b) ∀Γ∀ A∀ B (Γ , A∧ B ￿ A  and  Γ , A∧ B ￿ B). (pC1)
(a) ∃ A∃ B such that A∧ B is not a top particle, and
(b) ∀Γ∀ A∀ B (Γ , A, B ￿ A∧ B). (pC2)
Now, it is easy to see that:
FACT 2.12  Let L be a logic obeying (Con1)–(Con3).  (i) A conjunction in L is left-
adjunctive iff it respects (pC1).  (ii) A conjunction in L is left-disadjunctive iff it
respects (pC2). [(Con1)–(Con3)] ⇒  {[(D13) ⇔  (pC1)] and [(D14) ⇔  (pC2)]}
Proof:   To prove that a left-adjunctive conjunction respects (pC1) and that a left-
disadjunctive conjunction respects (pC2), use (Con1) and (Con2).  For the converses,
use (Con3). ￿
The reader might mind to notice that a conjunction which is both left-adjunctive
and left-disadjunctive is sometimes called, in the scope of relevance logic, an inten-
sional conjunction, and in the scope of linear logic such a conjunction is said to be a
multiplicative one (also, in [9], this is what the author calls an internal conjunction).
We may now check that:
FACT 2.13  Let L be a left-adjunctive logic.  (i) If L either is finitely trivializable
or has a strong negation, than it has a bottom particle.  (ii) If L is finitely triviali-
zable, then it will be supplementing explosive.  (iii) If L respects ex contradictione,
then it will respect ex falso. (D13) ⇒  {[(D7) or (D10)] ⇒  (D8)};
[(D13) and (D7)] ⇒  (sPPS); (D13) ⇒  [(PPS) ⇒  (ExF)]25
Proof:   To prove (i), note that if L has a finite trivial theory Γ , one may define a
bottom particle from the conjunction of all formulas in Γ ; in case it has a strong
negation, any formula in the form (A∧ ~A), for some formula A of L, will suffice.
Parts (ii) and (iii) are immediate. ￿
Consider now the discussive logic proposed by Jaskowski in [67], D2, which is
such that Γ  ￿D2 A iff ◊Γ  ￿S5 ◊ A, where ◊Γ ={◊ B: for all B∈Γ }, ◊  denotes the pos-
sibility operator, and ￿S5 denotes the consequence relation defined by the well-known
modal logic S5.  It is easy to see that in D2 one has that (A, ¬ A ￿D2 B) does not hold
in general, though (A∧¬ A) ￿D2 B does hold, for any formulas A and B.  This phe-
nomenon can only happen because (pC1) holds while (pC2) does not hold in D2, and
so its conjunction is left-adjunctive but not left-disadjunctive, while (A∧¬ A) defines a
bottom particle.  Hence, the fact above still holds for D2, and this logic indeed displays
a quite immediate example of a logic respecting (ExF) but not (PPS).
To sum up with the latest definitions and their consequences, we can picture the
situation as follows, for some given logic L:
2.4  Huge tracts of the logical space.  Lo and behold!  If now the reader only learns
that all properties mentioned in the last subsection are compatible with the definition
of a paraconsistent logic, they are sure to obtain a wider view of the paraconsistent
landscape.  Indeed, general non-explosive logics, that is, logics in which not all theo-
ries are explosive, can indeed uphold the existence either of finitely trivializable theo-
ries, strong negations, or bottom particles!  (A rough map of this brave new territory
may be found in Figure 2.2.)  Logics which are paraconsistent but nevertheless have
some special explosive theories, such as the ones just mentioned, will constitute the
focus of our attention from now on, for, as we shall argue, they may let us explore
some fields into which we would not tread in the lack of those theories.  Some inter-
esting new concepts can now be studied —this is the case of the notion of consis-
tency (and its dual, the notion of inconsistency), as we shall argue.
Consider for instance the logic Pac, given by the following matrices:
L is explosive L is finitely
trivializable
L has a
bottom particle
L admits a
strong negation
￿￿  means that ￿ entails ￿
￿￿  means that ￿ plus left-adjunctiveness entails ￿
Where:
Figure 2.1
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¬
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where both 1 and ½ are distinguished values.  This is the name under which this logic
appeared in Avron’s [8] (section 3.2.2), though it had previously appeared, for instance,
in Avron’s [7], under the name RM 3
⊃~, and, even before than that, in Batens’s [10],
under the name PI
s.  It is easy to see that, in such a logic, for no formula A it can be the
case that A, ¬ A ￿Pac B, for all B.  So, Pac is a non-explosive, thus paraconsistent,
logic.  Conjunction, disjunction and implication in  Pac are fairly classical connectives:
in fact, the whole positive classical logic is validated by its matrices.  But the nega-
tion in Pac is in some sense strongly non-classical in its surrounding environment, and
the immediate consequence of this is that Pac does not have any explosive theory as
the ones mentioned above.  If such a three-valued logic would define a
negation having all properties of classical negation, the table at the
right shows how it would look.  It is very easy to see that such a
negation (in fact, a strong negation with all classical properties) is not
definable in Pac, for any truth-function of this logic having only ½’s
as input will also have ½ as output.  As a consequence, Pac will not
respect ex falso, having no bottom particle (being unable, thus, as we shall argue before
the end of this section, to express the consistency of its formulas), and once it is evi-
dently a left-adjunctive logic as well, it will not even be finitely trivializable at all.  One
could then criticize such a logic for providing a very weak interpretation for negation,
once in this logic all contradictions are admissible.  This has some weird consequences
and is certainly too light a way of obtaining a paraconsistent logic (this is also the cen-
tral point of Batens’s criticism of Priest’s LP,
9 see [13]): if some contradictions will
give you trouble just assume, then, that no contradiction at all can ever really hurt your
logic!  Under our present point of view, proposing a logic in which no single contra-
diction can ever have a harmful effect on their underlying theories is quite an extremist
position, and may take us too far away from any classical form of reasoning.
10
Now, if one endows the language of Pac either with such a strong negation or a
falsum constant (a bottom particle), with the canonical interpretation, what will result
is a well-known conservative extension of it, called J3, which is still paraconsistent
but has all those special explosive theories neglected by Pac.  This logic J3 was first
introduced by D’Ottaviano and da Costa in 1970 (cf. [60]) as a ‘possible solution to
the problem of Jaskowski’, and reappeared quite often in the literature after that.  The
first presentation of J3 did not bring the strong negation ~ as a
primitive connective, but displayed instead a primitive ‘pos-
sibility connective’ ∇  (see its table to the right).  In [61] it was
once more presented, but this time having also a sort of ‘consis-
tency connective’ ◦ as primitive (table to the right), and in [44]
we have explored more deeply the expressive and inferential
power of this logic, and the possibility of applying it to the study of inconsistent
                                                  
9 By the way, Priest’s logic LP is nothing but the implicationless fragment of Pac (cf. [90]).
10 This constitutes indeed the kernel of a long controversy between H. Jeffreys and K. Popper.  The
first author argued in 1938 that contradictions should not be reasonably supposed to imply anything
else, to which the second author replied in 1940 saying that contradictions are fatal and should be
avoided at all costs, to prevent science from collapsing.  Jeffreys aptly reiterated, in 1942, that he was
not suggesting that all contradictions should be tolerated, but at least some.  Popper responded to this
successively in 1943, 1959 and 1963, saying that he himself had thought about a system in which
contradictory sentences were not ‘embracing’, that is, did not explode, but he abandoned this system
because it turned out to be too weak (lacking, for instance, modus ponens), and he hastily concluded
from that that no useful such a system could ever be attained.  See more details and references about
this dispute in [26], chapter VI.
~
1 0
½ 0
0 1
∇ ◦
1 11
½ 10
0 0127
databases, abandoning ~ and ∇  but still maintaining ◦ as primitive.  As a result, we
have argued that this logic (now renamed LFI1, one of our main ‘logics of formal
inconsistency’) has been shown to be perfectly adequate, among other options, for
the task of formalizing the notion of (in)consistency in a very strong and sensible way.
But we will have much more to say about this further on.
The reader could now certainly ask himself: If paraconsistency is about non-explo-
siveness, why are you so interested in having these special explosive theories?  Be-
cause our interest lies much further than the simple control of the explosive power
of contradictions —we want to be able to retain classical reasoning, if only under
some suitable interpretation of a fragment of our paraconsistent logics, and we also
want to use these paraconsistent logics not only to reason under conditions which do
not presuppose consistency, but we want to be able to take hold of the very notion
of consistency inside of our logics!  From this point of view, the paraconsistent
logics which shall interest us are exactly those which permit us to formalize, and get
a good grip on, the intricate phenomenon of inconsistency, as opposed to mere cut and
dried contradictoriness.
Whatever inconsistency might mean, by our previous analysis, we might surely sup-
pose a trivial theory to be not only contradictory but inconsistent as well.  But yet, a
contradiction is certainly one of the many guises of inconsistency!  So one may con-
jecture that consistency is exactly what a contradiction might be lacking to become ex-
plosive —if it was not explosive from the start.  Roughly speaking, we are going to
suppose that a ‘consistent contradiction’ is likely to explode, even if a ‘regular’ contra-
diction is not.  In logics such as classical logic, consistency is well established, and in-
deed all theories are explosive; therefore, in any given classical theory, a contradiction
turns out to be not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for triviality.
Figure 2.2
L is paraconsistent
L has
non-explosive
theories
L is paraconsistent
and
finitely trivializable
L has
non-explosive
theories
and also finite
explosive ones
L is paraconsistent
and admits a
strong negation
L is paraconsistent
and has a
bottom particle
￿￿ means that ￿ entails ￿
￿￿ means that ￿ plus left-
adjunctiveness entails ￿
Where:28
Now, based on the above considerations, let us suppose in general that a proposition
can be contradictory and still does not cause much harm, in general, in a paraconsistent
logic, if only its consistency is not guaranteed, or cannot be established.  Thus, an ‘in-
consistent’ contradiction will be allowed to show up with no big commotion, but still a
‘consistent’ one should behave classically, and explode!  This is how we will put
it in formal terms.  Let ∆ (A) here denote a (possibly empty) set of schemas depending
only on A.  We will call a theory Γ  gently explosive if:
(a) ∃ A such that ∆ (A)∪ {A} is not trivial, ∆ (A)∪ {¬ A} is not trivial, and
(b) ∀ A∀ B [Γ , ∆ (A), A, ¬ A ￿ B]. (D15)
The gently explosive theory Γ  will be said to be finitely so when ∆ (A) is a finite set,
so that a finitely gently explosive theory will be simply one that is finitely trivialized
in a very distinctive way. (D16)
Accordingly, a logic L will be said to be [finitely] gently explosive when all of its
theories are [finitely] gently explosive. [(D17)]  (D18)
Thus, in any such a gently explosive logic, given a contradictory theory there is
always something ‘reasonable’ —to wit, consistency— which one can add to it in or-
der to guarantee that it will become trivial.  We may now consider the following gentle
versions of the Principle of Explosion:
[FINITE] GENTLE PRINCIPLE OF EXPLOSION [(fgPPS)]  (gPPS)
L must be [finitely] gently explosive.
So, according to the interpretation proposed above, what we are implicitly assuming
in the above principles is that, for any given formula A, the (finite) set ∆ (A) will
express, in a certain sense, the consistency of A relative to the logic L.
Based on that, we may define the consistency of a logic in the following way.  L will
be said to be consistent if:
(a) L is gently explosive, and (b) ∀ A∀Γ(∀ B∈∆ (A))(Γ  ￿ B). (D19)
It immediately follows, from these definitions and the preceding ones, that:
FACT 2.14  (i) Any non-trivial explosive theory / logic is finitely gently explosive.  (ii)
Any transitive logic is consistent if, and only if, it is both explosive and non-tri-
vial.  (iii) Any transitive consistent logic is finitely gently explosive.  (iv) Any left-
adjunctive finitely gently explosive logic is supplementing explosive.
[not-(D2) and (D3)] ⇒  (D16); [(PNT) and (PPS)] ⇒  (fgPPS);
(Con3) ⇒  {(D19) ⇔  [(D6) and not-(D5)]};
[(Con3) and (D19)] ⇒  (D17);
[(D13) and (fgPPS)] ⇒  (sPPS)
Proof:   To check (i), just let ∆ (A) be empty, for every formula A.  This result evidently
parallels FACT 2.10(iii), about supplementing explosive logics.  To see, in (ii), that
any given consistent logic is explosive use transitivity whenever you meet a non-empty
∆ .  Part (iii) follows from (i) and (ii), and part (iv) simply reflects FACT 2.13(ii). ￿
So, based on the above definition of a consistent logic and the subsequent fact, if we
were to define a so-called Principle of Consistency, it would then simply coincide with
the sum of (PNT) and (PPS), for logics obeying transitivity.  We shall, therefore, not
insist in explicitly formulating here such a principle.
We may now finally define what we will mean by a logic of formal inconsistency
(LFI), which will be nothing more than a logic that allows us to ‘talk about consis-29
tency’ in a meaningful way.  We will consider, of course, an inconsistent logic to
be simply one that is not consistent.  This assumption, together with FACT 2.14(ii),
explains why paraconsistent logics were early dubbed, by da Costa, ‘inconsistent for-
mal systems’, once all paraconsistent logics are certainly inconsistent in the sense of
not respecting (D19), even though they are always also non-trivial and quite often
they are non-contradictory as well.  Those inconsistent logics which went so far
as to be trivial, and thus no more paraconsistent at all, were dubbed, by Miró Quesada,
absolutely inconsistent logics (cf. [80]).  Now, an LFI will be any non-trivial logic in
which consistency does not hold, but can still be expressed, thus being a gently explo-
sive and yet non-explosive logic, that is, a logic in which:
(a) (PPS) does not hold, but (b) (gPPS) holds. (D20)
Classical logic, then, will not be an LFI just because (PPS) holds in it.  Pac will also
not be an LFI, even though it is paraconsistent, for Pac is not finitely trivializ-
able.  But D’Ottaviano & da Costa’s J3 (and, consequently, our LFI1), which conserva-
tively extends Pac, will indeed be an LFI, where consistency is expressed by the con-
nective ◦ (see above), and inconsistency, as usual, is expressed, by the negation of this
connective.  Also, Jaskowski’s D2 will constitute an LFI, as the reader can easily check,
where the consistency of a formula A can be expressed by the formula (￿A∨ ￿¬ A),
written in terms of the necessity operator ￿ of S5.
11
‘Only’ LFIs —though these seem to comprise by far the great majority of all known
paraconsistent logics— will interest us in this study.
2.5  DEFCON 2: one step short of trivialization.  The distinction between the origi-
nal formulation of explosiveness, its formulation in terms of ex falso, and its sup-
plementing and gentle formulations offered above does not tell you everything you
need to know about the ways of exploding.  Indeed, there are more things in the
realm of explosiveness, dear reader, than are dreamt of in your philosophy!  Thus, for
instance, a not very interesting scenario seems to unfold if contradictions are still pre-
vented from rendering a given theory trivial but nevertheless are allowed to go half the
way, causing some kind of ‘partial trivialization’.  So, a theory  Γ  will be said to be par-
tially trivial with respect to a given schema σ (C1, …, Cn), or σ -partially trivial, if:
(a) ∃ C1…∃ Cn such that σ (C1, …, Cn) is not a top particle, and
(b) ∀ C1…∀ Cn [Γ  ￿ σ (C1, …, Cn)]. (D21)
Following this same path, a theory Γ  will be said to be partially explosive with respect
to the schema σ (C1, …, Cn), or σ -partially explosive, if:
(a) ∃ C1…∃ Cn such that σ (C1, …, Cn) is not a top particle, and
(b) ∀ C1…∀ Cn∀ A [Γ , A, ¬ A ￿ σ (C1, …, Cn)]. (D22)
Of course, a logic L will be said to be σ -partially trivial / σ -partially explosive if all
of its theories are σ -partially trivial / σ -partially explosive. respect. (D23), (D24)
More simply, a theory, or a logic, can now be said to be partially trivial / partially
explosive if this theory, or logic, is σ -partially trivial / σ -partially explosive, for some
                                                  
11 This needs to be qualified.  Among the various formulations among which D2 has appeared in the
literature, it is not completely clear if its language has a necessity operator available so as to make this
definition possible, or not.  If this is not available, it may well be that D2 is not characterizable as an
LFI after all (even though a situation for a necessity operator would quite naturally appear, to all practi-
cal purposes, in the trivial case in which there is just one person ‘discussing’, or even more unlikely, a
situation in which all contenders just agree with each other).30
schema σ .  We can now immediately formulate the following new version of the
Principle of Explosion:
PRINCIPLE OF PARTIAL EXPLOSION (pPPS)
L must be partially explosive.
One may immediately conclude that:
FACT 2.15  (i) Any partially trivial theory / logic is partially explosive.  (ii) Any ex-
plosive logic is partially explosive. (D21) ⇒  (D22); (D23) ⇒  (D24); (PPS) ⇒  (pPPS)
A well-known example of a logic which is not explosive but is partially explosive
even so, is given by Kolmogorov & Johánsson’s Minimal Intuitionistic Logic, MIL,
which is obtained by the addition to the positive part of intuitionistic logic of some
forms of reductio ad absurdum (cf. [68] and [69]).  What happens, in this logic, is that
∀Γ∀ A∀ B (Γ , A, ¬ A ￿ B) is not the case, but still it does hold that ∀Γ∀ A∀ B (Γ ,
A, ¬ A ￿ ¬ B).  This means that MIL is paraconsistent in a broad sense, for contra-
dictions do not explode, but still all negated propositions can be inferred from any
given contradiction!
It is something of a consensus that an interesting paraconsistent logic should not
only avoid triviality but also partial triviality.  Thus, the following definition now
comes in handy.  A logic L will be said to be boldly paraconsistent if:
(pPPS) fails for L. (BPL)
Evidently:
FACT 2.16  A boldly paraconsistent logic is paraconsistent. (BPL) ⇒  (PL2)
Now, let’s tackle a somewhat inverse approach.  Call a theory Γ  controllably ex-
plosive in contact with a given schema σ (C1, …, Cm) if:
(a) ∃ C1…∃ Cm such that σ (C1, …, Cm) and ¬σ (C1, …, Cm) are not bottom particles,
and (b) ∀ C1…∀ Cn∀ B [Γ , σ (C1, …, Cm), ¬σ (C1, …, Cm) ￿ B]. (D25)
Accordingly, a logic L will be said to be controllably explosive in contact with σ (C1,
…, Cm) when all of its theories are controllably explosive in contact with this sche-
ma. (D26)
Some given theory / logic can now more simply be called controllably explosive when
this theory / logic has some schema in contact with which it is controllably explosive.
An immediate new version of the Principle of Explosion that suggests itself then is:
CONTROLLABLE PRINCIPLE OF EXPLOSION (cPPS)
L must be controllably explosive.
Similarly to the case of FACT 2.14, parts (i) and (iii), it follows here that:
FACT 2.17  (i) Any non-trivial explosive theory / logic is controllably explosive.  (ii)
Any transitive consistent logic is controllably explosive. [not-(D2) and (D3)] ⇒  (D25)
[(PNT) and (PPS)] ⇒  (cPPS); [(Con3) and (D19)] ⇒  (D26)
By the way, we may also now emend FACT 2.9 so as to immediately conclude that:
FACT 2.18  Any finitely-gently / controllably explosive logic is finitely trivializable,
and yet non-trivial. [(D17) or (D26)] ⇒  [(D7) and not-(D5)]
This fact can be used to update and complement the information conveyed in Figure 2.1.31
Now, there seems to be no good reason to rule out controllably explosive theo-
ries, as we did in the case of partially explosive theories by way of the bold defini-
tion of paraconsistency, (BPL).  In fact, it seems that most, if not all, finitely gently
explosive logics are controllably explosive, and vice-versa!  We will see, later
on, many examples of paraconsistent logics —indeed, of LFIs— which not only are
obviously gently explosive, but are also controllably explosive in contact with schemas
such as (A∧¬ A), or such as ◦A, where ◦, we recall, is a connective expressing consis-
tency (Jaskowski’s D2, for instance, may already be one of these, but the logic LFI1,
on the other hand, explodes only in contact with the second of these schemas).  There
are even logics which controllably explode in contact with large classes of non-
atomic propositions (see [78], and ahead, for a number of them).  An extreme case of
these, as we shall see, is given by Sette’s three-valued logic P
1 (cf. [103]), which
controllably explodes in contact with any complex formula, and so can be said to be-
have paraconsistently only at the level of its atoms.  It is also not uncommon for some
paraconsistent logic L having a strong negation ÷  to be controllably explosive.  In
fact, it suffices that such a logic is transitive and infers ¬÷ A ￿ A, and of course it
will turn out to be controllably explosive in contact with ÷ A, or at least in contact
with ÷÷ A (see, for instance, FACT 3.76, or THEOREM 3.51(i) and FACT 3.66).
Many LFIs will moreover be controllably explosive in contact with any consistent
formula (see FACT 3.32).  And so on, and so forth.
A range of variations on the above versions of the Principle of Explosion can be
obtained if we only mix the ones we already have.  We shall nevertheless not investi-
gate this theme here any further, but only notice that the multiple relations, hinted
above, between (sPPS), (gPPS) and (cPPS), the supplementing, the gentle and the
controllable forms of explosion, certainly deserve a closer and more attentive look by
the ‘paraconsistent community’ and sympathizers.
2.6  C-systems.  Given a logic L=< For, ￿> , let For
+⊆ For denote the set of all posi-
tive formulas of L, that is, the negationless fragment of For, or, in still other words,
the set of all formulas in which no negation symbol ¬  occurs.  The logic L1=< For1,
￿1>  is said to be positively preserving relative to the logic L2= < For2, ￿2>  if:
(a) For
+
1=For
+
2, and (b) (Γ  ￿1 A  ⇔   Γ  ￿2 A), for all Γ∪{ A}⊆ For
+
1. (D27)
So, if L1 is positively preserving relative to L2, then it will in general be a conser-
vative extension of the positive fragment of L2.  Now, as an example of the ubiquity
of LFIs inside the realm of paraconsistent logics, just notice that:
FACT 2.19  Any paraconsistent logic that is positively preserving relative to classi-
cal logic and has a bottom particle can be characterized as an LFI.
Proof:   Just define ◦A as (A→⊥ )∨ (¬ A→⊥ ), and check that, in general, ◦A is not
a top particle, {◦A, A} is not always trivial, and {◦A, ¬ A} is not always trivial, but
that, in any case, {◦A, A, ¬ A} is indeed a trivial theory.  This result actually holds
for any logic having a left-adjunctive disjunction, that is, a binary connective ∨  such
that (B∨ C) is not a bottom particle, for some formulas B and C, and such that
∀ B∀ C∀Γ∀∆∀ D {(Γ , B ￿ D) and (∆ , C ￿ D)] ⇒  [Γ , ∆ , (B∨ C) ￿ D]} (for a
particular consequence of this feature, see FACT 3.7), and having modus ponens:
∀Γ∀ A∀ B [Γ , A, (A→ B) ￿ B].  You just have to choose Γ ={A}, B=(A→⊥ ),
∆ ={¬ A}, and C=(¬ A→⊥ ), and notice that, in this case, both (Γ , B ￿ ⊥ ) and (∆ ,
C ￿ ⊥ ), by modus ponens. ￿32
This last result shows that any paraconsistent logic conservatively extending the
positive classical logic and respecting either one of the principles of ex falso or of sup-
plementing explosion will be finitely gently explosive as well, throwing some light
on some hitherto unsuspected connections between (ExF), (sPPS) and (fgPPS), and
consequently any such a logic can be easily recast as an LFI (take another look
at Figure 2.2).  Consequently, for all such logics, it amounts to be more or less the
same starting either with a consistency operator, or with a strong negation, or with
a bottom particle: each of these can be used to define the others.  This does not mean,
however, that ‘only’ such logics are LFIs (see the case of CLim, in the subsection 3.10).
To specialize a little bit from this very broad definition of LFIs above we will
now define the concept of a C-system.  The logic L1 will be said to be a C-system
based on L2 if:
(a) L1 is an LFI in which consistency or inconsistency
are expressed by operators (at the object language level),
(b) L2 is not paraconsistent, and
(c) L1 is positively preserving relative to L2. (D28)
Any logic constructed as a C-system based on some other logic will more generally
be identified simply as a C-system.  In the next section we will study various logics
which are C-systems, and pinpoint some which are not.
Jaskowski’s D2, as we have already seen in the above subsections, is an LFI and can
define an operator expressing consistency —at least under some presentations (see note
11).  But, in order for it to be characterized as a C-system it would still have to be clari-
fied on which logic it is based, that is, where does its peculiar positive (non-adjunctive)
part come from!  This same question arises with respect to all other logics that are left-
adjunctive but not left-disadjunctive, as well as with respect to many relevance logics.
All C-systems we will be studying below are inconsistent, non-contradictory and
non-trivial.  Furthermore, they are boldly paraconsistent (though the proof of this fact
will be left for [42]), and often controllably explosive as well, they have strong ne-
gations and bottom particles, and are positively preserving relative to classical proposi-
tional logic —so, that they will respect (PNC), (PNT), (ExF), (sPPS), (gPPS) and often
(cPPS), but they will not respect neither (PPS) nor (pPPS).  Let’s now jump to them.
3  COOKING THE C-SYSTEMS ON A LOW FLAME
Indeed, even at this stage I predict a time when there will be mathematical
investigations of calculi containing contradictions, and people will actu-
ally be proud of having emancipated themselves even from consistency.
—Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, p.332.
Underlying the original approach of da Costa to the concoction of a propositional
calculus capable of admitting contradictions, yet remaining sensible to performing
reasonable deductions, laid the idea of maintaining the positive fragment of classical
logic unaltered.  This explains why his approach to paraconsistency has eventually
received the inelegant label of ‘positive (logic) plus approach’ and, more recently,
the not much descriptive (and in some cases plainly inadequate) label of ‘non-truth-
functional approach’ (cf., respectively, [92] and [94]).  Surely, competitive approaches
do exist, like the one stemming from Jaskowski’s or Rescher & Brandom’s investi-33
gations, which rejects left-disadjunction, and is usually referred to as a ‘non-adjunctive
approach’ (cf. [67] and [98]), and which has more recently been tentatively dubbed, by
J. Perzanowski, as ‘parainconsistent logic’.
12  Another megatrend comes from the ‘rele-
vance approach’ to paraconsistency, captained by the American-Australian school,
whose concern is not so much with negation as with implication, giving rise to ‘rele-
vance logics’ (cf. [3]).  Still another very interesting proposal came from Belgium, un-
der the appellation of ‘adaptive logics’, which do not worry so much about proving
consistency, but assume it instead from the very start, as some kind of default (cf. [11]
and [12]).  Now, let us make it crystal clear that our concentration in this study on the
investigation of C-systems, born from the first approach mentioned above, wishes not
to diminish the other approaches, nor affirms that they should be held as mutually ex-
clusive.  Our intention, indeed, is but to present the C-systems under a more general
and suggestive background, and from now on we shall draw on the other approaches
only when we feel that as a really necessary or instructive step.  To the reader particu-
larly interested in them, we prefer simply to redirect them to the competent sources.
3.1  Paleontology of C-systems.  All definitions and remarks made above were set
forth directing an arbitrary consequence relation ￿, be it syntactical, semantical or
defined in any other mind-boggling way.  Once the surfacing of contradictions on
a theory involves negation, and nothing but that, it is appealing to consider and ex-
plore the intuitive idea that an interesting class of paraconsistent logics is to be given
by the ones which are positively preserving relative to classical logic, differing from
classical logic only in the behavior of formulas involving negation.  This is the idea
into which we will henceforth be digging, by axiomatically proposing a series of logics
characterized by their syntactical consequence relations, ￿, and containing all rules
and schemas which hold in the positive part of classical logic.  Thus, let’s initially
consider ∧ , ∨ , → , and ¬  to be our primitive connectives, and consider the set of for-
mulas For, as usual, to be the free algebra generated by these connectives.  We will
start our journey from the following set of axioms:
  (Min1)  ￿min (A→ (B→ A));
  (Min2)  ￿min ((A→ B)→ ((A→ (B→ C))→ (A→ C)));
  (Min3)  ￿min (A→ (B→ (A∧ B)));
  (Min4)  ￿min ((A∧ B)→ A);
  (Min5)  ￿min ((A∧ B)→ B);
  (Min6)  ￿min (A→ (A∨ B));
  (Min7)  ￿min (B→ (A∨ B));
  (Min8)  ￿min ((A→ C)→ ((B→ C)→ ((A∨ B)→ C)));
  (Min9)  ￿min (A∨ (A→ B));
  (Min10)  ￿min (A∨¬ A);
  (Min11)  ￿min (¬¬ A→ A).
Here, by writing ￿min (A→ (B→ A)) we will be abbreviatedly denoting that:
∀Γ∀ A∀ B [Γ  ￿min (A→ (B→ A))],
                                                  
12 On his conference delivered at the Jaskowski’s Memorial Symposium, held in Toru , Poland, July 1998.34
and so on, for the other axioms.  The only inference rule, as usual, will be modus po-
nens, (MP): ∀Γ∀ A∀ B [Γ , A, (A→ B) ￿min B].  The logic built using such axioms,
plus (MP) and the usual notion of proof from premises (we may now be calling proofs,
theorems and premises which we have previously called, respectively, inferences, the-
ses and theories) was called Cmin=< For, ￿min> and studied by the authors in [39].
First of all, let us observe that the so-called Deduction Metatheorem is here valid:
THEOREM 3.1  [Γ , A ￿min B  ⇒   Γ  ￿min (A→ B)].
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Proof:   It is a familiar and straightforward procedure to show that the Deduction
Metatheorem holds for any logic containing (Min1) and (Min2) as provable schemas
and having only modus ponens as a primitive rule. ￿
Evidently, by monotonicity and transitivity, modus ponens already gives us the con-
verse of THEOREM 3.1.  This makes it possible for us to introduce all axioms as
some sort of axiomatic inference rules, and this is what we shall do from now on.
Moreover, using the Deduction Metatheorem and its converse, one could now equiva-
lently represent, in Cmin, the fact that (PPS) (the Principle of Explosion) does not
hold by the unprovability of the theorem (tPS): (A→ (¬ A→ B)).  And indeed:
THEOREM 3.2  (tPS) is not provable by Cmin.
Proof:   Use the matrices of Pac, in the subsection 2.4, to check that all axioms above
are validated and that (MP) preserves validity, while (tPS) is not always validated.
This shows that Cmin is a fragment of Pac, and so it also cannot prove (tPS).  In fact,
(tPS) is more than non-provable, it is independent from Cmin (and Pac) for its negation
is not even classically provable, and Pac is a deductive fragment of classical logic. ￿
As usual, bi-implication, ↔ , will be defined by setting (A↔ B)￿((A→ B)∧
(B→ A)).  Note that, by the above considerations, ￿min (A↔ B) if, and only if,
A ￿min B, and B ￿min A, which is the same as writing A ￿￿min B.  So, bi-implication
holds between two formulas if, and only if, they are (provably) equivalent (see (Eq1),
in the subsection 2.2).  Nevertheless, as the reader shall see below, having two  equiva-
lent formulas, in the logics we will be studying here, usually does not mean, as in
classical logic, that these formulas can be freely intersubstituted everywhere (take a
look, ahead, for instance, at results 3.22, 3.35, 3.51, 3.58, 3.65, and 3.74).
Axioms (Min1)–(Min8) are known at least since Gentzen’s [62] as providing an
axiomatization for the so-called ‘positive logic’.  Of course, they immediately tell
us, among other things, that the conjunction of this logic is both left-adjunctive and
left-disadjunctive (just take a look at axioms (Min3)–(Min5)).  Nevertheless, (Min9):
(A∨ (A→ B)), which is a positive schema, is not provable even if one uses (Min10)
and (Min11) in addition to (Min1)–(Min8) and (MP) (i.e. the logic axiomatized
as Cmin minus the axiom (Min9))!  Indeed:
THEOREM 3.3  (Min9) is not provable by Cmin\{(Min9)}.
Proof:   Use the following matrices (cf. [2]) to check that (Min9) is independent from
Cmin\{(Min9)}:
                                                  
13 Read this kind of sentence as a universally quantified one —in this case, for example, it would be
∀Γ∀ A∀ B (Γ , A ￿min B  ⇒   Γ  ￿min (A→ B))35
where 1 is the only distinguished value. ￿
So, what is this thing that Gentzen (and Hilbert before him) have dubbed ‘posi-
tive logic’, if even a deductive extension of it is unable to prove all positive theo-
rems of classical logic?  Here is the trick: Gentzen referred of course to positive in-
tuitionistic logic, and not to the classical logic!  So, this logic Cmin\{(Min9)}, which
was proposed by da Costa (cf. [49]) and called Cω  by him, turns out to be only posi-
tively preserving relative to intuitionistic logic, and not relative to classical logic.
In [39] we have proven that its deductive extension Cmin, obtained by adjoining (Min9)
to Cω , is indeed positively preserving relative to classical logic, and moreover:
THEOREM 3.4  Cmin does have neither a strong negation nor a bottom particle, and
is not finitely trivializable.
Proof:   PROPOSITION 2.5, in [39], shows that Cmin does not have a bottom parti-
cle, and so, by left-disadjunction and FACT 2.13, it does not have neither a strong
negation nor is it finitely trivializable. ￿
Moreover, in [39] we also proved that:
THEOREM 3.5  Cmin does not have any negated theorem, i.e. (￿ / min ¬ A).
Of course, both results above are valid, a fortiori, for Cω .  Indeed, as shown by Urbas
(cf. [107]), these logics are very weak with respect to negation, so that the follow-
ing holds:
THEOREM 3.6  No two different negated formulas of  Cmin are provably equivalent.
Proof:   The THEOREM 2, in [107], shows that ¬ A ￿￿ ¬ B is derivable in Cω  if
and only if A and B are the same formula.  It is straightforward to adapt this result
also to Cmin. ￿
Much more about the provability (or validity) of negated theorems will be seen in
the paper [42], which brings semantics to most logics here studied.
THEOREM 3.4 shows that Cmin, or Cω , cannot be C-systems based on classical
logic, or intuitionistic logic, once they are both compact (all proofs are finite) and not
finitely gently explosive, so that they cannot be gently explosive at all, and thus cannot
formalize ‘consistency’, in the precise sense formulated in the subsection 2.4.  We
had better then make them deductively stronger in order to get what we want.
We make a few more important remarks before closing this subsection.  First, note
that (Min10): (A∨¬ A) was added in order to keep Cmin and Cω  from being para-
complete as well as paraconsistent (let’s investigate one deviancy at a time!), and
this axiom can indeed be pretty useful in providing us with a form of proof by cases:
FACT 3.7  [(Γ , A ￿min B)  and  (∆ , ¬ A ￿min B)] ⇒  (Γ , ∆  ￿min B).
Proof:   From (Min8) and (Min10), by modus ponens, monotonicity, and the Deduc-
tion Metatheorem (from now on, we will not mention these last three every time we
use them anymore). ￿
∧ 1 ½ 0
1 1 ½ 0
½ ½½0
0 000
∨ 1 ½ 0
1 111
½ 1 ½½
0 1 ½ 0
→ 1 ½ 0
1 1 ½ 0
½ 110
0 111
¬
1 0
½ 1
0 136
It will also be practical here and there to use [(A→ B), (B→ C) ￿min (A→ C)]
(a kind of logical version for the transitivity property) as an alternative form of the
axiom (Min2).  Indeed:
FACT 3.8  (Min2) can be substituted, in Cmin, by [(A→ B), (B→ C) ￿min (A→ C)].
We shall often make use of both these forms without discriminating which.
In the next subsection (see THEOREM 3.13) we will learn about the utility of
(Min11): (¬¬ A→ A), which was added by da Costa as a way of rendering the nega-
tion of his calculi a bit stronger, using as an argument the intended duality with the
logics arising from the formalization of intuitionistic logic, in which usually only the
converse of (Min11), i.e. the formula (A→¬¬ A), is valid.
It is quite interesting as well to notice that the addition of the ‘Theorem of Pseudo-
Scotus’, (tPS), to Cmin as a new axiom schema will not only prevent the resulting
logic from being paraconsistent, but it will also provide a complete axiomatization
for the classical propositional logic (hereby denoted CPL).  In fact, it is a well-known
fact that:
THEOREM 3.9  Axioms (Min1)–(Min11) plus (tPS): (A→ (¬ A→ B)), and (MP),
provide a sound and complete axiomatization for CPL.
Actually, the axiom (Min11) can be discharged from the above axiomatization, being
proved from the remaining ones.  Axiom (Min9) also turns to be redundant (take a
look at the FACT 3.45, below).
3.2  The basic logic of (in)consistency.  Let’s consider an extension of our language
by the addition of a new unary connective, ◦, representing consistency.  Let’s now
also add, to Cmin, a new rule, realizing the Finite Gentle Principle of Explosion:
(bc1) ◦A, A, ¬ A ￿bC B. ‘If A is consistent and contradictory, then it explodes’
We will call this new logic, characterized by axioms (Min1)–(Min11) and (bc1),
plus (MP), the basic logic of (in)consistency, or bC.  Clearly, thanks to (bc1), we
know that bC is indeed an LFI, i.e. a logic of formal inconsistency, and so it is in fact
a C-system based on CPL.  A strong negation, ~, for a formula A can now be easily
defined by setting ~A￿(¬ A∧ ◦A), and evidently we will have [A, ~A ￿bC  B], as
expected.  A bottom particle, of course, is given by (A∧ ~A), for any A.  For alterna-
tive ways of formulating bC, consider FACT 2.19 and the comments which follow it.
We can already show that THEOREMS 3.5 and 3.6 do not hold for bC:
THEOREM 3.10  bC does have negated theorems, and equivalent negated formulas
(but, on the other hand, it has no consistent theorems, that is, theorems of the form ◦A).
Proof:   Consider any bottom particle ⊥  of bC.  By definition, it must be such that
(⊥  ￿bC  B), for any formula B, and so, in particular, (⊥  ￿bC  ¬⊥ ).  But we also have
that (¬⊥  ￿bC ¬⊥ ), and proof by cases (FACT 3.7) tells us then that ￿bC ¬⊥ .  By the
way, this result also transforms THEOREM 3.4 into a corollary of THEOREM 3.5
—if a reflexive logic has proof by cases and no negated theorems, then it cannot con-
tain a bottom particle.  Evidently, any bottom particle is equivalent to any other.  To
check that no formula of the form ◦A is provable, one may just use the classical matri-
ces for ∧ , ∨ , →  and ¬ , and pick for ◦ a matrix with value constant and equal to 0. ￿37
Now, it is easy to see that, in such logic bC, if the consistency of the right formulas is
guaranteed, than its inferences will behave exactly like in CPL.  Indeed:
THEOREM 3.11  [Γ  ￿CPL A] ⇔  [◦(∆ ), Γ  ￿bC A], where ◦(∆ )={ ◦B: B∈∆ }, and
∆  is a finite set of formulas.
Proof:   On the one hand, one may just reproduce line by line a CPL proof in bC,
and when it comes to an application of (tPS) —see an axiomatization of CPL in
the THEOREM 3.9— one will have to use (bc1) instead, and add as a further assump-
tion the consistency of the formula in the antecedent.  The converse is immediate. ￿
We know that bC is a both a linguistic and a deductive extension of Cmin, once it
not only introduces a new connective but has an axiomatic rule telling you what to do
with it.  But we know more than that:
THEOREM 3.12  bC is a conservative extension of Cmin.
Proof:   Indeed, if you consider the bC-inferences in the language of Cmin, you can
no more use (bc1) along a proof, and so you can prove nothing more than you could
prove before. ￿
What we have then, in (bc1), is a sort of rough logical clone for the finite gentle rule
of explosion.  Now, da Costa, in the original presentation of his calculi, which guides
us here, has never used a gentle form of explosion but used instead a gentle form of
reductio ad absurdum:
(RA0) ◦B, (A→ B), (A→¬ B) ￿ ¬ A.
‘If supposing A will bring us to a consistent contradiction, then ¬ A should be the case’
Notice, by the way, that ((A→ B)→ ((A→¬ B)→¬ A)) was exactly the form of
reductio used by Kolmogorov and Johánsson in the proposal of their Minimal Intui-
tionistic Logic, mentioned above as an example of a logic which is paraconsistent and
yet not boldly paraconsistent.  Now, the reader might be suspecting that it would really
make no difference whether we used (bc1) or (RA0) in the characterization of bC.
They are right, but this assertion could be made more precise.  Indeed, consider the
two following alternative versions of these rules:
(bc0) ◦A, A, ¬ A ￿ ¬ B;
‘If A is consistent and contradictory, then it partially explodes with respect to negated propositions’
(RA1) ◦B, (¬ A→ B), (¬ A→¬ B) ￿ A,
‘If supposing ¬ A will bring us to a consistent contradiction, then A should be the case’
and consider the logic PI (that is how it was called when it appeared in [10]), char-
acterized simply by (Min1)–(Min10) plus (MP), that is, Cmin deprived of the schema
(Min11): (¬¬ A→ A).  Then we can prove that:
THEOREM 3.13  (i) It does not have the same effect adding either (bc1) or (RA0) to
PI.  (ii) It does have the same effect adding to PI: a) (bc0) or (RA0); b) (bc1) or
(RA1).  (iii) It does have the same effect adding to Cmin whichever of the schemas
(bc0), (bc1), (RA0) or (RA1).  (iv) bC cannot be extended into a ¬ -partially explo-
sive paraconsistent logic.
Proof:   To check part (i), use the classical matrices (with values 1 and 0) for ∧ , ∨
and → , but let both ¬  and ◦ have matrices constant and equal to 1 —this way you
will see that (bc1) is not provable by the logic obtained from the addition of (RA0)
to PI.  Part (ii) is easy: use FACT 3.8 to prove (bc0) in PI plus (RA0), and to prove
(bc1) in PI plus (RA1); use (Min1) and the proof by cases to prove (RA0) in PI38
plus (bc0), and to prove (RA1) in PI plus (bc1).  We leave part (iii) as an even easier
exercise to the reader (hint: use (Min11)).  (iv) is an immediate consequence of (iii). ￿
So, this last result gives one reason for us to have our study started from Cmin rather
than from PI: we will be avoiding that paraconsistent extensions of our initial logic
might turn out to be partially explosive with respect to negated propositions in general,
as what occurred with MIL, the Minimal Intuitionistic Logic (recall the subsection 2.5).
This feature will help in making many results below more symmetrical.  But, to be sure,
this does not guarantee that all such extensions will be boldly paraconsistent as well!
The reader should notice that there are, however, some restricted forms of ‘reasoning
by absurdum’ left in bC.  For example:
FACT 3.14  The following reductio deduction rules hold in bC:
  (i)  [(Γ  ￿bC ◦A) and (∆ , B ￿bC A) and (Λ, B ￿bC ¬ A)] ⇒  (Γ , ∆ , Λ ￿bC ¬ B);
  (ii)  [(Γ , B ￿bC ◦A) and (∆ , B ￿bC A) and (Λ, B ￿bC ¬ A)] ⇒  (Γ , ∆ , Λ ￿bC ¬ B);
  (iii)  [(Γ ,¬ B ￿bC ◦A) and (∆ ,¬ B ￿bC A) and (Λ,¬ B ￿bC ¬ A)] ⇒  (Γ , ∆ , Λ ￿bC B).
Proof:   Part (i) comes immediately from (RA0), part (ii) comes from part (i) using re-
flexivity and proof by cases, part (iii) comes as a variation of (ii), if you use (Min11). ￿
But we still have not mentioned some of the most decisive features of bC!  We are
now ready for this.  Consider, to start with, the following result:
THEOREM 3.15  (i) (A∧¬ A) is not a bottom particle in any paraconsistent exten-
sion of bC.  (ii) ¬ (A∧¬ A) and ¬ (¬ A∧ A) are not top particles in bC.
Proof:   For part (i), just use left-disadjunction and THEOREM 3.2 (but the reader
might recall from the subsection 2.3 that this formula is a bottom particle in some non-
left-disadjunctive paraconsistent logics such as Jaskowski’s D2).  To check part (ii) use
the following matrices to confirm that neither ¬ (A∧¬ A) nor ¬ (¬ A∧ A) are provable
by bC:
where 1 and ½ are the distinguished values.  By the way, the matrices of ∧ , ∨ , → ,
and ¬  are exactly the same matrices which originally defined the maximal three-valued
logic P
1, proposed in [103], and mentioned in the subsection 2.5 as a logic which is pa-
raconsistent and yet controllably explosive when in contact with any non-atomic
formula. ￿
As to the relations between contradictions and inconsistencies what we will find here
are some variations on the intuitive idea that a contradiction should not be consistent
(but not necessarily the other way around):
FACT 3.16  These are some special rules of bC, relating contradiction and consis-
tency:
  (i)  A, ¬ A ￿bC ¬ ◦A;
  (ii)  (A∧¬ A) ￿bC ¬ ◦A;
  (iii)  ◦A ￿bC ¬ (A∧¬ A);
  (iv)  ◦A ￿bC ¬ (¬ A∧ A).
The converses of these rules do not hold in bC.
∧ 1 ½ 0
1 110
½ 110
0 000
∨ 1 ½ 0
1 111
½ 111
0 110
→ 1 ½ 0
1 110
½ 110
0 111
¬ ◦
1 01
½ 10
0 1139
Proof:   Use FACT 3.14 to prove (i), and left-adjunction to jump
from this fact to (ii); play similarly to prove (iii) and (iv).  To show
that none of the converses of (ii)– (iv) are provable by bC, use the
same matrices as in THEOREM 3.15(ii), substituting only the ma-
trix for negation by this one to the right. ￿
The significance of stating both (iii) and (iv) is to draw attention to the fact that,
in what follows, logics will be shown in which, due to some unexpected asymmetry,
only one of their converses hold.  This is the case, for instance, for C1, the first logic
of the pioneering hierarchy of paraconsistent logics, Cn, 1≤n<ω , proposed by da
Costa (cf. [49] or [50]).  As we shall see, the converse of (iii) holds in C1, while the
converse of (iv) fails, so that ¬ (A∧¬ A) and ¬ (¬ A∧ A) are not equivalent formu-
las in this logic (in this respect, see also THEOREM 3.21(iii)).
As the reader will learn in the next subsection (THEOREM 3.20), the regular forms
of ‘reasoning by contraposition’ cannot be valid in any logic which is, as bC and
its extensions (cf. THEOREM 3.13(iv)), both positively preserving with respect to
classical logic and not partially explosive with respect to negation.  But there are
some restricted forms of it that hold already in bC:
FACT 3.17  These are some restricted forms of contraposition that hold in bC:
  (i)  ◦B, (A→ B) ￿bC (¬ B→¬ A);
  (ii)  ◦B, (A→¬ B) ￿bC (B→¬ A);
  (iii)  ◦B, (¬ A→ B) ￿bC (¬ B→ A);
  (iv)  ◦B, (¬ A→¬ B) ￿bC (B→ A).
Proof:   To check (i), let Γ =∆ =Λ ={◦B, (A→ B), ¬ B} and apply FACT 3.14(ii) to
Γ∪ {A}, so as to obtain Γ  ￿bC ¬ A.  From this it follows that [◦B, (A→ B) ￿bC
(¬ B→¬ A)].  Part (ii) is similar to (i).  For parts (iii) and (iv) apply FACT 3.14(iii). ￿
Now, may the reader be aware that rules such as [◦A, (A→ B) ￿bC (¬ B→¬ A)]
do not hold in this logic!
3.3  On what one cannot get.  If ‘logic is about trade-offs’, as Patrick Blackburn
likes to put it, let us now start counting the dead bodies to see what we have irremedia-
bly lost, up to now.  The connectives ∧ , ∨  and →  of bC, for example, show up as quite
independent from one another, and cannot be interdefined as in the classical case:
THEOREM 3.18  The following rule holds in bC:
  (i)  (¬ A→ B) ￿bC (A∨ B),
but none of the following rules hold in bC:
  (ii)  (A∨ B) ￿bC (¬ A→ B);
  (iii)  ¬ (¬ A→ B) ￿bC ¬ (A∨ B);
  (iv)  ¬ (A∨ B) ￿bC ¬ (¬ A→ B);
  (v)  (A→ B) ￿bC ¬ (A∧¬ B);
  (vi)  ¬ (A∧¬ B) ￿bC (A→ B);
  (vii)  ¬ (A→ B) ￿bC (A∧¬ B);
  (viii)  (A∧¬ B) ￿bC ¬ (A→ B);
  (ix)  ¬ (A∧ B) ￿bC (¬ A∨¬ B);
  (x)  (¬ A∨¬ B) ￿bC ¬ (A∧ B);
  (xi)  ¬ (¬ A∨¬ B) ￿bC (A∧ B);
  (xii)  (A∧ B) ￿bC ¬ (¬ A∨¬ B).
¬
1 0
½ 0
0 140
Proof:   This is much easier to directly check after you take a look at the semantics
and decision procedure of bC, in the paper [42].  But it also comes as a consequence
from the fact that this is already valid for Cmin, as we have proved in [39], and that bC
is a conservative extension of it (THEOREM 3.12). ￿
Notice that any uniform substitution of a component formula C for its negation ¬ C,
or vice-versa, will not alter the fact that the above rules hold or not in bC.  That is to
say, for instance, that (A→¬ B) ￿bC (¬ A∨¬ B) does hold but (¬ A∨ B) ￿bC (A→ B)
does not.  Of course, the failure of a rule such as (A∨¬ B) ￿bC ¬ (A∧¬ B) was already
to be expected from the fact that (A∨¬ A) is provable (it is (Min10)) but ¬ (A∧¬ A)
is not (see THEOREM 3.15(ii)).
Now, it should be crystal-clear that the above fact is only about bC, and that it does
not necessarily carry on to stronger logics.  In fact, it is not hard at all to check, for
instance, that the three-valued maximal logic LFI1, whose matrices were presented
in the subsection 2.4, both extends bC and validates all the rules above, except for
(ii) and (vi).  Once more, the non-validity of (vi) is barely circumstantial, for there
are logics extending bC in which it holds, such as the above mentioned P
1 (see also
the results 3.68 and 3.70, below).  Still and all, there is a very good reason for the
failure of (ii)!  Indeed, this is a consequence of the following fact:
THEOREM 3.19  The disjunctive syllogism, [A, (¬ A∨ B) ￿ B], cannot hold in any
paraconsistent extension of positive (classical or intuitionistic) logic.
Proof:   Assume that it held.  From (Min6), we would have that [¬ A ￿ (¬ A∨ B)] and
so, ultimately, we would conclude, by the transitivity of ￿, that [A, ¬ A ￿ B]. ￿
Finally, as we have already advanced above, ‘full’ contraposition is lost (cf. [54]):
THEOREM 3.20  The regular forms of contraposition, such as [(A→ B) ￿ (¬ B→
¬ A)], cannot hold irrestrictedly in any paraconsistent extension of bC.  Furthermore,
they cannot hold in any extension of the positive classical logic which happens to be
not ¬ -partially explosive.
Proof:   If the above rule held in a logic L that extends the positive classical logic,
from (Min1) we would obtain [B ￿ (A→ B)], and from (MP) we obtain [(A→ B),
¬ B ￿ ¬ A].  These two rules would ultimately lead to [B, ¬ B ￿ ¬ A], and so L would
be partially explosive with respect to negated propositions.  If we assume L to be
bC, then a particular case of [B, ¬ B ￿ ¬ A] would be [B, ¬ B ￿ ¬¬ C], taking A as
¬ C, and (Min11) would then give [B, ¬ B ￿ C], and so it would not be paraconsis-
tent at all.  Indeed, this addition of contraposition to bC would simply cause the col-
lapse of the resulting logic into classical logic (by THEOREM 3.9).  Still some other
forms of this contraposition rule, such as [(¬ A→ B) ￿ (¬ B→ A)], could be ruled out
even without recurring to (Min11), or to partial explosion. ￿
The use of the disjunctive syllogism (THEOREM 3.19) constitutes indeed the kernel
of the well-known argument laid down by C. I. Lewis for the derivation of (PPS) in
classical logic (cf. [73], pp.250ff), and this was, in fact, a rediscovery of an argu-
ment used by the Pseudo-Scotus, much before.
14  The use of contraposition (THEO-
REM 3.20) to the same purpose was pointed out in an argument by Popper (cf. [89],
pp.320ff).  Of course, in a logic where both the disjunctive syllogism and contrapo-
sition are invalid derivations, these arguments do not apply as such.
                                                  
14 See Duns Scotus’s Opera Omnia, pp.288ff.  Cf. also note 3.41
The failure of contraposition gives us a good reason for having doubts also about the
validity of the intersubstitutivity of provable equivalents, which states that, given a
schema σ (A1, …, An):
∀ B1…∀ Bn [(A1 ￿￿ B1) and … and (An ￿￿ Bn)] ⇒ (IpE)
[σ (A1, …, An) ￿￿ σ (B1, …, Bn)].
Now, as a particular example, if we had (IpE), from A ￿￿ B we would immediately
derive, for instance, ¬ A ￿￿ ¬ B.  But this is not the case here.  Indeed, in what fol-
lows we exhibit some samples of that failure in bC:
THEOREM 3.21  In bC:
  (i)  (A∧ B) ￿￿bC (B∧ A) holds, but ¬ (A∧ B) ￿￿bC ¬ (B∧ A) does not;
  (ii)  (A∨ B) ￿￿bC (B∨ A) holds, but ¬ (A∨ B) ￿￿bC ¬ (B∨ A) does not;
  (iii)  (A∧¬ A) ￿￿bC (¬ A∧ A) holds, but ¬ (A∧¬ A) ￿￿bC ¬ (¬ A∧ A) does not.
Proof:   The parts which hold are easy, using positive classical logic.  Now, to check
that none of the other parts hold, even if axioms and rules of bC are taken into consid-
eration, use the same matrices and distinguished values as in THEOREM 3.15(ii),
changing only the values of (1∧ ½) and (1∨ ½) from 1 to ½ (but leaving the values of
(½∧ 1) and (½∨ 1) as they are, equal to 1). ￿
COROLLARY 3.22  (IpE) does not hold for bC.
The reader should keep in mind that this last result is, initially, only about bC, and
that some deductive extensions of it may fix some or even all the counter-examples
to intersubstitutivity.  Now, given that (IpE) holds for classical logic, it will obviously
hold for the positive (classical) fragment of bC as well, that is, for the set of for-
mulas in which neither ¬  nor ◦ occur.  Adding contraposition as a new inference rule,
it is easy to see, by the transitivity of the consequence operator and the Deduction
Metatheorem, that one could extend (IpE) from positive logic to include also the frag-
ment of bC containing negation.  But then (bold) paraconsistency would be lost, as
we learn from THEOREM 3.20!  What happens, though, is that the contraposition
inference rule is much more than one needs in order to obtain intersubstitutivity for
the consistencyless fragments of our logics.  In fact, any of the following ‘contrapo-
sition’ deduction rules would of course do the job equally well (cf. [107] and [105]):
∀ A∀ B [(A ￿ B) ⇒  (¬ B ￿ ¬ A)]; (RC)
∀ A∀ B [(A ￿￿ B) ⇒  (¬ B ￿ ¬ A)]. (EC)
It is obvious that (EC) can be inferred from (RC), and Urbas has shown in [107] that
the paraconsistent logic obtained by adding (EC) to Cω  is extended by the paracon-
sistent logic obtained by the addition of (RC) to Cω  (and both, of course, are extended
by classical logic).  So, it is possible to obtain paraconsistent extensions of Cω  (and also
of Cmin, for Urbas’s proof of non-collapse into classical logic by the addition of (EC)
also applies to this logic), but then these new logics can all still be shown to lack a
bottom particle (as in THEOREM 3.4), constituting thus no LFIs!  The question then
would be if (IpE) could be obtained for real LFIs.  The closest we will get to this here
is showing, in THEOREM 3.53, that there are fragments of classical logic extending
bC for which (IpE) holds, but then these specific fragments turn out not to be paracon-42
sistent in our sense.  At any rate, for various other classes of LFIs we will show that
such intersubstitutivity results are just unattainable, as shown in THEOREM 3.51 (see
also, for instance, FACT 3.74).
To be sure, one does not need to blame paraconsistency for these last few negative
results.  As the reader will see below, the eccentricities in THEOREM 3.21 can be
fixed by some extensions of bC.  As for THEOREM 3.20, one could always throw
away some piece of the positive classical logic in an extreme effort to avoid its
consequences.  This is what is done, for instance, by some logics of relevance.  This
could, however, have the effect of throwing the baby out with the bath water —most
such logics, if not all, will also dismiss the useful Deduction Metatheorem or, regretta-
bly enough, modus ponens.  Now, suppose that, driven by itches of relevance,  one was
taken to consider logics such that (A, B ￿ / A).  This would definitely mean, thus, that
their consequence relations would be no more than ‘cautiously reflexive’.  If one still
insisted that (A ￿ A) should hold, then the logics produced would be non-monotonic
as well.  This would mean, of course, that many of the results that we attained in the
last section would not be immediately adaptable to such logics (and this remark also
applies to adaptive logics, once they are also non-monotonic, even if for other rea-
sons).  These are not problems of actual relevance logics, nevertheless, as they are
usually relevant only at the level of theoremhood (always invalidating (A→ (B→ A)),
while in some cases still validating (A→ A)), but still not at the level of their conse-
quence relations, as conjectured above (see, for instance, [3] or [9]) —and of course,
in all such cases, the Deduction Metatheorem cannot hold.  But yes, we had better
push our exposition on, instead of scrubbing this matter here any further.
3.4  Letting bC talk about (dual) inconsistency.  The reader may find it a bit awk-
ward, indeed, that we would be calling bC a logic of formal inconsistency, since it
only has a connective expressing consistency, but not its opposed concept.  So, for us
to be more consistent, let’s now consider a further extension of our language, this
time adding a new unary connective, •, to represent inconsistency.  The intended in-
terpretation about the dual relation between consistency and inconsistency would re-
quire exactly that each of these concepts should be opposed to the other.  But how
do we formalize this?  Consider the following additional axiomatic rule:
(bc2) ¬ •A ￿bbC ◦A. ‘If A is not inconsistent, then it is consistent’
This is surely a must, but in fact it does not represent much of an addition.  Indeed,
consider its contrapositional variation:
(bc3) ¬ ◦A ￿bbC •A. ‘If A is not consistent, then it is inconsistent’
The lack of contraposition (see THEOREM 3.20), despite the presence of some re-
stricted forms of it (such as in FACT 3.17) can be partly blamed for the fact that bC
plus (bc2) can still not prove (bc3).  Indeed:
THEOREM 3.23  (bc3) is not provable by bC plus (bc2).
Proof:   Just consider three-valued matrices such that: v(A∧ B)=0
if v(A)=0 or v(B)=0, and v(A∧ B)=1, otherwise; v(A∨ B)=0
if v(A)=0 and v(B)=0, and v(A∨ B)=1, otherwise; v(A→ B)=0
if v(A)≠ 0 and v(B)=0, and v(A→ B)=1, otherwise; v(¬ A)=
1− v(A); and the matrices for the non-classical connectives are
the ones demonstrated on the right.  0 is the only non-distinguished value. ￿
◦•
1 01
½ 01
0 ½ 043
So, let us now, for the sake of symmetry, define the logic bbC as given by the addi-
tion of both (bc2) and (bc3) to the basic logic of (in)consistency, bC.  This is still
not much… for consider now the converses of these rules:
(bc4) •A ￿bbbC ¬ ◦A; ‘If A is inconsistent, then it is not consistent’
(bc5) ◦A ￿bbbC ¬ •A. ‘If A is consistent, then it is not inconsistent’
Will these hold in bbC?  The answer is once more in the negative:
THEOREM 3.24  Neither (bc4) nor (bc5) are provable by bbC.
Proof:   Consider the same three-valued matrices for the binary
connectives as in THEOREM 3.23, but let now negation be such
that v(¬ A)=0 if v(A)≠ 0, and v(¬ A)=1, otherwise.  The non-
classical connectives will now be defined by the new matrices to
the right.  Once more, 0 is the only non-distinguished value. ￿
In reality, the situation is even worse than it may appear at first sight, though pre-
dictable.  It happens that, once more, it is not enough to add just one of (bc4) or (bc5)
to bbC —the other one would still not be provable.  Indeed:
THEOREM 3.25  (i) (bc4) is not provable by bbC plus (bc5); (ii) (bc5) is not prov-
able by bbC plus (bc4).
Proof:   Consider now the four-valued matrices where ∧ , ∨ , →
and ¬  are once more defined as in THEOREM 3.23 (only that
now they have a wider domain, with four values).  For part (i),
let ◦ and • be given by the matrices to the right.  For part (ii),
just modify ◦ so that ◦(
2/ 3)=
1/ 3 (and no more 
2/ 3); modify also •
in the contrary sense, so that •(
2/ 3)=
2/ 3 (and no more 
1/ 3).  In both
cases, only 0 should be taken to be a non-distinguished value. ￿
Taking the above results into account, we will now define the logic bbbC to be
given by the addition of both (bc4) and (bc5) to the preceding bbC.
It is important to note that the last theorem above also shows that it is ineffective
trying to introduce the inconsistency connective in the logic bC simply by setting, by
definition, •A￿¬ ◦A.  The reason is that, even though this would automatically
guarantee that •A ￿￿ ¬ ◦A, and that ¬ •A ￿￿ ¬¬ ◦A, and so on, just by defini-
tion and reflexivity, this would not guarantee as well that, for instance, we would have
◦A ￿ ¬ •A.  Indeed, to check this you may here just reconsider THEOREM 3.25(ii).
So, the relation between ◦ and • cannot, in the cases of bC and bbC, be characterized
by a simple definition.  Despite this, one may now establish new presentations for
some previous facts and theorems, just slightly different from before:
THEOREM 3.26  The results 3.11, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17 are all valid for bbbC,
and are still valid as well if one substitutes any occurrence of ◦ for ¬ •, and ¬ ◦ for •.
Proof:   This is routine, just using  (bc2)–(bc5).  For 3.15 and 3.16 remember to add a
matrix for •, just negating the matrix for ◦ presented in THEOREM 3.15(ii). ￿
So, could the relation between ◦ and • be characterized by a definition, now that we
have bbbC?  Another NO is the answer.  For if a definition such as •A￿¬ ◦A were
feasible, this would mean, given (bc5): ◦A ￿bbbC ¬ •A, that ◦A ￿bbbC ¬¬ ◦A should
hold just by straightforward substitution.  But, as it happens, this last rule does
not hold in bbbC:
◦•
1 01
½ ½ 1
0 01
◦•
1 10
2/ 3
2/ 3
1/ 3
1/ 3 0 2/ 3
0 1044
THEOREM 3.27  Neither ◦A→¬¬ ◦A nor •A→¬¬ •A are
provable by bbbC.
Proof:   Consider once more the same three-valued matrices
for the binary connectives given in THEOREM 3.23, 0 as the
only non-distinguished value, but now let the unary connec-
tives be those pictured to the right. ￿
Evidently, the above matrices must also display the non-provability by bbbC of the
schema A→¬¬ A, the converse of (Min11).  But if the validity of A→¬¬ A clearly
implies the validity of the two schemas in THEOREM 3.27, the validity of those
schemas certainly does not imply the validity of A→¬¬ A.  Indeed:
THEOREM 3.28  A→¬¬ A is not provable by bbbC plus ◦A→¬¬ ◦A and •A→
¬¬ •A.
Proof:   Consider the same matrices and distinguished values as in THEOREM 3.27,
only that now ◦ is constant and equal to 0, and • is constant and equal to 1. ￿
Now, if we added to bbbC the axioms ◦A ￿ ¬¬ ◦A and •A ￿ ¬¬ •A this would
only shift our problem to proving that ¬ •A ￿ ¬¬¬ •A and ¬ ◦A ￿ ¬¬¬ ◦A hold,
and so on, and so forth.  Of course, these would be all guaranteed if we now de-
fined bbbbC by the addition to bbbC of an infinite number of axiomatic rules, to the
effect that ¬
n◦A ￿bbbbC ¬
n+ 2◦A and ¬
n•A ￿bbbbC ¬
n+ 2•A, where ¬
m denotes m
occurrences of negation in a row.  We could also solve all of this at once by fixing
A ￿ ¬¬ A as a new axiomatic rule, but we argue that it is a bit too early for this last
solution —indeed, there is a gamut of interesting C-systems in which this axiom does
not hold, and we would rather explore them first.  So, let us study first, in what
follows, some other forms of obtaining the intended duality between ◦ and • using
a finite set of schemas, and without yet incorporating A ￿ ¬¬ A as a rule.
3.5  The logic Ci, where contradiction and inconsistency meet.  While strength-
ening bC, we have been trying to keep up with the intended duality between consis-
tency and inconsistency.  But, given the new version of the FACT 3.16 obtained in
THEOREM 3.26 (which also applies to bbbbC), we know that in any of the logics
b(b(b(b)))C a contradiction implies an inconsistency, but not the other way around
—so, this situation has still not been changed.  Now, the distinction between contra-
diction and inconsistency is a contribution of the present study, and we are unaware
of any other formal attempts to do so in the same way as we do here.  What will ha p-
pen then if we now introduce new axioms in order to finally obtain the identification
of contradiction and inconsistency, getting closer this way to the other paraconsistent
logics in the literature?  Let’s do it.  Consider the two following axiomatic rules:
(ci1) •A ￿Ci A; ‘If A is inconsistent, then A should be the case’
(ci2) •A ￿Ci ¬ A. ‘If A is inconsistent, then ¬ A should be the case’
Given the classical properties of conjunction, these two rules will evidently have the
same effect as the following single one:
(ci) •A ￿Ci (A∧¬ A). ‘An inconsistency implies a contradiction’
So, let’s call Ci the logic obtained by the addition of (ci1) and (ci2) (or, equivalently,
the addition of (ci)) to bbbC, that is, the logic axiomatized by (Min1)–(Min11), (bc1)–
(bc5), (ci), and (MP).  In Ci we finally have that •A and (A∧¬ A) are equivalent for-
¬ ◦•
1 0 ½½
½ 101
0 10145
(bc5), (ci), and (MP).  In Ci we finally have that •A and (A∧¬ A) are equivalent for-
mulas, and we shall see that this will make a BIG difference on Ci’s deductive strength.
First, let us note that, even though we now have, in Ci, the converse of parts (i) and
(ii) of FACT 3.16, the converses of parts (iii) and (iv) still do not hold.  Indeed:
FACT 3.29  This rule does hold in  Ci:
  (i)  ¬ ◦A ￿Ci (A∧¬ A),
but the following rules do not:
  (ii)  ¬ (A∧¬ A) ￿Ci ◦A;
  (iii)  ¬ (¬ A∧ A) ￿Ci ◦A.
Proof:  The first part is obvious.  For the following ones, consider, for instance, the
three-valued matrices such that:
v(A∧ B)=min(v(A), v(B));
v(A∨ B)=max(v(A), v(B));
v(A→ B)=v(B), if v(A)≠ 0, and v(A→ B)=1, otherwise;
v(¬ A)=1− v(A);
v(◦A)=0, if v(A)=v(¬ A), and v(◦A)=1, otherwise;
v(•A)=1, if v(A)=v(¬ A), and v(•A)=0, otherwise,
where 0 is the only non-distinguished value.  The attentive reader might have no-
ticed that these are exactly the matrices defining the already mentioned LFI1, in the
subsection 2.4. ￿
So, this last theorem reminds us that, even though in Ci we do have an equivalent
way of referring to inconsistency using just the classical language, this does not mean
that we should also have an immediate CPL-linguistic equivalent manner of referring
to consistency as well (but confront this with what happens in the case of the dC-
systems, in the subsection 3.8)!  There are, however, many other things that we do
have.  For instance, in Ci the THEOREM 3.15 is still entirely valid.  Indeed:
THEOREM 3.30  ¬ (A∧¬ A) and ¬ (¬ A∧ A) are not top particles in Ci (also the
formula (A→¬¬ A) is still not provable).
Proof:   Use again the matrices of P
1 (in THEOREM 3.15(ii)), adding a matrix for
‘•’ by negating the matrix for ‘◦’. ￿
We also have in Ci some new ways of formulating gentle explosion and the re-
ductio deduction rules:
FACT 3.31  The following rules hold in Ci:
  (i)  ◦A, •A ￿Ci B;
  (ii)  ◦A, ¬ ◦A ￿Ci B;
  (iii)  •A, ¬ •A ￿Ci B;
  (iv)  [(Γ , B ￿Ci ◦A) and (∆ , B ￿Ci •A)] ⇒  (Γ , ∆  ￿Ci ¬ B);
  (v)  [(Γ , B ￿Ci ◦A) and (∆ , B ￿Ci ¬ ◦A)] ⇒  (Γ , ∆  ￿Ci ¬ B);
  (vi)  [(Γ , B ￿Ci •A) and (∆ , B ￿Ci ¬ •A)] ⇒  (Γ , ∆  ￿Ci ¬ B).
Proof:   Part (i) comes from (ci) and (bc1), parts (ii) and (iii) come from part (i) if
you use (bc2)–(bc5).  Rules (iv), (v) and (vi) are variations on FACT 3.14(ii), using
the previous rules. ￿
Parts (ii) and (iii) of FACT 3.31 simply show Ci to be controllably explosive in
contact either with a consistent or with an inconsistent formula.  In fact, in Ci one can
go on to prove a much more intimate connection between consistency and control-46
lable explosion, and this will reveal some even stronger consequences of the new
axiomatic rule, (ci), that we now consider:
FACT 3.32  A particular given schema in Ci (or in any extension of this logic) is con-
sistent if, and only if, Ci is controllably explosive in contact with this schema.
Proof:   To show that [(Γ  ￿Ci ◦A) ⇒  (Γ , A, ¬ A ￿Ci B)] just invoke axiom (bc1)
and the transitivity of ￿.  For the converse, note that, from (ci) and (bc3), one may
obtain [¬ ◦A ￿Ci (A∧¬ A)], and so, from the supposition that (Γ , A, ¬ A ￿Ci B) it
follows that ¬ ◦A is a bottom particle. One may then conclude, as in THEOREM 3.10,
that ￿Ci ¬¬ ◦A, and, by (Min11), that ￿Ci ◦A. ￿
FACT 3.33  These are some special theses of Ci:
  (i)  ￿Ci ◦◦A;
  (ii)  ￿Ci ¬ •◦A;
  (iii)  ￿Ci ◦•A;
  (iv)  ￿Ci ¬ ••A.
Proof:   Parts (i) and (iii) come directly from FACT 3.32 and from parts (ii) and (iii)
of FACT 3.31.  For (ii) and (iv), use (bc2) and the previous parts. ￿
This last result (check also [54]) implies that Ci will not have consistency or in-
consistency appearing at different levels: both consistent and inconsistent formulas
are consistent (in contrast to what happened in the case of bC —see THEOREM
3.10—, where no formula was provably consistent), and none of them is inconsistent
(check also FACT 3.50 for a much stronger version of the last fact in Ci).
The reader will recall from the subsection 3.3 that contraposition inference rules
not only did not hold in bC but could not even be added to any paraconsistent exten-
sion of it (THEOREM 3.20).  Ci can be shown to count, nevertheless, with more re-
stricted forms of contraposition than bC (compare the following with FACT 3.17):
FACT 3.34  These are some restricted forms of contraposition introduced by Ci:
  (i)  (A→ ◦B) ￿Ci (¬ ◦B→¬ A);
  (ii)  (A→¬ ◦B) ￿Ci (◦B→¬ A);
  (iii)  (¬ A→ ◦B) ￿Ci (¬ ◦B→ A);
  (iv)  (¬ A→¬ ◦B) ￿Ci (◦B→ A).
Proof:   To check (i), let Γ =∆ ={(A→ ◦B), ¬ ◦B} and apply FACT 3.31(v) to Γ∪ {A},
so as to obtain Γ  ￿Ci ¬ A.  This will give the desired result.  Alternatively, one could
use directly FACT 3.17(i) and note that ◦◦B is a theorem of Ci (this is FACT 3.33(i)).
The other parts are similar, and we leave them as easy exercises to the reader. ￿
Note that all rules in the last result continue to be valid if one substitutes any
‘◦’ for ‘¬ •’, and any ‘¬ ◦’ for ‘•’.  On the other hand, rules such as [(◦A→ B) ￿Ci
(¬ B→¬ ◦A)] do not hold in this logic!
Now, we have learned from COROLLARY 3.22 that the intersubstitutivity of
provable equivalents, (IpE), does not hold for bC.  The same result is true for Ci, and
still the same counter-examples mentioned before can be presented here:
THEOREM 3.35  (IpE) does not hold for Ci.
Proof:   Add to the matrices on THEOREM 3.21 one matrix for • such that v(•A)=
1− v(◦A), and check that all the new axioms, defining Ci from bC, still hold. ￿47
Now, in order to go one step further from the actual absence of contraposition in
Ci, let us recall that in the subsection 3.3 it has been pointed out that the addition of
some of the deduction ‘contraposition’ rules (EC) or (RC) would have been equally
sufficient for obtaining (IpE) for consistencyless fragments of our paraconsistent
logics.  It seems, nevertheless, that obtaining (IpE) will not be an easy task, after all:
FACT 3.36  The addition of (RC): [(A ￿ B) ⇒  (¬ B ￿ ¬ A)] to Ci causes its collapse
into classical logic.
Proof:   From (ci1) and (ci2), plus (bc3), one obtains, respectively, that ¬ ◦A ￿Ci A,
and ¬ ◦A ￿Ci ¬ A.  Applying (RC) and (Min11) one would have then ¬ A ￿Ci ◦A and
¬¬ A ￿Ci ◦A.  But then, using the proof by cases, one would conclude that ￿Ci ◦A,
that is, all formulas would be consistent.  Looking at THEOREM 3.9 and (bc1), one
sees that this was exactly what was lacking in order for classical logic to be char-
acterized. ￿
So, (RC) must be ruled out as an alternative in order to obtain (IpE), in the case
of Ci.  As for (EC), its possible addition to Ci will be discussed below, in THEO-
REM 3.51, FACT 3.52, and the subsequent commentaries on these results.
The new restricted forms of contraposition in FACT 3.34 are, in any case, strong
enough for us to show that Ci has some redundant axioms as it is.  Indeed:
FACT 3.37  In Ci: (i) (bc2) proves (bc3), and vice-versa.  (ii) (bc4) proves (bc5),
and vice-versa.
Other interesting consequences of (ci) are those that we shall call ‘Guillaume’s
Theses’, which regulate the propagation of consistency and the back-propagation of
inconsistency through negation:
FACT 3.38  Ci also proves the following:
  (i)  ◦A ￿Ci ◦¬ A;
  (ii)  •¬ A ￿Ci •A.
Proof:   From (ci) and (bc4), we have that [¬ ◦¬ A ￿Ci (¬ A∧¬¬ A)], from Cmin
we have that [(¬ A∧¬¬ A) ￿Ci (A∧¬ A)], and from FACT 3.16(ii) we know that
[(A∧¬ A) ￿Ci ¬ ◦A].  So, ultimately, we have the rule [¬ ◦¬ A ￿Ci ¬ ◦A].  By (bc3)
and (bc4) we prove part (ii) of our fact.  Part (i) comes from this same rule, by an
application of FACT 3.34(iv). ￿
This last result will provide us with some other forms for the theses in FACT 3.33,
such as:
FACT 3.39  These are also some special theses of Ci:
  (i)  ￿Ci ◦¬ ◦A;
  (ii)  ￿Ci ¬ •¬ ◦A;
  (iii)  ￿Ci ◦¬ •A;
  (iv)  ￿Ci ¬ •¬ •A.
It will also be useful to note that here we have (contrasting with THEOREM 3.30,
which informed us, among other things, that [A ￿ / Ci ¬¬ A]):
FACT 3.40  Here are some more special theses of Ci:
  (i)  ◦A ￿Ci ¬¬ ◦A;
  (ii)  •A ￿Ci ¬¬ •A.48
Proof:   These will follow directly if you apply FACT 3.34 twice.  The reader might
remember that we lacked these forms in bbbC (this was THEOREM 3.27). ￿
Now, do we obtain in Ci that intended duality between consistency and inconsis-
tency?  The answer is YES.  This is the topic for our next subsection.
3.6  On a simpler presentation for Ci.  The logic Ci provides us with a sufficient
environment to prove a kind of restricted intersubstitutivity or replacement theorem.
While we know from THEOREM 3.35 that full replacement for the formulas of Ci
does not obtain, our present restricted forms of contraposition, nevertheless, will help
us to show that intersubstitutivity does hold if only we are talking only about substi-
tuting some formula whose outmost operator is ‘◦’ by this same formula, but now
having ‘¬ •’ in the place of that ‘◦’, or if we will substitute some formula whose out-
most operator is ‘•’ by this same formula, but now having ‘¬ ◦’ in the place of that ‘•’.
In simpler terms, what we are saying is that we can now take just one of the opera-
tors ‘◦’ and ‘•’ as primitive, and define the other in terms of the negation of that first
one.  So, we will now show that:
THEOREM 3.41  An equivalent axiomatization for Ci is obtained if we consider only
axioms (Min1)–(Min11), (bc1), (ci), and (MP), and set one of these two definitions:
  (i)  •A￿¬ ◦A;
  (ii)  ◦A￿¬ •A.
Proof:   Consider part (i) to be the case.  This means that we can take (bc3): ¬ ◦A ￿Ci
•A and (bc4): •A ￿Ci ¬ ◦A, for granted, simply by definition.  Now, (bc2): ¬ •A ￿Ci
◦A, will be the case if, and only if, given the definition of ‘•’, ¬¬ ◦A ￿Ci  ◦A is the
case —and it is, because of (Min11).  As to (bc5): ◦A ￿ ¬ •A, it will be the case if,
and only if, ◦A ￿Ci ¬¬ ◦A is the case —and it is, this time thanks to FACT 3.40(i).
An alternative, and much simpler way, of checking that (bc2) and (bc5) should hold
here is by taking FACT 3.37 into consideration.  The axiomatic rule (bc1): ◦A, A,
¬ A ￿Ci B is already in the ‘standard form’ (we are here eliminating all occurrences
of ‘•’s and leaving only ‘◦’s), and the rule (ci): •A ￿Ci (A∧¬ A) can be exchanged,
by the definition of ‘•’, that is, by (bc3) and (bc4), for ¬ ◦A ￿Ci (A∧¬ A).  Now we
have shown that all occurrences of ‘•’ in the axioms of Ci can be substituted by an oc-
currence of ‘¬ ◦’, and all occurrences of ‘¬ •’ in the axioms of Ci can be substituted by
an occurrence of ‘◦’.  So, if you would have proven a formula in which, respectively,
an inconsistency connective ‘•’ or its negated form ‘¬ •’ appears at some point, you
can now rewrite the proof using the new versions of the axioms above and what will
appear in the end will be, respectively, a negated consistency connective ‘¬ ◦’, or
simply the connective ‘◦’.  For part (ii) the procedure is entirely analogous, but now
use FACT 3.40(ii), or FACT 3.37 again, when necessary. ￿
So, this last result provides us with a restricted form of replacement theorem for con-
sistent formulas, and guarantees the intended duality between ◦ and •, which could not
be obtained in the subsection 3.4, within bbbbC or its fragments.  With such a result
in hand we need make no big effort to verify that formulas such as ¬ (◦A∧¬ ◦A),
¬ (◦A∧ •A), ¬ (¬ •A∧¬ ◦A) and ¬ (¬ •A∧ •A) are all equivalent, which could, oth-
erwise, be quite a non-trivial task!49
The reason why we can obtain this new axiomatization, as the reader will make out
after he is introduced to the semantics of Ci, in [42], is that, truth-functionally based on
the non-classical behavior of negation, both the consistency and the inconsistency
operators of this logic will work quite ‘classically’.
3.7  Using LFIs to talk about classical logic.  At this point, working with Ci, per-
haps the question would arise as to how far we are from classical propositional logic,
CPL.  The answer is: a lot —and just a little bit.  As we are not presupposing any
kind of doublethinking, let us then reformulate a few things for the question, and its
answer, really to make sense.
To start with, it is hard to compare two logics if they ‘talk about different things’,
and are so disjoint that none of them is an extension of the other.  For Cmin was a con-
servative extension of positive classical logic, but it was a fragment, in the same lan-
guage, of ‘full’ CPL, as we know, and bC was a conservative extension of Cmin.
Thus, Ci, which is a deductive extension of bC, happens to be written in a richer lan-
guage than that of CPL, but it does not contain all classical inferences, and so these
two logics are hardly comparable.  Now, this is easy to fix.  Let us also conservatively
extend CPL by the addition of connectives for consistency and inconsistency, whose
matrices will be such that ◦ takes always the distinguished value 1, and •, on the con-
trary, is constant and equal to 0.  We will designate this ‘new’ logic, obtained by such
an extension of CPL, extended classical logic, or eCPL.  Of course, eCPL can be
easily axiomatized by the addition of an axiomatic schema such as:
(ext)  ￿eCPL ◦A ‘Every A is consistent’
to any axiomatization of CPL, like the one mentioned in THEOREM 3.9.  The in-
consistency connective, •, can be here introduced as a definition: •A￿¬ ◦A, just
as in THEOREM 3.41(i).  In this way we obtain an extension of classical logic which
looks as a logic of formal inconsistency (see (D20)), having an operator expressing
consistency, and of course an axiomatic rule such as [◦A, A, ¬ A ￿eCPL B], expressing
finite gentle explosion, will hold in eCPL.  But, as it happens, given axiom (ext), we
know that eCPL is not only finitely gently explosive (and so, non-trivial), but explo-
sive as well.  It is, in fact, a consistent logic (see (D19)), instead of an LFI.
Well and good, but is Ci now to be characterized as a deductive fragment of eCPL?
Indeed!  Just check that all axioms of Ci are validated by the matrices of eCPL,
and that’s it.  So, Ci is in fact a fragment of an alternative formulation of classical
logic, and this of course will guarantee that Ci is a non-contradictory logic (once Ci
is not explosive, but it is a fragment of eCPL, and eCPL is still at least as explo-
sive and non-trivial as CPL was, and consequently it cannot prove a contradiction).
Is that all to it?  No, because we will now see that we can still use Ci to reproduce
in a very faithful way every inference of CPL (or of eCPL)!
How can this be done?  Remember that Ci has a strong (or supplementing) negation,
which can be defined, as in the case of bC, by setting ~A￿(¬ A∧ ◦A).  But, in bC,
even though this negation had the power of producing (supplementing) explosions,
it could not still be said to have all properties of a classical negation.  Indeed:
THEOREM 3.42  The strong negation ~, in b(b(b(b)))C, is not classical.
Proof:   Just consider once more the classical matrices for the classical connectives,
as in the above definition of eCPL, but now exchange the matrices of ◦ and •, let-
ting ◦ be constant and equal to 0 (and not to 1, as before), and letting • be constant
and equal to 1 (and not to 0, as before).  It is easy to see that all axioms and rules of50
b(b(b(b)))C are validated by such matrices, but (ci) and (ext) are not, and conse-
quently formulas such as (A∨ ~A) and (A→ ~~A) (recall the definition of ~A) are not
validated as well, being independent from all logics we have exposed previous to Ci. ￿
This is an interesting result that shows that being explosive is not enough to make a
negation classical.
15  But what would be enough?  Well, given the axiomatization of
classical logic in THEOREM 3.9, we know that any connective ÷  added in an axio-
matic environment where (Min1)–(Min9) hold and which is such that:
  (Alt10)  ￿Alt (A∨÷ A);
  (Alt11)  ￿Alt (÷÷ A→ A);
  (Alt12)  ￿Alt (A→ (÷ A→ B)),
also hold, should behave as the classical negation.  So, all we have to do now is to
show that (Alt10)–(Alt12) hold in Ci if one substitutes ÷  for the strong negation ~.
We could here make use of an auxiliary lemma:
LEMMA 3.43  These are some theorems of Ci:
  (i)  ￿Ci (A∨ ◦A);
  (ii)  ￿Ci (¬ A∨ ◦A).
Proof:   For part (i), observe that, from (Min6), [◦A ￿Ci (A∨ ◦A)], and, from (ci1),
[¬ ◦A ￿Ci A], so, once more by (Min6), and transitivity, [¬ ◦A ￿Ci (A∨ ◦A)].  Using
the proof by cases one finally concludes that [￿Ci (A∨ ◦A)].  Part (ii) is similar to (i),
but you should now use (ci2). ￿
THEOREM 3.44  The strong negation ~, in Ci, is classical.
Proof:   To check that (Alt10) holds for ~, that is, that [￿Ci (A∨ (¬ A∧ ◦A))], notice
that this last schema is equivalent to [￿Ci (A∨¬ A)∧ (A∨ ◦A))], by positive classi-
cal logic, and the latter is provable from (Min10) and LEMMA 3.43(i), using (Min3).
Now, (Alt12) is immediate, by the very definition of ~, and to check (Alt11) you
might just notice that by reflexivity we have [~~A, A ￿Ci A], and from (Alt12) we
have [~~A, ~A ￿Ci A]; so, using a new form of proof by cases obtained from (Alt10)
and (Min8) (as in FACT 3.7), we conclude that [~~A ￿Ci A]. ￿
So, Ci is strong enough to endow its strong negation with all properties of a clas-
sical negation.  This result has some immediate consequences.  For instance, we could
use it to show that (Min9) is redundant in Ci (and all other logics extending it).  No-
tice, of course, that the two last results did not really need to use the whole positive
classical logic, but that its intuitionistic fragment (which does not contain (Min9))
would have been enough.  Confront the following fact with THEOREM 3.3:
FACT 3.45  The schema (Min9): (A∨ (A→ B)) is redundant in the axiomatization of Ci.
Proof:   From reflexivity and (Alt12) we have that [A ￿Ci A] and [~A ￿Ci (A→ B)].
But, of course, either A or (A→ B), by (Min6) and (Min7), imply the above schema,
(A∨ (A→ B)).  So, using (Alt10) once more to provide a proof by cases, we are done. ￿
                                                  
15 There seems to be, at any rate, a widespread mistaken assumption in the literature to that effect (despite
the example of intuitionistic negation, strong but not classical).  Yet in some other studies, as for instance
Batens’s [13], note 11, a ‘classical’ negation, ÷, in a paraconsistent logic is assumed to be one which is not
only strong but it should also be the case that [÷ A ￿ ¬ A] holds (as in axiom (bun), in the subsection 3.8).
This is the case, however, for bC’s strong negation ~, but now we know that it is still not classical (it
just has some kind of intuitionistic behavior).  Ten years before, nevertheless, this same author (see [10], page
224) had put things more precisely, and required for that definition that [￿ (A∨÷ A)] should also be the case.51
We shall not list the properties of ~ in Ci at this point, but only mention the fact that
‘it is a classical negation’ when necessary, and then use any property that derives from
this fact.
Now, this strong (classical) negation will give us a very interesting result.  We al-
ready knew that the other binary connectives worked as their classical counterparts,
and we were informed above that Ci comes also equipped with a negation which
works like the classical one; so why don’t we use Ci to ‘talk about classical logic’,
that is, use Ci’s own stuff to reproduce any classical inference?  One intuitive pro-
cedure to bring forth such an effect would be to pick any classical inference and
just substitute any occurrence of a classical negation by an occurrence of a strong ne-
gation, and leave the rest as it is.  And this indeed works:
THEOREM 3.46  The following mapping conservatively translates CPL inside of Ci:
  (t1.1)  t1(p)=p, if p is an atomic formula;
  (t1.2)  t1(A#B)=t1(A)#t1(B), if # is any binary connective;
  (t1.3)  t1(¬ A)=~t1(A).
So, it is the case that [Γ  ￿CPL A] ⇔  [t1[Γ ] ￿Ci t1(A)].
Proof:   Given THEOREM 3.44, we know that, by way of the above transformation,
a counterpart to CPL’s axiomatization can be obtained inside of Ci. ￿
COROLLARY 3.47  We also have a conservative translation of eCPL inside of Ci.
Just extend the above mapping by adding:
  (t1.4)  t1(◦A)=◦◦t1(A).
Proof:   This comes from the above theorem, eCPL’s axiom (ext) and FACT 3.33(i). ￿
The above recursive translation just substitutes one negation for another, thus giv-
ing rise to a grammatically faithful (cf. [61], chapter X) way of reproducing clas-
sical inferences inside of Ci, and inside of any other logic deductively stronger than
it, as the ones we will be studying below.  Of course, other logics may provide yet
some other sensible ways of translating classical logic inside of them (see, for instance,
COROLLARY 3.62).
To be sure, we already had, in bC, a way of reproducing classical inferences (re-
call THEOREM 3.11), but at that point we had to introduce further premises in our
theories —to wit, the premises that some of our propositions were consistent).  A
natural question which may arise then is whether this was really necessary, given
that from THEOREM 3.42 we know that the ‘canonical’ strong negation of bC was
not a classical one, and would then not allow the above translations to be performed
inside of bC, or could it perhaps be the case that all strong negations are indeed strong,
but some are stronger than others?  This last option is indeed what occurs, for it can
be easily shown, if we just recall FACT 2.10(ii), how one can define a classical ne-
gation inside of bC, despite the weakness of this logic, thus being able to talk about
classical logic already inside of the most basic C-system we here present:
THEOREM 3.48  The logic bC does have a classical negation.
Proof:   From (bc1), the axiom that realizes finite gentle explosiveness, and from
left-adjunctiveness, we know that (A∧ (¬ A∧ ◦A)) is a bottom particle, for any for-
mula A —let’s choose any of these conjunctions and denote it by ⊥ , as usual.  In-
spired by FACT 2.10(ii) and using the Deduction Metatheorem we then define a
new strong negation, ￿, on bC as ￿A￿(A→⊥ ).
16  To check that this negation is
                                                  
16 This was indeed one of the many ‘negations’ set forth by Bunder in [30], though this author seems
not to have completely understood their properties (see below the subsection 3.8).52
classical, we just need to prove that (￿￿A→ A) is a theorem of bC.  To such an
end, first note that [￿Ci (A∨ ￿A)], given that this is [￿Ci (A∨ (A→⊥ ))], a form of
axiom (Min9), and this gives us a new form of proof by cases, as in THEOREM 3.44.
Next, notice that [((A→⊥ )→⊥ ), (A→⊥ ) ￿Ci ⊥ ], by modus ponens, and [⊥  ￿Ci A]
by definition of the bottom particle, but also [((A→⊥ )→⊥ ), A  ￿Ci A].  Thus, the
new form of proof by cases will immediately give us [((A→⊥ )→⊥ ) ￿Ci A]. ￿
It is easy then to transform THEOREM 3.46 into a grammatically faithful transla-
tion of CPL already inside of bC, but it would be less easy to find a non-trivial ana-
logue of COROLLARY 3.47, the translation of eCPL, given that bC is already known
to have no consistent theorems (recall THEOREM 3.10) —that is, no theorems of the
form ◦A.  As to the status of the two different strong negations presented above inside
of the stronger logic Ci, one can easily go on to show that:
FACT 3.49  In Ci the two strong negations above, ~ and ￿, are both classical, and
are in fact equivalent, in a sense (but not all strong negations are classical in Ci).
Proof:   That they are both classical is an obvious consequence from THEOREM 3.44
and THEOREM 3.48.  To see that they are equivalent in Ci, remember, on the one hand,
that [A, ~A ￿Ci ⊥ ], by definition, and so [~A ￿Ci (A→⊥ )], that is, [~A ￿Ci ￿A], by
the Deduction Metatheorem.  On the other hand, we have both that [(A→⊥ ), A ￿ ⊥ ],
and thus [(A→⊥ ), A ￿Ci ~A], and that [(A→⊥ ), ~A ￿Ci ~A], so the form of proof by
cases offered by THEOREM 3.44 will allow us to conclude that [￿A ￿Ci ~A].  The
reader will be right in thinking that all classical negations extending a positive classi-
cal basis are equivalent, but it is still the case, nonetheless, that Ci can define other
strong negations that do not have a classical character, as for instance (¬¬ ~A) or
(¬¬ ￿A).  Take a look at [42], our paper on semantics, in the section on Ci, to check
this claim. ￿
Now, the reader may perhaps think that classically negated propositions in bC
and Ci (especially given the reconstruction of classical inferences inside of these logics
that such negations support by way of the above mentioned conservative translations)
would be classical enough so as to be consistent propositions themselves, that is, that
◦÷ A would be a theorem, for instance, of Ci, for some classical negation ÷ .  We will
now show that this can hardly be the case:
FACT 3.50  Only consistent or inconsistent formulas can themselves be provably
consistent in Ci.  Thus, (◦A) is a theorem of Ci if, and only if, A is of the form ◦B,
•B, ¬ ◦B or ¬ •B, for some B.
Proof:   On the one hand, we already know from FACT 3.33 and FACT 3.39 that for-
mulas such as ◦B or •B, and their variations, are all provably consistent in Ci.  To
see that the converse is also true, consider the following three-valued matrices, such
that 0 is the only non-distinguished value and v(A∧ B)=½ if v(A)≠ 0 and v(B)≠ 0,
and v(A∧ B)=0, otherwise; v(A∨ B)=½ if v(A)≠ 0 or v(B)≠ 0, and v(A∨ B)=0, oth-
erwise; v(A→ B)=½ if v(A)=0 or v(B)≠ 0, and v(A→ B)=0, otherwise; v(¬ A)=
1− v(A); v(◦A)=1 if v(A)≠ ½, and v(◦A)=0, otherwise. ￿
As a consequence of the last result, in particular, formulas of the form ◦~A and
◦￿A will not be provable in Ci, and, from FACT 3.32, we conclude that Ci is not
controllably explosive in contact with (at least some) classically negated proposi-
tions.  As we shall see, on the other hand, there are many extensions of this logic that53
do have this property, at least for some particular A’s (see FACT 3.66, or FACT 3.76).
But what would have happened if we had indeed theorems such as tho ones ruled
out above?  Let us here allow ourselves some counterfactual reasoning, and ask our-
selves about the possible validity of (IpE) in some specific paraconsistent logics,
like the extensions of Ci, or of some of its fragments (given that we know, from
THEOREM 3.35, that (IpE) still does not hold in Ci, anyway):
THEOREM 3.51  (IpE) cannot hold in any paraconsistent extension of Ci in which:
  (i)  (◦÷÷ A) holds, for some given classical negation ÷ ; or
  (ii)  ¬ (A∧¬ A) or ¬ (¬ A∧ A) hold; or
  (iii)  [(¬ A∨¬ B) ￿ ¬ (A∧ B)] hold; or
  (iv)  [¬ (A∧ B) ￿ (¬ A∨¬ B)] hold.
(IpE) cannot hold in any paraconsistent extension of bC in which:
  (v)  [¬ (A→ B) ￿ (A∧¬ B)] hold.
(IpE) cannot hold in any adjunctive paraconsistent extension of Cmin in which:
  (vi)  both [(A∧ B) ￿ ¬ (¬ A∨¬ B)] and [¬ (¬ A∨¬ B) ￿ (A∧ B)] hold.
(IpE) cannot hold in any adjunctive paraconsistent logic in which:
  (vii)  both ¬ (A∧¬ A) and [(A∧¬ A) ￿￿ ¬¬ (A∧¬ A)] hold.
Proof:   For part (i), given that ÷  is a classical negation we can then assume [A ￿￿
÷÷ A] to hold.  Now, if (IpE) were valid one could conclude, in particular, that [◦A ￿￿
◦÷÷ A], and given that (◦÷÷ A) is a theorem of this logic extending Ci, by hypothe-
sis, one would infer ◦A as a theorem, but this is (ext), exactly the axiom that is
lacking to make Ci collapse into eCPL.  This generalizes a similar argument to be
found in [107], Theorem 9.  To check part (ii), recall that, in Ci, [•A ￿￿ (A∧¬ A)],
and (IpE) would then give [◦A ￿￿ ¬ (A∧¬ A)], and we are again left with the
theorem ◦A, as in part (i).  For part (iii), recall that (¬ A∨¬¬ A) is a theorem al-
ready of Cmin, and the problem reduces then to part (ii).  For parts (iv) and (v), we
will just show that [(¬÷ A) ￿ A] is obtained, and so we may conclude that con-
trollable explosion occurs in contact with ÷ A.  Given that [¬ (A∧ B) ￿ (¬ A∨¬ B)]
holds, consider the strong negation ~A￿(¬ A∧ ◦A), for which one would imme-
diately obtain [¬ ~A ￿ (¬¬ A∨¬ ◦A)], and so, from (Min11), (ci1) and (Min8), we
get [¬ ~A ￿ A].  Given that [¬ (A→ B) ￿ (A∧¬ B)] holds, pick up ￿A￿(A→⊥ ),
and, from (Min4), we have that [¬ ￿A ￿ A].  For part (vi), given once more that
(¬ A∨¬¬ A) is a theorem of Cmin, (IpE) would give us [¬ (¬ A∨¬¬ A)  ￿￿
¬ (¬ B∨¬¬ B)], and the rules that we here assume give us [(A∧¬ A) ￿￿ (B∧¬ B)],
so, by adjunction, we conclude in particular that [A, ¬ A ￿ B].  This is the main re-
sult in Béziau’s [21].  Finally, for part (vii), (IpE) would give us [¬¬ (A∧¬ A) ￿￿
¬¬ (B∧¬ B)], and so [(A∧¬ A) ￿￿ (B∧¬ B)], and we are in the same situation as in
(vi).  This is a stronger version of the main result in Béziau’s [22], where actually [A
￿￿ ¬¬ A] was assumed, instead of [(A∧¬ A) ￿￿ ¬¬ (A∧¬ A)].  Of course, a
similar version of this last result arises if one just uniformly substitutes (A∧¬ A)
for (¬ A∧ A) in its statement.  Notice that the rules mentioned in parts (iii) to (vi)
had already shown up as the items (x), (ix), (vii), (xii) and (xi) of THEOREM 3.18.￿
So far we have some negative results about the validity of (IpE) in some possible
paraconsistent extensions of bC or Ci, but are there paraconsistent extensions of these
logics in which (IpE) does hold?  In the search for an answer, one could start by  testing
the compatibility of the addition, to those logics, of at least one of the following rules
of deduction, (RC): [(A ￿ B) ⇒  (¬ B ￿ ¬ A)] or (EC): [(A ￿￿ B) ⇒  (¬ B ￿ ¬ A)]54
(see the subsection 3.3, where these were argued to be enough for the consistency-
less fragment of our language), and also of at least one of the following:
∀ A∀ B [(A ￿ B) ⇒  (◦A ￿ ◦B)]; (RO)
∀ A∀ B [(A ￿￿ B) ⇒  (◦A ￿ ◦B)]. (EO)
We have already shown, in FACT 3.36, that (RC) cannot be added to Ci without col-
lapsing into classical logic.  We can now actually show more:
FACT 3.52  In extensions of Ci, the validity of (EC) also guarantees (EO).
Proof:   From [A ￿￿ B] we conclude, by (EC), that [¬ A ￿￿ ¬ B].  From these two
sentences, by positive logic, we conclude that [(A∧¬ A) ￿￿ (B∧¬ B)], but from
FACT 3.16(ii) and FACT 3.29(i) we know that [¬ ◦C ￿￿ (C∧¬ C)], and so we have
that [¬ ◦A ￿￿ ¬ ◦B].  Finally, from FACT 3.34(iv), we have that [◦A ￿￿ ◦B]. ￿
The problem of finding paraconsistent extensions of Ci in which (IpE) holds reduces
then to the problem of finding out if (EC) can be added to this logic without losing
the paraconsistent character.  We suspect this can be done, but shall leave it as an open
problem at this point.  As to extensions of bC, on the other hand, we can already
present a (very partial) result:
THEOREM 3.53  There are fragments of eCPL extending bC in which (IpE) holds.
Proof:   We already know, from COROLLARY 3.22, that (IpE) does not hold for bC
as it is.  It suffices now to show that the addition of the rules (EC) and (EO) to bC
may still originate a paraconsistent fragment of (extended) classical logic, once these
rules are evidently enough to ensure (IpE).  To such an end, one may simply make
use of the following matrices by Urbas ([107], Theorem 8):
∧ 1
6/ 7
5/ 7
4/ 7
3/ 7
2/ 7
1/ 7 0
1 1 6/ 7
5/ 7
4/ 7
3/ 7
2/ 7
1/ 7 0
6/ 7
6/ 7
6/ 7
3/ 7
2/ 7
3/ 7
2/ 7 00
5/ 7
5/ 7
3/ 7
5/ 7
1/ 7
3/ 7 0 1/ 7 0
4/ 7
4/ 7
2/ 7
1/ 7
4/ 7 0 2/ 7
1/ 7 0
3/ 7
3/ 7
3/ 7
3/ 7 0 3/ 7 000
2/ 7
2/ 7
2/ 7 0 2/ 7 0 2/ 7 00
1/ 7
1/ 7 0 1/ 7
1/ 7 001/ 7 0
0 00000000
∨ 1
6/ 7
5/ 7
4/ 7
3/ 7
2/ 7
1/ 7 0
1 11111111
6/ 7 1 6/ 7 116/ 7
6/ 7 1 6/ 7
5/ 7 115/ 7 1 5/ 7 1 5/ 7
5/ 7
4/ 7 1114/ 7 1 4/ 7
4/ 7
4/ 7
3/ 7 1 6/ 7
5/ 7 1 3/ 7
6/ 7
5/ 7
3/ 7
2/ 7 1 6/ 7 1 4/ 7
6/ 7
2/ 7
4/ 7
2/ 7
1/ 7 115/ 7
4/ 7
5/ 7
4/ 7
1/ 7
1/ 7
0 1 6/ 7
5/ 7
4/ 7
3/ 7
2/ 7
1/ 7 0
¬
1 0
6/ 7
5/ 7
5/ 7
2/ 7
4/ 7
3/ 7
3/ 7
4/ 7
2/ 7
5/ 7
1/ 7 1
0 1
→ 1
6/ 7
5/ 7
4/ 7
3/ 7
2/ 7
1/ 7 0
1 1 6/ 7
5/ 7
4/ 7
3/ 7
2/ 7
1/ 7 0
6/ 7 115/ 7
4/ 7
5/ 7
4/ 7
1/ 7
1/ 7
5/ 7 1 6/ 7 1 4/ 7
6/ 7
2/ 7
4/ 7
2/ 7
4/ 7 1 6/ 7
5/ 7 1 3/ 7
6/ 7
5/ 7
3/ 7
3/ 7 1114/ 7 1 4/ 7
4/ 7
4/ 7
2/ 7 115/ 7 1 5/ 7 1 5/ 7
5/ 7
1/ 7 1 6/ 7 116/ 7
6/ 7 1 6/ 7
0 1111111155
where 1 is the only distinguished value, and add to these a matrix for ◦ that is con-
stant and equal to 0.  It is straightforward to check that the above matrices validate
all axioms and rules of bC plus the two rules above, while formulas such as (A→
(¬ A→ B)) and ¬ (A∧¬ A) are still not validated by them.
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3.8  Beyond Ci: The dC-systems.  We have now come closer to the more orthodox
approach to paraconsistent logics that the reader will find in the field, which does iden-
tify contradictoriness and inconsistency.  All logics that we will be studying from here
on, and, we argue, all logics of formal inconsistency presented in the literature so far, do
not distinguish between these two notions.  But this does not mean, the reader should
be aware, that one can simply dispense with the new operators that have allowed us,
so far, to talk about a formula being consistent or inconsistent, for, we remember from
FACT 3.16, even though [•A ￿￿Ci (A∧¬ A)] holds, [◦A ￿￿Ci ¬ (A∧¬ A)], for in-
stance, does not hold (in fact, [￿ / Ci ¬ (A∧¬ A)])!  Suppose then that we construct now
the logic Cil exactly by adding to Ci (that is, (Min1)–(Min11), (bc1), (ci), (MP),
plus the definition of ◦ in terms of •) the following ‘missing’ axiomatic rule:
(cl) ¬ (A∧¬ A) ￿ ◦A. ‘If ¬ (A∧¬ A) is the case, then A is consistent’
Much confusion has been raised around this particular formula, ¬ (A∧¬ A).  Recall,
from THEOREM 3.15(ii) and THEOREM 3.30, that it was not a theorem of our pre-
vious logics, bC or Ci.  Now, of course, we can immediately conclude even more:
FACT 3.54  No paraconsistent extension of Cil can have ¬ (A∧¬ A) as a theorem.
Proof:   If so, axiom (cl) would give us consistency, thus ruining paraconsistency. ￿
Nonetheless, some other paraconsistent extensions of Ci, such as LFI1 (see its ma-
trices in the subsection 2.4 or at FACT 3.29, and see its axiomatization in THEO-
REM 3.69), do have this as theorem (and, as a consequence of THEOREM 3.51(ii),
they must lack a full replacement theorem).
The attribution of a privileged status to the formula ¬ (A∧¬ A), using it to express
consistency inside some paraconsistent logics, stems from the early requisites put for-
ward by da Costa on the construction of his famed calculi Cn:
  dC[i]  in these calculi the principle of non-contradiction [sic], in the form ¬ (A∧¬ A),
should not be a valid schema;
  dC[ii]  from two contradictory formulas, A and ¬ A, it would not in general be
possible to deduce an arbitrary formula B;
  dC[iii]  it should be simple to extend these calculi to corresponding predicate cal-
culi (with or without equality);
  dC[iv]  they should contain the most part of the schemas and rules of the classical
propositional calculus which do not interfere with the first conditions.
While the requisite dC[ii] is nothing but the very definition of a paraconsistent logic
(recall the subsection 2.2), dC[iii] is simply a claim for extensions of these logics
to higher-order calculi (that we will not explore here, reiterating instead the popu-
lar and still powerful argument of paraconsistentists about the fact that most, if not
all, innovations of paraconsistent logic can already be met at the propositional level),
and dC[iv] is indeed somewhat vague, having received much attention and many di-
                                                  
17 Notice, nevertheless, that all that is proved here is that there certainly exist fragments of classical logic ex-
tending bC for which (IpE) holds.  But the matrices above do not fulfill, of course, our requisite for defining a
paraconsistent logic (namely, disrespecting (PPS)), so that the question is still left open as to whether there are
paraconsistent such extensions of bC!  (With thanks to Dirk Batens for calling our attention to that.)56
verse interpretations from several researchers (our own proposal on its interpretation
will be found in the subsection 3.11), the requisite dC[i] is in fact the one to blame
for the confusion we were talking about.  First of all, under our present perspective,
to call the formula ¬ (A∧¬ A) ‘principle of non-contradiction’ is quite misleading, not
only because this would bring us, as a side effect, to commit to very particular in-
terpretations for the negation of a proposition, the conjunction of contradictory propo-
sitions, and the negation of this conjunction, but ascribe to us as well a very particu-
lar interpretation for the consistency connective (however, if —and only if— you are
working in the context of some specific consistent logics, such as classical logic itself,
or intuitionistic logic, we admit that this designation can indeed make sense).  Evi-
dently, FACT 3.54 is then just a consequence of such a contract.
Now, if, on the one hand, some authors have questioned the validity of ¬ (A∧¬ A)
in the context of a paraconsistent logic,
18 on the other hand the construction of paracon-
sistent logics in which this formula does not hold has also been rather criticized since
then, and for various reasons.  Some of these criticisms unfold from or link to, by
and large, still that same understandable and widespread confusion between the ‘prin-
ciple of non-contradiction’ and the aims of paraconsistent logic, namely to avoid
the ‘principle of explosion’ instead (see dC[ii], and our subsections 2.1 and 2.2) —but
these more or less loose arguments can hardly be recast under our present formal
definitions of those principles.  A slightly more elaborate argumentation appears in
Routley & Meyer’s [100], where the authors are looking for some formalization of dia-
lectical logic, and they claim to that effect not only that ¬ (A∧¬ A) is ‘usually’ a theo-
rem of the ‘entailment systems’ that they have examined, but also that this does
not conflict with other logical truths of those dialectical systems (in their words, this
does not generate any ‘intolerable tensions which destroy any prospect of a coherent
logic’), even though these systems do have contradictory theorems (that are to be un-
derstood as ‘synthetic a priori’), and validate adjunction.  Moreover, they maintain that
‘the orthodox Soviet position appears to retain ¬ (A∧¬ A) as a thesis’, and they want
to deal with it.
19  Now, none of the logics we study here are dialectical, in the sense
of disrespecting the Principle of Non-Contradiction and actually proving contra-
dictory formulas (recall the subsection 2.2), and so the last critique above, in any
case, simply falls idle.
                                                  
18 For instance, Béziau’s [23], section 2.3, argues that, from a philosophical standpoint, it is hard to
reconcile the validity of ¬ (A∧¬ A) and an intuitive interpretation for the negation symbol of a para-
consistent logic; as to the technical aspect of his criticism, it seems to consists basically of a conse-
quence of THEOREM 3.51(vii) and the wish to obtain both adjunctiveness and the validity of  (IpE).
19 They also say some other things which seem a bit weird.  First, that the ‘non-orthodox’ systems not
containing ¬ (A∧¬ A) as a theorem are all weaker dialectical logics (as if the logics were all linearly
ordered by strength!).  Secondly, they insist on calling the formula ¬ (A∧¬ A) ‘Aristotle’s principle of
non-contradiction’, and after formally presenting their dialectical logics they argue that this formula is
‘correct, both in syntactical and semantical formulations’: syntactically correct because ‘it is a theorem,
hence valid, hence true’ —despite the seemingly naive petitio principii brought therein; and semantically
correct because ‘[one of its historical formulations] asserts that no statement is both true and false’, and
this feature, in the case of their logics, is supposed to be ‘guaranteed by the bivalent features of the se-
mantics’ —now this is surely a mistake, for what guarantees this fact can only be the functional (rather than
relational) character of their proposed interpretation, but in any case this last argument by these authors,
even if they were kind enough to clear up the somewhat obscure relation of it with the first one, should
hardly be accepted as a justification, given that any associated semantics provided to a consequence
relation of a given logic is barely circumstantial, in a sense, and can often be recast in many apparently
non-equivalent ways (if you’re not happy with a particular semantics, you can always look for another one).
A similar criticism of these points has been made before in Batens’s [10], section 9.57
But let us first explore some consequences of the new axiom (cl), before really
questioning it any deeper, or looking for substitutes.  The main and most far-reaching
consequence is the following:
THEOREM 3.55  In Cil we can define the inconsistency operator as •A￿(A∧¬ A)
(from which the consistency operator will be defined as ◦A￿¬ (A∧¬ A)).
Proof:   It can immediately be seen, from the above definitions, that the axioms (bc1),
(ci) and (cl) will still hold if one just substitutes all occurrences of the operators •
and ◦ by their new definitions. ￿
COROLLARY 3.56  Given a theorem B of Cil we can substitute all occurrences of
• and of ◦ in its subformulas according to the above definitions.
Proof:   Recall from THEOREM 3.41 that all axioms of Ci can be written just with
the use of •, substituting ◦ for ¬ •, or just with the use of ◦, substituting • for ¬ ◦.  In
the first case, where we have only ‘•’s, the above theorem permits us to rewrite in Cil
the proof of B using (A∧¬ A) in the place of each formula •A that appears, and
using ¬ (A∧¬ A) in the place of each formula ¬ •A that occurs in the proof.  In the
second case, and for the same reason, we may rewrite the proof of B using ¬ (A∧¬ A)
in the place of each formula ◦A that appears, and using (A∧¬ A) in the place of
each formula ¬ ◦A that occurs in the proof (you may in this last part also wish to take
FACT 3.40 and (Min11) once more into consideration). ￿
The above results are structurally similar to those of THEOREM 3.41 and its con-
sequences, where a restricted form of replacement was obtained for the operators •
and ◦, and we have seen that each one of them could be substituted in Ci by the ne-
gation of the other.  But now we know more, we know that we can simply dispense
with the operators • and ◦, substituting each formula •A and each formula ¬ ◦A for the
formula (A∧¬ A), each formula ◦A and each formula ¬ •A for the formula ¬ (A∧¬ A).
This brings us to the definition of a particular subclass of the C-systems that we will
call dC-systems, such as the C-systems in which • and ◦ can be defined in terms of
the other connectives.  Cil is the first example of a dC-system that we here consider;
before presenting other examples let us point out some consequences of this last result
for Cil.  It is easy to see, for instance, that the restricted forms of contraposition pre-
sented in FACT 3.17 for bC and in FACT 3.34 for Ci, as well as the forms of re-
ductio presented in FACT 3.14 for bC and in FACT 3.31 for Ci, and the forms of
controllable explosion presented in this last fact, together with the fundamental fact
relating controllable explosion and consistency in FACT 3.32, all have new versions
in Cil, if we just change each ocurrence of ◦ and • for their definitions in THEO-
REM 3.55.  We can also update THEOREM 3.11 with yet another way of reproducing
classical inferences inside of Cil by the addition of the appropriate premises to its
theories (namely the addition of a finite number of formulas of the form ¬ (A∧¬ A),
the formula that in the present circumstances represents the consistency of A).
Analogously to what we did in FACT 3.40, we can now prove that [(A∧¬ A) ￿Cil
¬¬ (A∧¬ A)], even though [A ￿Cil ¬¬ A] still does not hold.
Now, if FACT 3.50 has provided us with a very precise characterization of the
consistent theorems in Ci, which turned out to be only consistent or inconsistent for-
mulas themselves, namely the ones appearing in FACT 3.33 and FACT 3.39, we
may now use those same results to conclude that formulas such as ◦(A∧¬ A), and, by58
FACT 3.38(i), also ◦¬ (A∧¬ A), are theorems of Cil.  These last theorems have raised
yet some other protests in the literature.  For instance, Sylvan (cf. [105]) claims that
the fact that such a logic validates some ‘unjustifiable’ intuitionistically invalid theo-
rems, together with the validity of ◦(A∧¬ A) ‘defeats certain paraconsistent objectives’
(too bad that he did not proceed to clear up which objectives were these…).  This
echoes, in one way or another, to a common, and entirely well-founded, criticism,
which has been raised by various authors, both to the fact that C-systems such as those
we have been studying do maintain the whole of positive classical logic and to the fact
that many of them (but not all!) are in fact dC-systems, and come up with rather par-
ticular definitions for the consistency operator.  However, both these aspects can be
easily varied and experimented.  We have here, by a matter of simplicity, set up an
investigation of C-systems based on classical propositional logic, but it is clear that
other approaches may be tackled, by the investigation of C-systems based on relevance
logic, or intuitionistic logic, as soon as some paradoxes of relevance, or paradoxes
raising from some non-constructive assumption, are decided to be avoided.  This is
clearly not, however, a problem of paraconsistency as we have it, but a further (in-
teresting) problem which can be added to it.
Some dC-systems based on intuitionistic logic have in fact been defined and stud-
ied, for instance, in Bunder’s [29].  B1, the stronger logic of the main hierarchy of cal-
culi proposed by the author of that paper, is obtainable simply by dropping the axioms
(Min9), (Min10) and (Min11) out of Cil, while adding to the resulting logic the axiom:
(bun) (A→ (◦B∧ (B∧¬ B))) ￿ ¬ A. ‘If A implies a bottom particle, then ¬ A is the case’
It is more or less clear that the deletion of the above axioms from Cil will give the re-
sulting logic a kind of intuitionistic behavior, and that the addition of (bun) cannot re-
cover any of the classical properties which were lost.  Despite of this, most, if not all,
other claims that the author advances about this logic seem to be mistaken.  He con-
jectures, for instance, that the strong negation defined by the antecedent of (bun), by
setting ￿A￿(A→ (◦B∧ (B∧¬ B))), for some formula B, is not a classical negation,
and continues not to be a classical negation even if one adds back to B1 the axioms
(Min10) and (Min11).  This is wrong, for we know from FACT 3.45 that in this case
the axiom (Min9) turns to be provable, and so we obtain a logic at least as strong
as Ci (plus (bun), if this would make any difference), but than we remember from
FACT 3.49 that ￿ is indeed a classical negation in Ci (and even in bC, as we saw
in THEOREM 3.48).  The author then claims, and purports to prove, that his B1 is
not a subsystem of da Costa’s logic C1, which, as we will see in the subsection 3.10,
is simply an extension of Cil.  Once more he is wrong, and for the very same reason
—FACT 3.49 shows us once more that (bun) is evidently provable in Ci, and so
already Ci (and consequently C1) extends B1 and all the other weaker calculi pro-
posed by Bunder.  From that point on, all of the remaining remarks made by this
author on the comparison of his calculi with the ones proposed by da Costa falls apart.
The only point remaining from those calculi, therefore, is that of constituting dC-systems
based on intuitionistic, rather than classical, logic.  But the author did not even try
to study them any deeper, looking for instance for interpretations for these calculi!
In another paper, Bunder unwittingly produced an even bigger mistake.  Starting
from the reasonable idea of looking for other formulations for da Costa’s version of
reductio (that is, (RA0): [◦B, (A→ B), (A→¬ B) ￿ ¬ A], in the subsection 3.2), the59
author simply proposes (in [31]) to change ◦B for ◦A in that formula, asserting
that ‘there seems to be no particular reason why, in (RA0), the B has a restriction,
rather than the A’.  In this case, however, we can use our THEOREM 3.13 again to
see that this proposal would be equivalent to the addition of [◦B, A, ¬ A ￿  C] to
Cmin, which is clearly absurd, for it would be trying to express the consistency of A
by way of some foreign formula B!  The author then claims that the ‘paraconsistent’
calculus D1 (again, the ‘strongest’ one of a hierarchy Dn) that he obtains by adding
this last formula as a new axiom to C1 is ‘strictly stronger than Cn’, the calculi of
da Costa’s hierarchy, and purports to prove some facts about them.  Once more these
facts turn out to be mistaken, and this is easy to see if one remembers that ◦◦D is a
theorem of Ci (see our FACT 3.33(i), or his Theorem 5), and so we are left with [A,
¬ A ￿ C], for any A and C, and explosiveness is back.  So, the author was actually
right about his calculi being extensions of the calculi Cn, but only because they all
collapse into classical logic, after all…
20
As advanced above (and we shall confirm this below, in the subsection 3.10), that
the identification of consistency with the formula ¬ (A∧¬ A) was exactly what was
done in da Costa’s calculus C1, which in fact just adds to Cil some more axioms
to deal with the ‘propagation of consistency’ from simpler to more complex formulas.
Now, many authors have criticized this identification —‘there is nothing sacrosanct
about the original definition of this schema as ¬ (A∧¬ A)’, says Urbas in [107]—,
or else its consequences, as we have mentioned above (as the ‘anomalies’ described,
for instance, in Sylvan’s [105]).  One of the most unexpected consequences of this identi-
fication, in fact, has already been pointed out in Urbas’s [107], Theorem 4, and was
hinted above in our subsection 3.2:
THEOREM 3.57  In Cil the consistency of the formula A can be expressed by the
formula ¬ (A∧¬ A), but not by the formula ¬ (¬ A∧ A).  In fact, one can even add
¬ (¬ A∧ A) to Cil, but not ¬ (A∧¬ A), without this logic losing its paraconsistent
character.
Proof:   That consistency is so expressed in  Cil and that ¬ (A∧¬ A) cannot be added
to it are simply consequences, respectively, of COROLLARY 3.56 and FACT 3.54.
But while it is easy to see that [¬ (A∧¬ A) ￿Cil  ¬ (¬ A∧ A)], the converse of this
does not hold, as we see from the matrices in THEOREM 3.21 (those three-valued
matrices are in fact a much simpler way of checking the same result for which Ur-
bas has used six-valued ones).  Notice, in particular, that these matrices in fact also
validate the formula ¬ (¬ A∧ A). ￿
The above phenomenon is a bit tricky, and has actually fooled people working with the
calculi Cn for perhaps too long a time (see, for instance, [76], note 6, ch.2, p.49, or
else [42]).  Let us then consider the following alternatives to the ‘levo-’axiom (cl):
(cd) ¬ (¬ A∧ A) ￿ ◦A;
(cb) (¬ (A∧¬ A)∨¬ (¬ A∧ A)) ￿ ◦A.
                                                  
20 By the way, given the above considerations, one of Bunder’s main results about these systems (besi-
des the supposed proof about all the calculi Dn constituting different systems), objected to show that the
calculi Dn do not satisfy (IpE) (namely the Theorem 10 that closes his [31]) evidently must fail.  It is
easy, in fact, to find counter-examples for the validity of the formula [¬ (A∧¬ A), (A→ B), (A→¬ B) ￿
¬ A] in the matrices that he proposes (picking them up from Urbas’s [107], who have used them
correctly, in the case of the Cn systems): just choose v(A)∈ {0, 3} and v(B)=1.60
Evidently, the addition to Ci of the ‘dextro-’axiom (cd), instead of the axiom (cl),
would give us this logic Cid which has exactly the same qualities and defects as Cil,
but which would singularize the formula ¬ (¬ A∧ A) as much as the formula ¬ (A∧¬ A)
has been previously singularized by Cil.  The addition of (cb), instead, defining the
logic Cib, would assure to both ¬ (A∧¬ A) and ¬ (¬ A∧ A) the same status, and this
would fix, for instance, the famed asymmetry in THEOREM 3.21(iii) (but not the
ones in parts (i) and (ii)).  Logics having (cb) instead of (cl) have already been
studied (see [36] or [76]), but it should be noted that these still suffer from some
anomalies related to the definition of consistency in terms of some operation over a
conjunction of contradictory formulas.  In fact, if the logics having (cb) as an axiom do
identify the two formulas above, they do not necessarily identify these with some
other formulas such as ¬ (A∧ (A∧¬ A)), or ¬ ((A∧¬ A)∧ A), for instance, even though
all of the formulas (A∧¬ A), (¬ A∧ A), (A∧ (A∧¬ A)) and ((A∧¬ A)∧ A) are equiva-
lent on any C-system based on classical logic.  All of this will have, of course, deep
consequences when we go on to provide semantics to these logics, as the reader will
see in [42]).  Perhaps a good way of fixing all of this at once is by the addition of a
new ‘global’ axiomatic rule to such dC-systems, such as:
(cg) (B↔ (A∧¬ A)) ￿ (¬ B↔¬ (A∧¬ A)),
or else the weaker deduction rule:
(RG) [B ￿￿ (A∧¬ A)]  ⇒   [¬ B ￿￿ ¬ (A∧¬ A)].
Logics having such rules are yet to be more deeply investigated.  In one way or an-
other, it is clear that the mere addition of such rules is not enough to remedy the whole
of THEOREM 3.21 (but compare the following result to the proposal by Mortensen,
in the subsection 3.12).  Indeed, similarly to what had happened in COROLLARY 3.22
and in THEOREM 3.35:
THEOREM 3.58  (IpE) does not hold for Cib plus (cg) or (RG).
Proof:   Check for instance that THEOREM 3.21(iii) still holds, that is, that formulas
such as ¬ (A∨ B) and ¬ (B∨ A) are still not equivalent, once more by way of the same
matrices and distinguished values as in THEOREM 3.15(ii), but now changing only
the value of (1∨ ½) from 1 to ½ (and leaving the value of (½∨ 1) as it is, equal to 1). ￿
It is also noteworthy that da Costa in fact proposed not just one definition of consis-
tency (the one above, from the calculus C1), but considered instead the possibility of
having weaker and weaker logics (see [49] or [50]), modifying the requirement for
consistency in such a way as to produce an infinite number of logics at once (he
acted more with an illustrative than with a practical purpose, but that manoeuvre has,
in one way or another, produced some permanent impression).  The idea is simple,
namely that of having, for each Cn, 0≤n<ω , more and more premises to be fulfilled
in order to guarantee consistency.  In the case of n=1 we already know that ◦A (da
Costa denoted it Aº) abbreviated the formula ¬ (A∧¬ A), for 1< n<ω  it was taken
to be A
(n), where this abbreviation was recursively defined by first setting A
n,
0≤n<ω , as A
0￿A and A
n+1￿(A
n)º, and then setting A
(n), 1≤n<ω , as A
(1)￿A
1
and A
(n+1)￿A
(n)∧ A
n+1.  In other words, each of da Costa’s dC-systems was defined
by exactly the same axioms, changing only the definition of ◦A in each case for A
(n),61
for each given n.
21  It is clear in this way, if one really feels inclined to do it for  some
reason or another, that for each dC-system one can go on to multiply it into an infi-
nite number of (in principle, distinct) dC-systems, applying the same strategy above.
Of course, the same asymmetries already pointed out in the case of Cil, Cid and Cib
(THEOREM 3.57), may still apply in each case in appropriate forms, and the theo-
rems obtained from these systems must also be modified, in each case, according to
the specific definition of consistency brought therein.
3.9  The opposite of the opposite.  Having been introduced to the dC-systems, a
particular class of C-systems that can dispense with the use of the operators ◦ and •,
we shall not, nevertheless, dedicate ourselves in what follows exclusively to the study
of dC-systems.  All the logics we will present from this point on are still bound to
be C-systems extending Ci, but only by chance will they turn out to be dC-systems
as well.  What we will consider in this subsection is the addition of the following
axiomatic rule for ‘expansion’ of negations, converse to (Min11): (¬¬ A→ A):
(ce) A ￿ ¬¬ A.
Let Cie be the logic obtained by the addition of (ce) to Ci (recall, from THEOREM
3.30, that this addition is not redundant).  In the subsections 3.1 and 3.2 we have
learned about the role played by (Min11) in bC and the logics which extend it (recall
THEOREM 3.13), and suggestions were made as to the reasons why da Costa has
introduced (Min11) in his first paraconsistent calculi as a dual substitute to (ce), pre-
sent in intuitionistic logic, as much as (Min10): (A∨¬ A) was intended to be the dual
substitute to (PPS), the explosiveness (or reductio) that is lost by all paraconsistent
calculi.  Despite this, qualified forms of both (PPS) and (ce) are retained by bC, in
the form of the rule (bc1): [◦A, A, ¬ A ￿ B], and the rule [◦A, A ￿ ¬¬ A], this last
one being a rule of bC that comes immediately from (bc1) and FACT 3.14(iii).  Now,
it happens that only (PPS), but not (ce), is a problem of paraconsistent logic, as we
put it, and, as far as we know, (ce) was only avoided by da Costa in his first calculi
(see [49] and [50]), in spite of his manifest intention, on his requisite dC[iv] (see the
last subsection), to maintain ‘most rules and schemas of classical logic not conflicting
with the other requisites’, because there seemed to be some apprehension about the
addition of (ce) leading us back to classical logic, CPL, or perhaps making us just lose
the paraconsistency character of our logics, after all.  It is, however, very easy to see
that this is not the case.  Indeed:
THEOREM 3.59  (tPS): (A→ (¬ A→ B)) is not provable by Cie.
                                                  
21 One should observe, however, that the definition of the schema A
(n) proposed in da Costa’s founda-
tional work, [49], in reality does not coincide with the definitions to be found in other studies in the
literature (such as the well-known da Costa’s [50], or da Costa & Alves’s [53]), and those that we
adopt here.  Indeed, on page 16 of [49] the reader will find the following definition, setting A
(1) ￿ A°
and A
(n+1)￿  A
(n)∧( A
(n))° .  If one follows this last definition, one ought to conclude, for instance,
that A
(3) is to denote the formula A°∧ A°°∧ ( A°∧ A°°)° , while the definition we have presented abo-
ve would give instead A°∧ A°°∧A°°° .  It is easy to see, however, if one just makes use of any of the
semantics and decision procedures that have been associated to the calculi Cn that these two formulas
are not equivalent in each Cn (see [36] for the semantics of a slightly stronger version of these cal-
culi —in the case of n =1, for instance, axiom (cb) is used instead of (cl), and axiom (ce), which
appears below, was also added; or else go to [76] and [74], for the original versions).62
Proof:   Use the matrices of LFI1 again, as in FACT 3.29, or else the matrices of P
1,
as in THEOREM 3.30 —but in this last case you must change the matrix of negation,
setting the value of ¬ ½ as ½, instead of 1.  In fact, it is to be remarked that this modi-
fication on the matrices of P
1 in fact originates a new and interesting maximal three-
valued paraconsistent logic, P
2.  These three logics, LFI1, P
1 and P
2, will be studied in
their own right in the subsection 3.11, as members of a larger family of similar logics. ￿
Some of the immediate and main syntactical results obtained by the logic Cie are:
FACT 3.60  Cie proves the following:
  (i)  ◦¬ A ￿Cie ◦A;
  (ii)  •A ￿Cie •¬ A.
Proof:   Just turn the FACT 3.38 upside-down. ￿
Now, some people felt unease by the presence of FACT 3.60(ii), understanding that
this would mean a ‘proliferation of inconsistencies’ —given that any formula A proved
to be inconsistent would, by way of that rule, generate infinitely many ‘other’ in-
consistencies (the negation of A, the negation of the negation of A, and so on).  Be
that as it may, it is still clear that in Cie there are no new inconsistencies added by
way of this procedure, in a sense, given that the converse of FACT 3.60(ii) is also
valid here (it is the FACT 3.38(ii)), and so, in fact, •A and •¬ A are equivalent for-
mulas!  In Cile, the logic obtained by the addition of (ce) to Cil, instead of Ci (to see
that this logic is also paraconsistent, use again the matrices of P
2 in THEOREM 3.59)
we evidently obtain a new version of the above result, and FACT 3.60(ii) converts
itself into [(A∧¬ A) ￿Cile (¬ A∧¬¬ A)], leading, so it seems, into a ‘proliferation of
contradictions’.  Once again, this would perhaps not be said to be the case if the for-
mulas at the right and the left hand side are again remembered to be equiv alent.
Routley & Meyer, in [100], on their attempt to define a ‘dialectical logic’, DL, meet-
ing the standards of ‘Soviet logic’ and to recover the ‘orthodox Marxist view of negation’
have pondered the possibility of criticism coming from some dialecticians to the effect
that their ‘negative logic is excessively classical’, and considered the constitution
of a ‘weaker dialectical logic’, DM, having only (Min11), but not (ce), as an axiom.
But, even in the case of their DL, they have met inferences such as the ones above,
acknowledging the possibility of generation of an infinite number of ‘distinct’ con-
tradictions from any given one, and still defended that this would be all right —
one just has to remember that it is still not the case that any contradiction is derivable,
indeed, just a very specific set of contradictions, ‘forming a chain’, are derivable, but
this, of course, ‘does not result in total system disorganization’.  But how could it be
that these contradictions that they obtain in DL are all distinct, as they asserted?
This is a bit tricky.  Let A0 and ¬ A0 be two theorems of DL (it’s a dialectical logic,
after all —see the subsection 2.2), and let An abbreviate the formula (An− 1∧¬ An− 1).
We have already learned in the last subsection about Routley & Meyer’s argument
for the validity of the schema ¬ (A∧¬ A), and from this we may conclude that each
An will be a theorem, starting from the mere fact that both A0 and ¬ A0 hold.  But if,
on the one hand, it is clear that (An→ An− 1) will be a theorem of DL, on the other hand
it is equally clear that [An ￿￿ An− 1] holds, as above, similarly also to what had oc-
curred in the cases of Cie and Ciel (FACT 3.60(ii) and its variations).  So, again,63
how could it be that ‘all these contradictions are distinct’, as asserted by these authors?
The point is that the propositional bases of both DL and DM are relevance logics,
and so it may occur that An and An− 1 are equivalent formulas, but it is still the case
that (An− 1→ An) is not a theorem of DL.  So, after all, we see that this is the sense of
‘distinctness’ employed by those authors, determined exclusively by the validity or not
of a bi-implication, and not by the sets of consequences of the formulas under ex-
amination.
3.10  Consistency may be contagious!  Supposing we can really trust the consistency
of some formulas in our theories, what can we say about the more complex formulas
that one can build using the last ones as components: will these be also consistent?
From FACT 3.38(i): [◦A ￿ ◦¬ A] we know that already in Ci the consistency ‘propa-
gates’ through negation, that is, the consistency of A is sufficient information for us
to be sure about the consistency of ¬ A.  This is essentially a consequence of (Min11):
(¬¬ A→ A) and the identification of inconsistency and contradiction guaranteed by
the axiom (ci).  Now, what do we know about the propagation of consistency through
other connectives besides negation?  Not much, so far.
The idea behind the construction of the original calculi Cn by da Costa (see [49]
and [50]) was that of requiring each component to be consistent as a sufficient reason
to count on the consistency of the more complex formula.  Bluntly speaking, da
Costa’s C1 was built by the addition to Cil (see the beginning of the subsection 3.8) of
the following axiomatic rules:
(ca1) (◦A∧ ◦B) ￿ ◦(A∧ B);
(ca2) (◦A∧ ◦B) ￿ ◦(A∨ B);
(ca3) (◦A∧ ◦B) ￿ ◦(A→ B).
Let’s call Cila the logic obtained by the addition of (ca1)–(ca3) to Cil.  The differ-
ence from Cila and the original formulation of C1 is only one: that the connective ◦
in C1 was not taken as primitive, but ◦A was instead denoted as Aº and was taken
more directly as an abbreviation of the formula ¬ (A∧¬ A) (recall the THEOREM
3.55).  As for the other calculi in the hierarchy Cn, 1≤n<ω , they were built using the
simple trick of letting ◦A abbreviate more and more complex formulas (as we saw at
the end of the subsection 3.8).
As an immediate consequence of the above definitions, one can easily prove in Cila
—and in each calculus Cn— the following ‘translating’ results (compare these with the
less specific THEOREM 3.11 and with the generally applicable COROLLARY 3.47):
THEOREM 3.61  [Γ  ￿CPL A] ⇔  [◦(Π ), Γ  ￿Cia A], where ◦(Π )={◦p: p is an atomic
formula occurring as a subformula in Γ∪ {A}}.
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Proof:   Immediate, using (ca1)–(ca3).  Note that the axiom (cl) plays no role here. ￿
COROLLARY 3.62  The following mapping conservatively translates  eCPL inside
of Cia:
  (t2.1)  t2(p)=◦p, if p is an atomic formula;
  (t2.2)  t2(A#B)=t2(A)#t1(B), if # is any binary connective;
                                                  
22 Might the reader observe that the first formulations of this result, on da Costa’s [49], Theorem 9,
page 16, and on da Costa’s [50], Theorem 4, page 500, the general case in which an infinite number
of atomic formulas occur in Γ∪ {A} is not considered.64
  (t2.3)  t2(¬ A)=¬ t2(A);
  (t2.4)  t2(◦A)=◦t2(A).
So, working with Cila, all we need to rely on in order to go on making ‘classi-
cal inferences’ is on the consistency of the atomic constituents of our formulas.  As a
particular consequence of that, one can now substitute each new axiomatic rule of
Cila by an alternative version in terms of ‘•’s instead of ‘◦’s.  Thus, the axiom (ca3),
for instance, can be rewritten as [•(A→ B) ￿ (•A∨ •B)] (use FACT 3.34(i) and COR-
OLLARY 3.62).  And so on.
Proposing an infinite number of calculi, instead of one, as in the case of the Cn, only
starts to make sense after we prove that we are not just repeating the same tune:
THEOREM 3.63  Each Cn deductively extends each Cn+1, for 1≤n<ω .
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Proof:   We will not here give it a try by usual ‘syntactical means’.  For sure, this will
be much easier to check if one just considers the semantics associated with these cal-
culi, for instance in [53] (corrected in [74]) and in [36] (or [76]). ￿
Evidently, all these calculi Cn extend also the calculus Cω  —they even extend Cmin,
the stronger logic on which we based bC, our first LFI (recall the subsection 3.1 for
the definition of these logics).  This Cω , we argue, was indeed a very bad choice as a
kind of ‘limit’ to the hierarchy Cn, 1≤n<ω .  Consider, for instance, the following result:
FACT 3.64  The only addition made by Cn (in fact, by Cia, for the axiom (cl) has
no use in this result) to the rules provable by bC about the interdefinability of the bi-
nary connectives (see THEOREM 3.18) is the rule (ix): [¬ (A∧ B) ￿Cia (¬ A∨¬ B)],
and its variants.
Proof:   We just show that that rule holds already in Cia, and point the reader again to
the semantical studies of the calculi Cn to check that the other formulas are still not prov-
able in Cila.  First of all, setting Γ ={◦(A∧ B), ¬ (A∧ B), A} it can immediate be seen
that [Γ , B ￿Cia ◦(A∧ B)], [Γ , B ￿Cia (A∧ B)] and [Γ , B ￿Cia ¬ (A∧ B)], so we apply
FACT 3.14(ii) to obtain [Γ  ￿Cia ¬ B], and consequently [Γ  ￿Cia (¬ A∨¬ B)].  But
then, also [¬ A ￿Cia (¬ A∨¬ B)], and so the proof by cases will give us [◦(A∧ B),
¬ (A∧ B) ￿Cia (¬ A∨¬ B)].  By (ca1) we then conclude that [◦A, ◦B, ¬ (A∧ B) ￿Cia
(¬ A∨¬ B)], but we also have, from LEMMA 3.43(ii), that [￿Cia (¬ A∨ ◦A)], and from
that we obtain [◦B, ¬ (A∧ B) ￿Cia (¬ A∨¬ B)].  By a similar reasoning, from [¬ B
￿Cia (¬ A∨¬ B)], we finally arrive at our goal, [¬ (A∧ B) ￿Cia (¬ A∨¬ B)]. ￿
COROLLARY 3.65  (IpE) cannot hold in the calculi Cn, or in any extension of them.
Proof:   Just recall THEOREM 3.51(iv). ￿
The FACT 3.64 also suggests some further information about the plausibility of
calling either Cω  or Cmin ‘limits’ for the hierarchy Cn, 1≤n<ω .  For, as we have seen
in THEOREM 3.18, these new forms of De Morgan rules that we now have in each Cn
                                                  
23 A supposedly general proof of this fact, dating still from the ‘syntactical period’, when no semantics
had yet been presented to those calculi, appears for instance in da Costa’s [49], pp.17–9, and once
again in Alves’s [2], pp.17–9, and is credited to Ayda Arruda.  There is surely some mistake, however,
in their attempt to prove the independence of each axiom [A
(n), A, ¬ A ￿  B] with respect to the axi-
oms of Cn+1, given that this very axiom assumes non-distinguished values in all matrices Tn thereby
presented, if one only picks 1 as the value of A and picks for B any value in between 1 and n+2.65
are not present even in Cmin.  Also, by a combination of FACT 3.40(i) and COROL-
LARY 3.56, we know that ((A∧¬ A)→¬¬ (A∧¬ A)) is valid in Cia, and so in each
Cn, while we also know, from the matrices of P
1, as in THEOREM 3.15(ii), that this
formula cannot be a theorem of neither Cmin nor Cω .  Now, it is only compelling to
think of a deductive limit for an infinite hierarchy of increasingly weaker calculi as
the logic having as inferences exactly all sets of inferences common to the whole
hierarchy!
24  As we have shown in [39], it is possible to define such a logic, for each
hierarchy of dC-systems as the one given above, by way of the useful tool of possible-
translations semantics, obtaining, as a byproduct, some clear-cut and effective decision
procedures, even though some other very interesting questions, such as how to finitely
axiomatize this limit-calculi, or how to define a strong negation in them, if this is pos-
sible at all, were still left open (check also the paper [42]).  Indeed, notice that when
we go from each Cn to the following Cn+1 we need in fact to add a further require-
ment in order to express the consistency of a formula A —while in Cn this was ex-
pressible by way of A
(n), or, equivalently, by way of the set {A
1, A
2, …, A
n}, in Cn+1
that same set must be incremented by the formula A
n+1.  So, ultimately, in CLim, the de-
ductive limit of the hierarchy Cn, the consistency of A can evidently be expressed by
an infinite number of formulas, and again we obtain a logic which is gently explo-
sive, being thus an LFI.  What we still do not know is if logics such as CLim can be
alternatively characterized in such a way so as to also reveal themselves as finitely
gently explosive, like all the other logics presented up to this point, based on the axiom
(bc1).  If this characterization is not possible, it is hard to see how a strong negation or
a bottom particle could then be defined in such a logic,
25 so that this would make a
                                                  
24 This logic Cω  has puzzled people for too long as ‘part’ of the original hierarchy  Cn.  The existence
of a logic as a real deductive limit to this hierarchy (see [39]) shows that it was clearly just a matter of
coincidence that Cω  would appear as a kind of ‘syntactical limit’ to the original axiomatic formulation
of the Cn, by the deletion of all the axioms and definitions involving the connectives ◦ and • ((bc1), (ci)
and (cl)), and the ‘deletion’ also of (Min9) (actually, this last axiom was not in the original formulat i-
on of these calculi, and could not even be proved from the other axioms of Cω  —see THEOREM 3.3).
To put the matter in clear terms, Cω  can of course be studied in its own right, as a very weak paracon-
sistent (non-LFI) logic based on positive intuitionistic logic, but it should not be seen as part of the
hierarchy Cn, n≥1, for it has no more right to occupy that position than Cmin or many other logics that
could substitute it would have!
This coincidence had also some harmful effects on the philosophical appreciation of the logics pro-
duced by da Costa.  As da Costa himself has put it in his original piece on these systems (cf. [49], p.21),
‘roughly speaking, we could say that human reason seems to attain the peak of its power the more it
approaches the danger of trivialization’.  This statement has been inspiring people to naively defend
stances according to which, for instance, ‘the more a theory is useful to found mathematics, the more
easily it results to trivialize it; and the more difficult it is to trivialize it, the less it is useful to found
mathematics’ (see [26], p.243).  There are good and bad points about these somewhat hasty conclusi-
ons.  First, as a general technical assertion about paraconsistent logics in general, da Costa’s motto is
certainly misleading, given the existence of maximal logics such as the three-valued Pac (subsection 2.4),
which is both as strong as a fragment of classical logic as it could be, and at the same time is not fini-
tely trivializable at all.  One could, then, restrict their attention to LFIs and repeat that motto in an
environment in which it seems to make sense.  In that case, of course, the second statement above would be
affirming that no non-LFI could be useful to found mathematics —and this statement would be very
likely to find its defensors (cf., for instance, Batens’s attack [13] on Priest’s [90]).
25 Here, we really mean defined inside the logic, as a real formula of this logic.  For instance, in Priest’s
[90] a logic containing no bottom particle is presented, but the author argues that such a propositional
constant ⊥  could be ‘thought of informally as the conjunction of all formulas’ (p.146), so that, for
instance, a strong negation ~ would be obtainable from that in the usual way, by letting ~A be defined66
case in which the Gentle Principle of Explosion does not coincide with the Sup-
plementing one, or with ex falso (compare this with FACT 2.19, and the comments
which follow that result).
Some other interesting theses of Cila are the following (see Urbas’s [107]):
FACT 3.66  In Cila the schemas ◦⊥  and ◦￿￿A are provable.
Proof:   Recall first that ￿A was the classical negation defined inside of bC (in
THEOREM 3.48) as (A→⊥ ), and ⊥  is a bottom particle that can be defined, for in-
stance, as (◦B∧ (B∧¬ B)), for some B.  Now, by FACT 3.33 and COROLLARY 3.56,
we know that both ◦◦B and ◦(B∧¬ B) are theorems of Cil, and then we conclude,
by the axiom (ca1), that ◦(◦B∧ (B∧¬ B)), and so ◦⊥  is a theorem of Cila.  Recall also
from FACT 3.49 that ￿A is equivalent, in Ci, to ~A, and this last strong negation
was defined as (¬ A∧ ◦A), and so we have in particular that [(A→⊥ ) ￿Cila ◦A].  So,
from this last inference and from the fact that ◦⊥  is a theorem of Cila, as proved
above, we use (ca3) and conclude that [(A→⊥ ) ￿Cila ◦(A→⊥ )].  As particular cases
of the last two inferences, substituting A for ((A→⊥ )→⊥ ) in the first case, and for
(A→⊥ ) in the second case, we obtain, respectively, [￿￿￿A  ￿Cila  ◦￿￿A] and
[￿￿A ￿Cila ◦￿￿A], and the version of proof by cases obtained for ￿ leaves us at
last with [￿Cila ◦￿￿A]. ￿
This last result gives us yet another reason for the failure of (IpE) in the Cn and in
their extensions (COROLLARY 3.65) —now, it is THEOREM 3.51(i) that applies.
As we shall see in subsection 3.12, the failure of (IpE) makes it impossible for us to
find a Lindenbaum-Tarski-like algebraization for these logics.  In the case of the Cn the
situation is actually worse: as Mortensen ([82]) has shown, no non-trivial congruence
is definable for these logics, making these logics non-algebraizable even in a much
more general sense, the one of Blok-Pigozzi (cf. THEOREM 3.83).  There are, nev-
ertheless, several extensions of the Cn in which non-trivial congruences can be de-
fined, being thus much more receptive to algebraic treatments.  We will be seeing
many examples of these below.
Let us now investigate another way of propagating consistency, by liberalizing a
little bit the conditions required by Cila (that is, C1).  Da Costa, Béziau & Bueno pro-
posed, in [57], to substitute the above axioms, (ca1)–(ca3), by the following:
(co1) (◦A∨ ◦B) ￿ ◦(A∧ B);
(co2) (◦A∨ ◦B) ￿ ◦(A∨ B);
(co3) (◦A∨ ◦B) ￿ ◦(A→ B).
We will call Cilo the logic obtained by the addition of (co1)–(co3) to Cil.  It is very
easy to see, using the positive axioms, that this logic, christened C1
+ in [57], is a de-
ductive extension of C1.  Requiring less assumptions in order to obtain consistency
of a complex formula in terms of the consistency of its components, Cilo (or even Cio,
already, without recourse to the axiom (cl)) gives us some interesting results such as:
THEOREM 3.67  [Γ  ￿Cio ◦A] whenever [Γ  ￿Cio ◦B], for some subformula B of A.
Proof:   Immediate, using (co1)–(co3). ￿
                                                                                                                                
as (A→⊥ ).  But such an ‘informal’ bottom particle is simply no formula of our language!  (And if it
were, then we would have been done: all paraconsistent logics would turn out to be LFIs, in one way or
another).  This idea of Priest has already been criticized in Batens’s [13].67
FACT 3.68  Cio makes some new additions to FACT 3.64 and to the rules displayed
in THEOREM 3.18 about the interdefinability of the binary connectives, namely the
following provable schematic rules:
  (vi)  ¬ (A∧¬ B) ￿Cio (A→ B);
  (vii)  ¬ (A→ B) ￿Cio (A∧¬ B);
  (xi)  ¬ (¬ A∨¬ B) ￿Cio (A∧ B).
Proof:   Go to [57] or [76], or else the section on semantics for Cibo (and Ciboe)
in [42], to check this.  The actual syntactical proofs are, in any case, structurally similar
to the one presented in FACT 3.64. ￿
Of course, given THEOREM 3.51(v), we know that FACT 3.68(vii) gives us yet
another reason for the failure of (IpE) from this point on.  But that we already knew,
from the case of Cila, in FACT 3.64.  What is new in this case is only that Cilo can,
differently from Cila, define non-trivial congruences, making it possible to algebraize
it à la Blok-Pigozzi (see FACT 3.81).
Once again, the axioms (co1)–(co3) have equivalent versions in terms of •, in-
stead of ◦, and it is an easy exercise to try to find them.  The reader should remem-
ber that both Cila and Cilo have not only associated decreasing hierarchies, and can
evidently define different calculi as their deductive limits, but they also can be struc-
turally varied in terms of their inner definition of consistency, if we only change the
axiom (cl) for axiom (cd), or (cb), or (cg), as we did in the subsection 3.8, or if we add
to them the axiom for expansion of negations, (ce), as in the subsection 3.9 (defining
the logics Cido, Cibo, Cito, Ciloe, Cidoe, Ciboe and Citoe).  In all these cases, we
can show that the resulting logics are extended by the three-valued paraconsistent
logic P
2, as in the THEOREM 3.59.
There are, actually, an unlimited number of ways of propagating consistency.
26  Be-
fore proceeding to a general investigation of the ‘extreme cases’, in the next sub-
section, let us just briefly survey some propagation axioms which have already shown
up in the literature so far, and some of their consequences.  Consider, for instance,
the following axioms, converse to (co1)–(co3):
(cr1) ◦(A∧ B) ￿ (◦A∨ ◦B);
(cr2) ◦(A∨ B) ￿ (◦A∨ ◦B);
(cr3) ◦(A→ B) ￿ (◦A∨ ◦B).
Adding these to Cibo and to Cio (that is, Cibo minus the axiom (cb)) we build, re-
spectively, the logics Cibor and Cior (and so on, mutatis mutandis, for Cilo and Cido).
These give us yet more perspectives on the propagation (and back-propagation) of con-
sistency, and some of the possible meanings which can be assigned to it).  Suppose, on
the other hand, that we, more simply, consider the following axioms in order to auto-
matically guarantee the consistency of some complex propositions:
(cv1) ￿ ◦(A∧ B);
(cv2) ￿ ◦(A∨ B);
                                                  
26 Working with monotonic logics, the addition of consistency-propagation to some logic always me-
ans a gain in deductive strength.  However, in a non-monotonic environment in which consistency is
pressuposed by default, given that propagating consistency in one direction can mean propagating in-
consistency the other way, the addition of such axioms for propagation can either be innocuous or in
some cases even have a weakening effect on the resulting system (see [79], and [15]).68
(cv3) ￿ ◦(A→ B);
(cw) ￿ ◦(¬ A).
Let’s add v to the name of a logic that contains the axioms (cv1)–(cv3), and add w
to the name of a logic containing (cw).  Let’s also recall the axiom (ce): [A ￿ ¬¬ A],
from which we obtained the FACT 3.60 (backward propagation of consistency through
negation).  There are now several new possible combinations to be considered.  Evi-
dently, any logic having (cv1)–(cv3) proves not only (co1)–(co3) but also (ca1)–(ca3).
So we have, for instance, the logic Cibv, and have at least two immediate ways of
enrichening it with respect to the behavior of negation, obtaining the logics Cibve
and Cibvw.  As it happens, Cibvw axiomatizes the three-valued maximal para-
consistent logic P
1 (matrices in THEOREM 3.15(ii)), that has the peculiarity of ad-
mitting inconsistency only at the atomic level, and Cibve axiomatizes P
2 (matrices in
THEOREM 3.59), a logic that admits inconsistency only at the level of atomic
propositions, or of propositions of the form (¬
np), where p is atomic and ¬
n denotes
n applications of negation.  If, on the other hand, one considers the logic Ciborw, once
more a three-valued paraconsistent logic pops up, namely the one given by the fol-
lowing matrices:
where 1 and ½ are both distinguished.  We shall here call this logic P
3.  All these
three logics, P
1, P
2 and P
3, are in fact dC-systems, and can ultimately dispense
with the axiom (cb), proving it from the other axioms.  If, on the other hand, we con-
sider the logic Ciore, the result is a maximal three-valued logic again, LFI2 (investi-
gated in [44]) whose matrices differ from those of P
3 only in the matrix of negation,
assigning ½ instead of 1 as the value of ¬ (½).
All the above logics have some kind of ‘non-structural’ propagation of consis-
tency, that is, a propagation that does not really depend on the particular connective
in focus.  Alternatively, one can propose other forms of propagation which do depend
on the connectives being considered.  Now, some reasonable symmetry conditions on
inconsistency and its behavior with respect to the different connectives could suggest
to us, for instance, the consideration of the following forms:
(cj1) •(A∧ B) ￿￿ ((•A∧ B)∨ (•B∧ A));
(cj2) •(A∨ B) ￿￿ ((•A∧¬ B)∨ (•B∧¬ A));
(cj3) •(A→ B) ￿￿ (A∧ •B).
The logic Cij, built from the addition of (cj1)–(cj3) to Ci, can now be enriched with
(ce) in order to give us Cije, an axiomatization for the above many times mentioned
maximal three-valued paraconsistent logic LFI1 (see its matrices in FACT 3.29, and
consult [44] again).  It is interesting enough to note that neither LFI1 nor LFI2 are dC-
systems, that is, they cannot define the consistency operator by way of the other con-
nectives.  Let us now just summarize, give some references and mention some proper-
ties of the five above mentioned maximal paraconsistent three-valued logics, before we
proceed to show, in the next subsection, that these are just the top of the iceberg:
∧ 1 ½ 0
1 110
½ 1 ½ 0
0 000
∨ 1 ½ 0
1 111
½ 1 ½ 1
0 110
→ 1 ½ 0
1 110
½ 1 ½ 0
0 111
¬ ◦
1 01
½ 10
0 1169
THEOREM 3.69  The matrices of P
1 (in THEOREM 3.15(ii)) are axiomatized by
Civw; the matrices of P
2 (in THEOREM 3.59) by Cive; the matrices of P
3 (above)
by Ciorw; the matrices of LFI2 (above) by Ciore; the matrices of LFI1 (in
FACT 3.29) by Cije.
Proof:   As a general reference for all these logics and all the other ones in the next
section, consult [78].  As specific references for some of them, go to [103] and [84] for
P
1 (or [10], where it appeared under the name PI
v); notice that P
2 has also appeared in
[10], under the name PI
m, but was then redefined in [84] (where it actually was
wrongly supposed to be characterizable using just one distinguished value, invalidating
the soundness proof therein presented —note 13 of that paper shows that the author had
even been informed about that) and later rediscovered in [76]; go to [44] for LFI2
and LFI1 (but the reader should bear in mind that this last logic is in fact equivalent to
the logic called J3 in [60], and to the propositional fragment of the logic called CLuNs
in [15], which is in fact identical to the logic Φ v presented in [101], a logic that has
been reappearing quite often in the literature). ￿
FACT 3.70  Of the rules displayed in THEOREM 3.18 on the interdefinability of the
binary connectives, these are the instances validated by each of the five three-valued
logics above:
  (i)  in P
1, P
2, P
3 and LFI2: parts (i), (iv), (vi), (vii), (ix), (xi);
  (ii)  in LFI1: parts (i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii).
Also, formulas such as ¬ (A∧¬ A) and ¬ (¬ A∧ A) may be easily seen to hold in LFI1
and LFI2, and rules such as (A∧¬ A) ￿ ¬¬ (A∧¬ A) hold in P
2, LFI1 and LFI2.
Figure 3.1
Cmin
bC
Ci
Cib
Cibo Ciba
Cibae Ciboe
Cibow Cibv
Cive
Civw Ciorw
Cibor
Cibaw
Cie
Cio
Cije
Ciore
Cior70
Proof:   Just use the corresponding matrices to check this.  Notice from  FACT 3.68
that part (iv) was the only addition made by the first four logics above to the rules
already validated by Cilo. ￿
This last result, of course, supplies us with still some further justifications for the
failure of (IpE) in all these logics: parts (iii) and (vi) of THEOREM 3.51 applies
to LFI1, parts (ii) and (vii) of 3.51 apply to both LFI1 and LFI2, parts (iv) and (v) of
3.51 apply to all of the five logics; and finally we will see in FACT 3.76 that part (i)
of 3.51 also applies to all of them.
We can, at this point, try our hand at sketching a very thin slice of the great number
of C-systems introduced so far.  Doing that, something like Figure 3.1 might eventu-
ally be obtained.  In that figure, an arrow leading from a logic L1 into a logic L2 says
that L2 deductively extends L1.  The logic Cmin, at the upper end, is the only one that
does not constitute a C-system; the logics at the lower ends are the three-valued ones
appearing in THEOREM 3.69.  The logics inside the dotted lines are some of those
which we can prove to be not many-valued, by adapting the results in [76], pp.213–
216 or, better, by checking [42].  The other logics not contemplated by these results,
namely Cior, Ciboe, Cibor, Cibaw, and Cibow, are also conjectured to be not many-
valued, but we must at this moment leave the proof of this fact in the hands of our
clever readers.  Do remember to have a look, however, at the elegant possible-trans-
lations semantics offered to Ciboe in [42] (also originating from [76], section 5.3).
3.11  Taking it literally: the Brazilian plan completed.  The sagacious reader will
have observed that all we have been doing so far, in this section on axiomatization
of C-systems, was to basically try to explore at a very general level some of the pos-
sibilities for the formalization and understanding of the relationship between the con-
cepts of consistency, inconsistency and contradictoriness.  In particular, this research
line makes it possible for us to reconsider and pursue, in an abstract perspective, a
specific interpretation of da Costa’s method and requisites on the construction of
his first paraconsistent calculi (see dC[i]–dC[iv], in the subsection 3.8).  Indeed, start-
ing from the intuition that consistency should be expressible inside some classes of
paraconsistent logics, and assuming furthermore that the consistency of a given for-
mula would be enough to guarantee its explosive character (that is, assuming a Gentle
Principle of Explosion, as formulated in the subsection 2.4), we have arrived at the
definition of an LFI, a Logic of Formal Inconsistency (see (D20), in the same sub-
section).  To realize that (in a finitary way), we have above proposed the axiom
(bc1): [◦A, A, ¬ A ￿ B] for particular classes of C-systems based on classical logic.
Even more than that, as we have remarked before, while dC[ii] simply establishes the
non-explosive character of the paraconsistent negation, a general formulation of dC[i] is
realized in a subclass of the C-systems, the ones in which the connectives ‘◦’ and ‘•’
happen to be definable from the remaining connectives, and to the members of this
class we gave the name of dC-systems.  Now, putting dC[iii], the problem of providing
higher-order versions of these logics, aside for a moment, we still need to provide an an-
swer to dC[iv], the requirement that ‘most schemas and rules of classical logic’ should
hold in our logics.  And that’s the point we will ruminate in the present subsection.
Our proposed interpretation for dC[iv] will in fact be a very simple one, involving
the following notion of ‘maximality’.  A logic L2 is said to be maximal relative to a71
logic L1 if: (i) both are written in the same language (so that they can be deductively
compared); (ii) all theorems of L2 are provable by L1; (iii) given a theorem D
of L1 which is not a theorem of L2, if D is added to L2 as a new schematic ax-
iom, then all theorems of L1 turn to be provable.  The idea, of course, is that any
deductive extension of L2 contained in L1 and obtained by adding a new axiom
to L2 would turn out to be identical to L1.  We will call maximal, to simplify, any
logic L2 which is maximal relative to some logic L1, previously introduced.  Ex-
amples of maximal logics abound in the literature.  It is widely known, for instance,
that each Lukasiewicz’s logic Lm is maximal relative to CPL, the classical propositi-
onal logic, if and only if (m− 1) is a prime number.  We also know that CPL is ma-
ximal relative to a ‘trivial logic’, in which all formulas are provable, but on the other
hand it is also well-known that intuitionistic logic is not a maximal fragment of CPL,
as the existence of an infinite number of intermediate logics promptly attests.  As to
the C-systems which have been introduced this far, only the five three-valued ones
that were collected in the THEOREM 3.69 are maximal relative to CPL, or else re-
lative to eCPL, the extended version of CPL introduced in the subsection 3.7 (so
that, in particular, the calculus C1, that we have presented as Cila, the strongest cal-
culus introduced by da Costa on his first hierarchy of paraconsistent calculi, or the
even stronger calculus C1
+, that we presented as Cilo, proposed by da Costa and his
collaborators much later, readily fail to be maximal, and to respect dC[iv]).
Let us explore then the idea that underlies the five three-valued maximal C-systems
above.  Suppose we are faced with this problem of finding models to contradictory,
and yet non-trivial, theories.  We might then intuitively start looking for non-trivial
interpretations under which both some formula A and its negation ¬ A would be
simultaneously validated.  A very simple such interpretation would be found in  the
domain of the many-valued.  Suppose we try to depart from classical logic as lit-
tle as possible, so that the interpretation of our connectives will still be classical
if we remain inside the classical domain, and suppose we just introduce a third
value (½), besides true (1) and false (0), so that this third value
will also be seen as a modality of trueness, that is, ½ will also be
a distinguished value, together with 1, while 0 will be the only
non-distinguished value.  There are then two possible negations
which are such that there is a model for both A and ¬ A being
true, for some formula A (see the table to the right).  One of these negations, the one
that takes ½ into ½, is exactly the negation of LFI1 and of LFI2, the other nega-
tion, taking ½ into 1, is exactly the negation of P
1, P
2 and P
3.  What about the other
connectives?  Let us again try to keep them as classical as possible (we want to keep
on investigating C-systems based on classical logic), even at the level of the third
value, that is, let us add to the requirement of coincidence of classical outputs for
classical inputs the further higher-level ‘classical’ requirements to the effect that:
(C∧ ) v(A∧ B)∈ {½, 1}  ⇔   v(A)∈ {½, 1} and v(B)∈ {½, 1};
(C∨ ) v(A∨ B)∈ {½, 1}  ⇔   v(A)∈ {½, 1} or v(B)∈ {½, 1};
(C→ ) v(A→ B)∈ {½, 1}  ⇔   v(A)∉ {½, 1} or v(B)∈ {½, 1}.
This leaves us then with the following options:
¬
1 0
½ ½ or 1
0 172
Thus, we have, theoretically, 2
3 options of ‘conjunctions’, 2
5 options of ‘disjunctions’,
2
4 options of ‘implications’, and, as we saw above, 2
1 options of ‘negations’, making
a total of 2
13(=8,192, or 8K) possible ‘logics’ to play with.  To remove the scare
quotes of the previous passage we just have to show that these logics make some
sense, and are worthy of being explored.  To such an end, and to
complete the definition of our 8K logics as LFIs, we will just
also add to these logics the connectives for consistency and for
inconsistency, implicitly assuming that the consistent models are
the ones given by classical valuations, and only those (see matri-
ces to the right).  Evidently, all these 8K logics will be fragments of eCPL, the Ex-
tended Classical Propositional Logic (recall the subsection 3.7).  It is also clear that
the logic Pac (subsection 2.4) is not one of these, for it cannot define the connectives
◦ and •, though its conservative extension LFI1 can (and it is one of the 8K).
Evidently, the five three-valued logics we discussed earlier are but special cases
of the above outlined 8K logics, and we already know (from THEOREM 3.69 and
Figure 3.1) that those five are axiomatizable by way of the addition of suitable axi-
oms to the axiomatization of Ci, one axiom for each connective.  In fact, as shown in
[78], this idea can be extended to all the 8K logics above:
THEOREM 3.71  All the 8K three-valued sets of matrices above are axiomatizable
as extensions of Ci.
Proof:   In each case, one just has to add, for the negation, either the axiom (A→
¬¬ A) or the axiom ◦¬ A, depending respectively if the negation of ½ goes to ½ or
to 1.  And, for each other binary connective, #(∈ {∧ , ∨ , → }), one just has to add ei-
ther ◦(A#B) or else (•(A#B)↔σ (A, B)), where σ (A, B) is a schema depending only
on A and on B —these last axioms will evidently depend on the specific matrices of
each #, and act in order to describe how inconsistency (or consistency) propagates
back and forth for each binary connective.  Full details on how to define these axi-
oms may be found in [78]. ￿
Moreover, one can also prove that:
THEOREM 3.72  All the 8K three-valued logics above are distinct from each other,
and they are all maximal relative to eCPL.
Proof:   Again, we refer to [78] for the general proofs.  The basic idea behind the
proof of distinctness is the following: choosing any two of these 8K logics (without
repetition), there will be some connective about which they differ, one of them giv-
◦•
1 10
½ 01
0 10
∧ 1 ½ 0
11 ½ or 1 0
½ ½ or 1 ½ or 1 0
000 0
∨ 1 ½ 0
11 ½ or 1 1
½ ½ or 1 ½ or 1 ½ or 1
01 ½ or 1 0
→ 1 ½ 0
11 ½ or 1 0
½ ½ or 1 ½ or 1 0
01 ½ or 1 173
ing 1 as an output for the same input(s) that the other one gives ½.  But then the ne-
gations of such matrices will not be equivalent, and all we must do then is write down a
formula which describes that situation in such a way that this formula will be a theorem
of one of these logics, but a non-theorem of the other (again, see [78] on how to do it).
For the maximality proofs, the reader might mind to be informed that for at least five of
those logics (the ones referred to in THEOREM 3.69) the specific proofs were al-
ready presented elsewhere.  It is also interesting to remark that the connective  ◦ (or •)
plays a fundamental role in the general maximality proof exhibited in [78]. ￿
Now, how do these 8K logics compare with the other C-systems that have been stud-
ied this far?  It is this simple: every logic investigated so far either coincides or is
extended by some of the above 8K three-valued logics.  So that now we have a
very interesting class of (extended) solutions to the problem posed by da Costa’s re-
quirement dC[iv]!  Furthermore, it is straightforward to check that all the above
matrices do not only extend Ci, but also extend Cia, so that the original hunch by
da Costa for the propagation axioms is a kind of minimal condition obeyed by every
one of our 8K maximal three-valued logics.  The only limitative point of the original
proposal, under this approach, really rests in dC[i], which is of course not verified by
all those matrices, and in fact imposes a very restricted interpretation for the notion
of consistency, limiting our sample space to only a very selective class of dC-systems,
which is, however, larger than the reader might initially imagine (recall, in any case,
that logics such as LFI1 and LFI2 are not dC-systems).  Indeed:
FACT 3.73  All the 8,192 logics above are C-systems extending Cia.  Of these, 7,680
are in fact dC-systems, being able to define ◦ and • in terms of the remaining con-
nectives (and being maximal, thus, relative to CPL, and not only to eCPL).  Of
these, 4,096 are able to define ◦A as ¬ (A∧¬ A), and so all of these do extend C1
(that is, Cila).  Of the 7,680 logics which are dC-systems, 1,680 extend Cio, the
stronger alternative to Cia, and 980 of these are able to define ◦A as ¬ (A∧¬ A),
so that these 980 logics do extend C1
+ (that is, Cilo).
Proof:   This is just a combinatorial exercise on the above matrices, and we shall  leave
it for the reader to check. ￿
It might well be that not all of the above 8K three-valued maximal logics will be
interesting as logics.  Some of them, for instance, do not have symmetric matrices for
the conjunction or for the disjunction (but notice that some such logics have had
their use in results such as 3.21, 3.26, 3.35 and 3.57, or in 3.58), though any con-
junction / disjunction is evidently equivalent to any other conjunction / disjunction (the
negations of these conjunctions / disjunctions are what may differ).  The fact that all
the 8K three-valued logics do extend Cia (FACT 3.73) informs us, as a corollary to
FACT 3.64, that:
FACT 3.74  (IpE) cannot hold in any of the 8K logics above.
Proof:   Again, just recall THEOREM 3.51(iv). ￿
Now, if, in the next subsection, this failure of the replacement theorem will be seen
to constitute a negative answer for the possibility of obtaining a Lindenbaum-Tarski-
style algebraization for these logics (as already occurred for the calculi Cn and all of
their extensions —see COROLLARY 3.65), the following result will help us to show
in the following a positive answer for the possibility of obtaining a Blok-Pigozzi-like74
algebraization to each one of them (as already hinted for some extensions of Cn, such
as C1
+, see FACT 3.81 and FACT 3.82):
FACT 3.75  The following matrices of classical negation and congruences can be de-
fined in each one of the above 8K logics:
Proof:   To define the classical negation ~ one just has first to define ⊥  either as
(B∧ (¬ B∧ ◦B)) or as (◦B∧¬ ◦B), for some formula B, and then define ~A either as
(¬ A∧ ◦A) or as (A→⊥ ).  To define one of the above congruences one just has to set
(A≡B) as ((A↔ B)∧ (◦A↔ ◦B)).  If one wants to make sure that v(A≡B)=1 when
both v(A)=½ and v(B)=½, this is also possible: just set some (A≡
2 B) as ~~(A≡B). ￿
In fact, it is not difficult to see that the above classical negation is indeed the one
and only matrix of a strong negation that can be defined inside of these 8K three-
valued logics (the paper [42] will also come back to this question).  The reader will
notice that this negation is indeed, in a sense, a ‘highly’ classical one.  Indeed, it
comes as a corollary, for instance, that:
FACT 3.76  The schema ◦~A is provable in all of the above 8K three-valued logics.
This last result is more than what one needs to confirm, by way of THEOREM
3.51(i), the fact that (IpE) cannot hold in these logics (as in FACT 3.74).
A noteworthy expressibility result that can be proved for these 8K three-valued
logics is the following:
FACT 3.77  (i) The matrices of P
1 can be defined inside of any of the 8K three-valued
logics above.  (ii) All the matrices of all the 8K logics above can be defined inside
of LFI1.
Proof:   To check part (i), let ∧ , ∨ , → , ¬ , ◦ and • be the connectives of any of the
8K logics above, and let ~ be the classical negation, defined inside this logic as in
FACT 3.75.  Then, the P
1’s negation of a formula A can be defined as ~~¬ A, the
P
1’s conjunction of some given formulas A and B, in this order, can be defined either
as ~~(A∧ B) or as (~~A∧ ~~B), and the same we did for conjunction applies to both
disjunction and implication, mutatis mutandis.  The matrices for the connectives ◦
and • already coincide in all of these logics.  Part (ii) is a particular consequence of the
expressibility result that we have proven in [44], Theorem 3.6.  In that result we
showed, in fact, that the matrices definable in LFI1 are all those, and exactly those,
n-ary matrices that have classical (1 or 0) outputs for classical inputs (and that can
have any output value if non-classical inputs are considered).  Of course, all the above
matrices, on these 8K three-valued logics, are, by definition, just 1-ary and 2-ary ex-
amples of such LFI1-definable hyper-classical matrices, as we have called them. ￿
COROLLARY 3.78  (i) The logic P
1 can be conservatively translated inside any of
the 8K three-valued logics above.  (ii) Any of the 8K logics above can be conser-
vatively translated inside of LFI1.
≡ 1 ½ 0
1 100
½ 0 ½ or 1 0
0 001
~
1 0
½ 0
0 175
Are there other interpretations, besides maximality, of da Costa’s requisite dC[iv]
leading to yet some other classes of solutions to the problem of finding C-systems
containing ‘most rules and schemas of classical logic’?  Are there non-many-valued
(monotonic) solutions to that problem, or perhaps some other n-valued ones, for n> 3?
And, this is an important first step and probably an easier problem to solve, are there
other interesting C-systems based on classical logic which are not extended by any of
the above 8K three-valued logics?  We must leave these questions open at this stage.
It is interesting to notice, at any rate, that this problem has already been addressed
here and there, in the literature.  Besides [78], from which we drew the results in the
subsection 3.12, one could also recall, for instance, the adaptive programme for the
confection of paraconsistent logics aiming to represent (non-monotonically) the
dynamics of scientific reasoning and of argumentation (see [15]).  Roughly speaking,
the basic idea behind adaptive logics is that of working in between two boundary
logics, classical logic often being one of them and a paraconsistent logic being the
other one, so that consistency is pressuposed by default and we try to keep on reason-
ing (i.e. making inferences) inside of classical logic up to the point in which an ‘ab-
normality’ (an inconsistency?) pops out, a situation in which we had better descend to
the level of the complementary paraconsistent logic, and go on reasoning over there.
Indeed, the ancestral motivations of this programme (see [10]) seem to have been, as it
is reasonable to conceive, yet another attempt to originate logics maintaining as much
of classical logic as possible, so that paraconsistency will only be needed at limit cases.
As the reader will see in [42], when we go on to provide possible-translations se-
mantics (as in [36], [39] or [76]) to some of the above non-three-valued logics, as
for instance Ci or Ciboe, the intuition behind the construction of the previous three-
valued paraconsistent logics can be pushed much farther, since it can be shown that
some infinite-valued logics can also be split in terms of suitable combinations of clus-
ters of three-valued logics.
3.12  Algebraic stuff.  You may think, perhaps, that logic has ‘too many formulas’.
There is nothing unreasonable in supposing, however, that some of these formulas
can in fact be identified, and indistinctly used in all contexts.  If we consider classical
logic, for instance, we will promptly see that there is no reason to distinguish be-
tween any two given theorems (or top particles) with respect to their relation to the
other formulas of the classical language —even though they may very well still be
understood as ‘expressing’ quite different facts, somehow conveying different bits of
information.  In the classical case, also, and for the very same reason, one does not
really need to distinguish between any two given bottom particles (or two different
pairs of contradictory formulas); even more than that, any two formulas A and B
which turn out to be provably equivalent (that is, such that [A ￿￿ B], or, what in
many logics amounts to be just the same, to put it in terms of a bi-implication,
such that [￿ (A↔ B)]) are, in a certain sense, indistinguishable, and can be indis-
tinctly employed in the same contexts, to attend similar purposes.  The action of put-
ting the glasses through which some ‘contingent’ properties of formulas are hidden
and only those features related to their general behavior in relation to other formu-
las are exposed is the task of algebraization.  Whenever a given logic turns out to be
algebraizable, so that the logical problems can be faithfully and conservatively trans-
lated into some given well behaved algebra, then it will be possible for us to use the
powerful (universal) algebraic tools to tackle those problems, so that, in the next and
final step, we will be able to translate the results back into logic.76
Being the above remarks all too informal, we had better strive to put them in more
precise terms.  If the whole activity of mathematics and logic involves ‘forgetting’
some things (and calling attention to others), and identifying what could otherwise, at
the first look, have seemed just different, their tools by excellence, in such respect, are
the key notions of equivalence, congruence, isomorphism, and so on.  Once the very
definition of a logic, as we have proposed it at the start of section 2, can immediately
be seen as some sort of algebra having the set of formulas as its domain (indeed, in the
structural and propositional case, it is exactly the free algebra generated by the primi-
tive connectives of the languages —here understood as operators— over the set
of atomic propositions), the quest for dividing these formulas into disjunct packages of
equivalent and indiscernible ones can easily be accomplished if one is able to define a
congruence relation over these formulas, that is, an equivalence (reflexive, symmetric
and transitive) relation such that any two equivalent formulas (with respect to this rela-
tion) can be just justifiably and indistinctly used in all and the same contexts.  So, if
some given formula A appears as a component of some other formula G, then any for-
mula B which is congruent to A should be able to do the same job, with no loss or in-
crease in expressibility or generality.  What we implicitly mean with this is that the
new quotient algebra obtained by dividing the original algebra of formulas by this con-
gruence relation should preserve the original ‘operations’, existing thus an obvious
homomorphism from the original algebra into the quotient algebra.  So, in dividing the
formulas this way into classes of congruent ones, one can go on to work and dialogue
with just the (arbitrary) representants of these classes, once they are supposed to
behave exactly the same as any of their congruent colleagues with respect to any op-
eration of (any isomorph of) the quotient algebra.  Any two congruent formulas are ‘the
same up to a congruence’, and can play exactly the same roles in some specific dramas.
It comes perhaps as no surprise the confirmation that the most easy and standard way
of algebraizing a given logic is obtained by way of the relation of provable equivalence
induced by its underlying consequence relation.  Indeed, the so-called Lindenbaum-
Tarski algebraization sets two formulas A and B as congruent if A ￿￿ B —let’s denote
this fact by writing A≈ B.  Such ‘congruence’ relation ≈  is evidently an equivalence
relation, and to confirm that any two so congruent formulas ‘work the same in all
contexts’, one has to check if they can be intersubstituted everywhere, that is, one has
to prove a replacement theorem, to the effect that the intersubstitutivity of provable
equivalents, (IpE), holds (recall its definition in the subsection 2.3, and check [111]).
Many logics have Lindenbaum-Tarski-like algebraizations, as it is the case for clas-
sical logic, intuitionistic logic, several normal modal logics, several many-valued
logics, and so on.  But not all algebraizable logics are algebraizable in the sense of
Lindenbaum-Tarski, not being able for instance to prove replacement with respect to
provable equivalence (or provable bi-implication).  In the case of many non-normal
modal logics, for example, what one needs is strict (that is, necessary) provable
equivalence (that is, strict bi-implication).  In the case of the paraconsistent logics
studied here, frequent negative results on what concerns the validity of (IpE) —
and so, on what concerns the possibility of obtaining an algebraization à la Lin-
denbaum-Tarski— have been met: In fact, all of the above C-systems have be-
en shown at some point to lack (IpE) (recall the results 3.22, 3.35, 3.58, 3.65, and
3.74).  Yet, the possibility of obtaining some positive results within some extensions
of those C-systems was not ruled out (recall 3.53, but confront it with 3.51).77
An immediate result about algebraizations that may come quite handy is the fol-
lowing one (cf. [25], Corollary 4.9):
FACT 3.79  Every deductive extension of an algebraizable logic is algebraizable.
A case study which was particularly well investigated is that of the logic Cila (the
logic C1 of da Costa’s [49] —check the subsection 3.10).  Even though at least as early
as in da Costa & Guillaume’s [54] it had already been noticed that (IpE) does not
hold for Cila (COROLLARY 3.65), so that no Lindenbaum-Tarski-like algebraization
for this logic (or for any other of the weaker calculi Cn) can be available, several
attempts have been made to find other kinds of algebraizations for this logic (check,
for instance, da Costa’s [48]).  The intuitive idea underlying the search of other  alge-
braizations, generalizing the idea of Lindenbaum-Tarski, has been quite often that
of finding ‘any’ congruence on the set of formulas that could be used to produce a
quotient algebra from the algebra of formulas of the logic.  Furthermore, if such a
congruence is no more necessarily supposed to be induced directly by way of the
consequence relation associated to the logic, nor should this congruence be neces-
sarily supposed to be expressible by way of a formula written in the very language of
the logic (it may happen to be definable only metalinguistically —for instance, if you
do need a metalinguistical ‘and’ to characterize it, but there is no adequate conjunc-
tion available to express it in the language of the logic), it is still reasonable to sup-
pose as well that this congruence should put no distinguished and non-distinguished
formulas inside the same class of equivalence (so, for instance, no class will simul-
taneously contain a theorem and a non-theorem), so that we will have no trouble in
attributing a distinguished or a non-distinguished status to some class of equivalence
(cf. [84]).  The final blow to the search for congruences algebraizing the logic Cila was
delivered by Mortensen’s [82], where this author proved that:
THEOREM 3.80  No non-trivial quotient algebra is definable for  Cila, or for any logic
weaker than Cila.
It is never too late to remember that, for non-trivial logics, a trivial quotient algebra is
an algebra defined by a congruence relation ≈  such that A≈ B if, and only if, A and B
are the same formula (so, all equivalence classes are singletons).  Now, some au-
thors have argued that the exclusive existence of trivial quotient relations for a gi-
ven logic is a major ‘defect’ (cf. [84], section 3), while others do not think so (cf.
[20]) —and this is the reason why we have used scare quotes in writing ‘‘any’ con-
gruence’, above.  In any case, this last result can be easily remedied by extensions of
Cila.  Consider, for instance, the logic Cilo (the logic C1
+ of da Costa, Béziau & Bue-
no’s [57] —check again the subsection 3.10).  A non-trivial congruence can be defined
within this logic by requiring, for any two given formulas, that they are not only prova-
bly equivalent, but are also both provably consistent.  This can be put in terms of a sin-
gle formula, by defining A≈ B if ￿ ((A↔ B)∧ (◦A∧ ◦B)).  One can then immediately
prove that:
FACT 3.81  There is a non-trivial quotient algebra for Cilo (and already for Cio).
Proof:   The above defined connective ≈  clearly sets up an equivalence relation.  We
have to show that it is in fact a congruence, so that given a schema G(A) depending on A
as a component formula (and possibly on some other formulas as well), we have to
show that G(A)≈ G(B) whenever A≈ B, where G(B) is obtained by replacing each
occurrence of A in G(A) by B.  Now, given this supposition that  A≈ B, and recalling78
from THEOREM 3.67 that the consistency of any component of a complex formula,
in Cio, is enough to guarantee the consistency of the complex formula itself, we may
infer that ￿ ◦G(A) and ￿ ◦G(B).  To check that ￿ (G(A)↔ G(B)) just do a straight-
forward induction on the complexity of G.  In the trivial case in which no other con-
nectives or formulas intervene, but A, there is really nothing to prove.  The case of
conjunction, disjunction and implication is also immediate, from positive logic.  For
negation, just recall, as a consequence of FACT 3.17, that contraposition holds for
provably consistent formulas, so that from A ￿￿ B and both ￿ ◦A and ￿ ◦B one
can infer ¬ A ￿￿ ¬ B.  This concludes the proof (a similar semantical argument can
already be found in [57], Theorem 3.21), and it is obvious that this congruence is
non-trivial —we know for example from FACT 3.66 that ◦⊥  is a theorem of Cila,
and thus of Cilo, so that all bottom particles will of course belong to the same equiva-
lence class determined by ≈  over Cilo.  In all other respects, except for this last
particular example, the above proof is clearly valid not only in Cilo but also in Cio
(that is, Cilo without the axiom (cl) that transforms this last C-system, Cio, into a
dC-system). ￿
Various other extensions of Cila having non-trivial quotient algebras have been
proposed in the literature.  In [84], for instance, Mortensen has proposed an infinite
number of them, all situated of course somewhere in between Cila and classical logic.
They were called Cn/(n+1), for n>0 (C0 is the name traditionally reserved for classi-
cal logic), and axiomatized by the addition to Cila of the following axioms, for each
fixed n>0:
(M1n) ¬
n− 1A ￿ ¬
n+ 1A, where ¬
n, as usual, denotes n iterations of ¬ ;
(M2n) ￿
n
i= 1(¬
i− 1A↔¬
i− 1B) ￿  ￿
n
i= 1(¬
i(A#C)↔¬
i(B#C))∧ ￿
n
i= 1(¬
i(C#A)↔
¬
i(C#B)), where # is any binary connective, and ￿ abbreviates, as usual,
a long conjunction.
In the section 4 of [84] the connective ≈  defined by letting A≈ B hold whenever
￿ ￿
n
i= 0(¬
iA↔¬
iB) is shown to constitute a non-trivial congruence, for each n>0.
The reason for non-triviality is that, in general, each Cn/(n+1) can be understood as pro-
viding us with n+1 ‘negations’: for any formula A of this logic we have that ¬
m− 1A
is congruent to ¬
m+ 1A if, and only if, m≥ n, so that there are n+2 distinct equiva-
lent classes (represented by A, ¬ A, …, ¬
n+ 1A) of the quotient algebra generated by
≈ .  Do any of these new C-systems coincide with any of the other above studied
ones?  Do they have any special interest in themselves (besides being equipped with
a non-trivial congruence)?
How can one understand these more general algebras induced by more esoteric con-
gruence relations, if they do not fit inside the ‘classical’ algebraization theory of
Lindenbaum-Tarski?  A neat and elegant solution to that can be found in the study
of Blok & Pigozzi (cf. [25]), where a much more general theory of algebraization is
developed, extending the work of other authors.  Some terminology and definitions are
needed to explain what is a Blok-Pigozzi algebraization.  Fixing some logic L=< For,
￿> , an L-algebra is any structure homomorphic to L (being For a structured set of
formulas constructed over some set of connectives, the corresponding L-algebra will of
course contain, for each connective, an operator of the same arity ‘interpreting’ it).
An L-matrix model of an L-algebra Alg is any pair < Alg, D> , where D is a proper
subset of the universe of Alg, of the so-called distinguished elements.  Formally, let79
an interpretation of a set of formulas For be an assignment of terms of Alg to each
element of For (an assignment which is usually defined over some primitive ele-
ments and then extended to the whole set of formulas by way of the interpretation of
the building structural operators).  The semantic consequence relation ￿M associated
to an L-matrix model M is then defined, as usual, by setting Γ  ￿M A whenever A is
assigned a distinguished element for every assignment of distinguished elements to
all members of Γ .  Matrices of finite many-valued logics are simple practical examples
of sound and complete matrix models (that is, models such that [(Γ  ￿ A) ⇔  (Γ  ￿M
A)]) that can be associated to some logics.  In general, by a result of Wójcicki (see
[111]) it is known that every structural logic can be characterized by sound and com-
plete matrix models, in fact by κ-valued matrices, where κ has at most the cardinality
of the set of formulas of the logic.
Any pair of terms ϕ  and ψ  of the L-algebra will be said to constitute an equation,
to be designated by writing (ϕ ￿ψ ).  Such equations are always schematic, as any usual
mathematical equation, and their non-operational components are said to be its vari-
ables; we may accordingly write ϕ (C)￿ψ (C) to designate an equation having C as its
single variable, and similarly for any number of variables.  Now, what an interpretation
does is exactly assigning values to these variables.  One may then define an equa-
tional consequence relation induced by a class of L-algebras KA, to be denoted as
￿KA, as follows: [Γ  ￿KA (ϕ ￿ψ )], where Γ  is a set of equations, whenever the equa-
tion (ϕ ￿ψ ) is a semantic consequence of Γ  for every L-matrix model M of each
L-algebra in KA, that is, when all those matrix models are such that [Γ  ￿M (ϕ ￿ψ )].
The relation ￿KA is said to constitute an adequate algebraic semantics for a given
logic L whenever there is a finite set of equations δi(C)￿εi(C), for i< n, such that:
(Γ  ￿ A) ⇔  [{δi(B)￿εi(B): for all i< n and all B∈Γ } ￿KA (δi(A)￿εi(A))].  In this
case, the equations δi(C)￿εi(C), for i< n, are called defining equations of L, and
we shall write simply δ￿ε as an abbreviation of them.  Finally, an algebraic semantics
for a logic L, induced by a class of L-algebras KA, is said to be equivalent (or con-
gruential) if there can be defined in L a finite set of connectives with two variables ≈ j,
for j< m, such that, for every equation ϕ ￿ψ, we have that [{(ϕ≈ jψ ): for all j< m}
￿￿KA {δ(ϕ ￿ψ )≈ jε(ϕ ￿ψ ): for all j< m}].  This set of connectives ≈ j, for j< m, will
be abbreviated simply as ≈  and called a system of equivalence (or congruence) con-
nectives for L and KA.  Now, a logic L is said to be (Blok-Pigozzi-)algebraizable if
it has an equivalent algebraic semantics.  Another way of stating this definition (in
terms of the consequence relation of L) is by requiring, to call a logic L algebraizable,
to have in hand a set of equations δ￿ε and a set of formulas ≈  such that: (i) ≈  consti-
tutes an equivalence relation; (ii) (A1≈ B1), …, (An≈ Bn) ￿ σ (A1, …, An)≈σ (B1,
…, Bn), for each n-ary connective σ ; and (iii) A ￿|￿ δ(A)≈ε(A).  It should by now
be completely clear how this generalizes the idea of (proving (IpE) and) producing a
congruence over a set of formulas.
Not all logics are algebraizable (even in this broader sense of Blok-Pigozzi).  For
example, most modal logics, and the system E of entailment are not algebraizable,
though they do have non-congruential algebraic semantics.  As to the C-systems
that we study in this paper, it has already been shown or mentioned some lines above
(FACT 3.81 and below), that the logics Cilo and Cn/(n+1), extensions of Cila, do have
non-trivial congruences defined by finite sets of equations, being thus algebraizable in
the sense of Blok-Pigozzi (though they are not algebraizable in the traditional sense
of Lindenbaum-Tarski).80
Also, as hinted in the last subsection, one can now prove that all the 8K three-valued
maximal paraconsistent logics there presented are algebraizable (making use of and
extending an argument by Lewin, Mikenberg & Schwarze, who have proved in [71]
that the three-valued logic P
1 is algebraizable):
FACT 3.82  All the 8K three-valued logics from the last subsection are algebraizable.
Proof:   Just consider any of the two connectives ≡ or ≡
2 defined in the FACT 3.75,
let δ(A) be defined as ((A→ A)→ A) and ε(A) be defined as (A→ A), and check that
the conditions (i)–(iii) defining an algebraizable logic two paragraphs above do hold. ￿
It can also be shown, at this point, that some of our C-systems are not algebrai-
zable.  To such an intent, yet another characterization of algebraizable logics can come
on handy.  Let L be a logic and M be an L-matrix model.  A Leibniz operator Λ is
a mapping from each arbitrary subset S of M into the largest congruence ≈  of M
compatible with S, where ≈  is compatible with S if whenever we have that ϕ∈ S and
ϕ≈ψ  we also have that ψ∈ S.  It can be proved that a logic L is algebraizable if, and
only if: (iv) Λ  is injective and (v) order-preserving on the collection CT(L) of all
closed theories of L, (vi) Λ  preserves unions of directed subsets of CT(L), where a
subset of CT(L) is directed if there is a common upper limit to every finite collecti-
on of elements of CT(L).  (At this point, we had better direct the reader to [25] for
details and proofs.)  In any case, one might observe that a consequence of these last
observations is that, for every logic L, the Leibniz operator produces an isomorphism
between the lattice of filters of each L-matrix model M and the lattice of congru-
ences of M.  So, if such an operator is not an isomorphism, for some L-matrix model
M, then the logic L is not algebraizable.  This was the idea used by Lewin, Miken-
berg & Schwarze in [72] (and that we extend here) to refine THEOREM 3.80:
THEOREM 3.83  The logic Cila (that is, da Costa’s C1) is not algebraizable.  The
same holds even for the stronger logic Cibaw (see Figure 3.1, in the subsection
3.10), or any weaker logics extended by Cibaw.
Proof:   Consider the following set of truth-values, V={0, a, b, 1, u}, ordered as fol-
lows: 0≤a, 0≤b, a≤1, b≤1, 1≤u, and where u and 1 are the distinguished elements.
Consider now the following matrices defined over them:
∧ u 1 ab0
u u 1 ab0
1 11ab0
a aaa00
b bb0 b 0
0 00000
¬ ◦
u 10
1 01
a b 1
b a 1
0 11
∨ u 1 ab0
u uuuuu
1 u 1111
a u 1 a 1 a
b u 11bb
0 u 1 ab0
→ u 1 ab0
u uuab0
1 u 1 ab0
a u 11bb
b u 1 a 1 a
0 u 111181
All axioms of Cibaw are validated by these matrices, as the reader can easily check.
Now, it is also easy to check that there are no non-trivial congruences over V.  Sup-
pose for instance that u≈ x, for some x￿ /u.  In this case, as we know that ¬¬ u￿0,
and ¬¬ x￿x, then the condition (ii) above will give us ¬¬ u≈¬¬ x from u≈ x, and
so we conclude that 0≈ x, and thus 0≈ u.  But, as we have observed before, there can
be no congruence class containing both distinguished and non-distinguished values
(in any case, this will violate condition (iii) above).  We leave to the reader the easy
exercise of showing, using the above connectives, that for any x≈ y, with x￿ /y, one
gets trapped at a similar predicament, namely, that of a distinguished value getting
grouped with a non-distinguished one inside the same congruence class.  Now, it is
clear that < A, ∧ , ∨>  is a lattice, and that {0, a, 1, u} and {0, b, 1, u} are two filters
over V.  But there is just one congruence over V (which is of course the largest one
compatible with both the filters just mentioned), and so the Leibniz operator cannot
be an isomorphism.  Once the logic Cibaw is, as a consequence, not algebraizable,
FACT 3.79 informs us that none of its fragments can be algebraizable. ￿
Now, even non-algebraizable logics can happen to be amenable to sensible algebraic
investigation.  Indeed, a class of weakly algebraizable logics is characterized by the
validity of conditions (iv) and (v) above, two of the three clauses of the characterizati-
on of Blok-Pigozzi algebraizability in terms of the Leibniz operator, and condition (v),
alone, defines the class of proto-algebraizable logics.  This last class includes all nor-
mal modal logics and most non-normal ones, but there are still some other logics which
are not protoalgebraizable: an example is IPC*, the implicationless fragment of intui-
tionistic logic, is neither algebraizable nor protoalgebraizable (cf. [25], chapter 5).
Which of our non-algebraizable C-systems are protoalgebraizable, and which not (if
any)?  We shall leave this question open at this stage.  It is interesting to notice, at any
rate, that some sort of algebraic counterparts to some of these non-algebraizable
C-systems have been proposed and studied, for instance, in Carnielli & de Alcantara’s
[37] and Seoane & de Alcantara’s [102], where a variety of ‘da Costa algebras’ for the
logic Cila has been introduced and studied, and a Stone-like representation theorem
was proved, to the effect that every da Costa algebra is isomorphic to a ‘paracon-
sistent algebra of sets’.  It would be interesting now not only to extend that approach to
other C-systems, but also to check how it fits inside this more general picture gi-
ven by (Blok-Pigozzi-)algebraizable and protoalgebraizable logics.
An interesting application of the above mentioned algebraic tools is the following.
Consider again, for example, the FACT 2.10(ii), where strong negations were shown
to be ‘definable’ from bottom particles.  Now, it is completely clear how this defini-
tion can be stated in practice if, for instance, a suitable implication is available inside
of a compact logic (this is the case in all our examples, but needs not to be).  This
illustrates in fact how intuitionistic negation may be defined from a bottom particle
and intuitionistic implication.  But is that definition, in the general case, an implicit
or an explicit one?  For example, in positive classical logic (plus bottom and top) the
theory containing both the formulas ((A∧ B)↔⊥ ) and ((A∨ B)↔  ) implicitly de-
fines the formula B (as the ‘classical negation of A’).  Are all implicit definitions also
explicit ones?  Or do we have, in some cases, to explicitly add some more structure
to a logic to make explicit definitions expressible even when implicit ones are avail-
able?  If, whenever a logic can implicitly define something, it can also explicitly de-
fine it, then the logic is said to have the Beth definability property, (BDP).  Now, con-82
sider any class of L-algebras KA, for some logic L, and pick up a set HA of homo-
morphisms between any two of these L-algebras.  A homomorphism f:Alg1→Alg2
in HA is said to be an epi if every pair of homomorphisms g, h:Alg2→Alg3 in HA is
such that g◦ ◦ ◦ ◦f = h◦ ◦ ◦ ◦f only if g= h.  Evidently, all surjective homomorphisms are epis;
if the converse also holds, that is, if all epis are surjective, we say that KA has the
property (ES).  Now, by a result of I. Németi (cf. [4]), an algebraizable logic has (BDP)
if, and only if, its class of algebras has (ES).  This is a very interesting result, and cons-
titutes, in fact, just one example of how algebraic approaches can help us to solve real
logical problems, in this case the problem of definability.  Extensions of such results
to wider classes of algebraic structures associated to (wider classes of) logics are
clearly desirable.
4  FUTUROLOGY OF C-SYSTEMS
When you encounter difficulties and contradictions, do not try to break
them, but bend them with gentleness and time.
—Saint Francis de Sales.
This is not the end.  The next and natural small step for a paper, giant leap for para-
consistency, is providing reasonable interpretations for C-systems.  This is the theme
of our [42], where semantics for C-systems are presented and surveyed, ranging from
the already traditional bivaluations to the more recently proposed possible-translations
semantics, traversing on the way a few connections to many-valued semantics (a theme
that already intromitted in our subsection 3.11), and to modal semantics.  A quite
diverse approach to paraconsistent logics (in general) from the semantical point of view
is also soon to be found in Priest’s [91] (the remarkable possible-translations seman-
tics, according to which some complex logics are to be understood in terms of com-
binations of simpler ones, will nevertheless not be found there —see instead [76], [36],
[39], and, of course, [42]—, in addition, its section on many-valued logics is unfor-
tunately too poor to give a reasonably good idea on the topic).
In this last section of the present paper we want to point out some interesting open
problems and research directions connected to what we have herein presented.  For
example, in the section 2 we have extensively investigated the abstract foundations
of paraconsistent logic, and the possibility and interest of defining the so-called logi-
cal principles at a purely logical level.  There is still a lot of stirring open space to
work here, and we will feel happy to have stimulated the reader to try their own hand
at the relations between all the alternative formulations of (PPS), that is, all the dif-
ferent forms of explosion (or, if they prefer, the various forms of reductio, as in the
subsection 3.2 —recall that the reductio and the Pseudo-Scotus are not always equiva-
lent, for instance, if you think about intuitionistic logics).  Think about it: are there
any interesting logics, in our sense, disrespecting the Pseudo-Scotus, while respect-
ing ex falso or the Supplementing Principle of Explosion, but still disrespecting the
Gentle Principle of Explosion as well?  In other words, are there interesting para-
consistent logics having either bottom particles or strong negations which do not con-
stitute LFIs?
Recall that our approach contributed a novel notion of consistency.  This is the pic-
ture again: There are consistent and inconsistent logics.  The inconsistent ones may
be either paraconsistent or trivial, but not both.  The paraconsistent ones may be either83
dialectical or not.  The consistent logics are explosive and non-trivial.  The paracon-
sistent logics are non-explosive, and the dialectical paraconsistent ones are contra-
dictory as well.  The trivial logics (or trivial logic, if you fix some language) are e x-
plosive and contradictory (if the underlying logic has a negation symbol).  Nega-
tionless logics are trivial if and only if inconsistent.  Let us say that a theory has
models only if these are non-trivial (they do not assign distinguished values to all
formulas).  So, the theories of a consistent logic have models if and only if they are
non-contradictory.  Paraconsistent logics may have models for some of its contra-
dictory theories, and in the dialectical case all models of all theories are contradic-
tory.  Trivial theories (of trivial logics, or of any other logics) have no models.  The
consistency of each formula A of a logic L is defined exactly as what else one must
say about A in order to make it explosive, that is, as what one should add to an A-
contradictory theory in order to make it trivial.  If the answer is ‘nothing’, then A is
already consistent in L (whether the theories that derive this formula are contra-
dictory or not).  So, consistent logics are, quite naturally, those logics that have only
consistent formulas.  The above study sharply distinguishes the notions of non-con-
tradictoriness and of consistency, and the model-theoretic impact of this should ob-
viously be better appraised!
We now also have a precise definition of a large and fascinating class of para-
consistent logics, the logics of formal inconsistency, LFIs, and an important sub-
class of that, the C-systems.  This is important to stress: according to our proposal it
should be no more the case that the C-systems will be identified simply with the cal-
culi Cn of da Costa, or with some other logics which just happen to be axiomatized
in a more or less similar way.  A general idea was put forward to be explored, namely
that of being able to express consistency inside of our paraconsistent logics, and this
helped collecting inside one big single class logics as diverse as the Cn and P
1, or
even J3 (now rephrased as LFI1), whose close kinship to the Cn seemed to have passed
unsuspected until very recently (recall the subsections 2.4, and end of 3.11).  This
is, we may suggest, a fascinating challenge that we propose to our readers: To show
that many other logics in the literature on paraconsistent logics can be characterized
as C-systems, or, in general, as LFIs.  This exercise has been explicitly put forward
in the subsection 2.6, but even previous to that, in the end of the subsection 2.4, we
have already hinted to the fact that other logics, such as Jaskowski’s D2, a discussive
paraconsistent logic with motivations and technical features completely different
from the ones that we study here, could be recast as an LFI (based on the modal logic
S5) —more precisely, it can be recast as an LFI if only it is presented having some
necessity operator, ￿, among its primitive or definable connectives (see note 11).  An-
other recent example of that is the paraconsistent logic Z (are we perhaps running out
of names?) proposed by Béziau in [24], in which a paraconsistent negation ¬  is de-
fined from a primitive classical negation ~ and a possibility operator ◊ , by setting
¬ A￿◊ ~A.
27  Again, it is easy to see that Z can also be seen as an LFI (in fact, a
                                                  
27 By the way, exactly the same logic was proposed by Batens in [16] under the name A, and appears
on another of Béziau’s paper, [23], section 2.8, under the appelation of ‘Molière’s logic’.  Strangely
enough, after longly attacking, in the section 2.5 of [23], those logics that he calls ‘paraconsistent atomical
logics’, that is, those logics in which ‘only atomic formulas have a paraconsistent behavior’ (being
thus controllably explosive with respect to every complex, or ‘molecular’ formula), a class of logics84
C-system based on S5), in which the consistency of a formula A is expressed by the
formula (￿A∨ ~A).  Which other paraconsistent logics constitute C-systems, or LFIs,
and which not?  Inverting the question, are there good reasons for one trying to avoid
LFIs, that is, can the investigation of non-LFIs have good technical or philosophical
justifications?  And how would the C-systems based on intuitionistic logic (I-systems?)
or on relevance logic (R-systems?) look like, and which interesting properties would
they have?  How would this improve our map and understanding of C-land?  In
general, how could one use the very idea of a C-system to build up some new inter-
esting paraconsistent logics, what advantages would they bring and particular technical
tools could they contribute to the general inquiry about LFIs?  The point to insist
here is on the remarkable unification of aims and techniques that LFIs can seemingly
produce in the paraconsistency terrain!
Another related interesting route is the one of  upgrading any given paraconsistent
logic in order to turn it into an LFI.  This is exactly what is done by the logic LFI1
(or CLuNs, or J3) over the logics Pac and LP (see subsection 2.4), for which the
gain in expressive power should already be obvious to the reader.  Now, consider, for
instance, the three-valued closed set logic studied by Mortensen and collaborators in
[85], whose matrices of conjunction and of disjunction coincide with those of LFI1,
and whose matrix of negation coincides with that of P
1, having, again, 0 as the only
non-distinguished value.  Now, it is easy to see that the addition of appropriate ma-
trices of implication and of a consistency operator will turn the upgraded closed-set
logic into one of our 8K three-valued maximal paraconsistent logics, discussed in
the subsection 3.11 above.  The motivation for such closed set logic is also to be found
among some of the most striking features of the ‘Brazilian approach’ to paracon-
sistency, namely, the idea of studying paraconsistent logics which are in a sense dual
to other broadly intuitionistic (also called paracomplete) logics.  We have slightly
touched on this issue at a few points above —see, for instance, subsections 3.1 and
3.2— as this has been one of the preferred justifications used by da Costa, among other
authors, for the constitution of many of his paraconsistent logics.  Indeed, if classical
logic is not rarely held by some authors as the ‘logic of sets’, particularly because of
its Boolean algebraic counterpart, Heyting’s Intuitionistic Logic is very naturally held,
in a topological setting, as the ‘logic of open sets’.  The very same dualizing intuition
that we have just mentioned can then lead one to study the ‘logic of closed sets’
as a very natural paraconsistent logic.  This is done in [85], where this investigation
is also lifted to the categorial space —again, if intuitionistic logic is very naturally
thought of as the logic of a topos, the closed set logic can be thought of as the un-
derlying logic of a categorial structure called complemented topos.  The upgrade of
the closed set logic into an LFI may thus set up some interesting new space for the
                                                                                                                                
that seems to comprise not many logics up to this moment (the logic P
1 —recall THEOREM 3.15(ii)
and THEOREM 3.69— being among them), Béziau presents the above mentioned logic Z as the logic
enjoying ‘the best paraconsistent negation’ around.  But even if one concedes an enlargement of this
definition of atomical logics in order to comprise all paraconsistent logics which are only ‘paraconsistent
up to some level of complexity’, this author would still have to deal with the bourgeois fact that the
negation of his preferred logic Z, exactly as what occurred with P
1’s negation, is such that {p, ¬ p} is
not trivial, for atomic p, while {¬ p, ¬¬ p} is trivial: why, in this largely analogous case, would that
same phenomenon be ‘philosophically justifiable’, and not be reducible just to some more bits of ‘formal
nonsense’, as he puts it?  One interesting such a justification, we suggest, may be found in terms of the
dualization obtained by logics such as Mortensen’s closed set logic, also mentioned in the present section.85
study of topological and categorial interpretations of the notion of consistency.  This
proposed duality has also often been pushed, in the literature, in the contrary direc-
tion, namely, into the study of paracomplete logics which are dual to some given para-
consistent logics.  Some samples of this can be found, for instance, in our papers [39]
(where a logic called Dmin is presented as dual to Cmin, mentioned above in the subsec-
tion 3.1), and [43] (where logics dual to slightly stronger versions of the calculi Cn
are studied), as well as in Marcos’s [78] (where 1K three-valued maximal paracom-
plete logics are presented, in addition to the 8K paraconsistent ones above mentioned).
A more thorough study of the LFUs, the Logics of Formal Undecidability (or Logics
of Incomplete Information), following the standards of the investigation set up by the
present paper rests yet to be done.
We of course do not, and cannot, claim to have included and studied above all
‘interesting’ C-systems based on classical logic.  We cannot but offer here a very par-
tial medium-altitude mapping of the region, but we strongly encourage the reader to
help us expand our horizons.  So, if, guided mostly by technical reasons, we have
started our study from the basic logic bC (subsection 3.2), constructing all the remain-
ing C-systems as extensions of bC, this should not be a impediment for the reader to
study still weaker and more basic logics, such as mbC, the logic axiomatized by de-
leting (Min11): (¬¬ A→ A) from the axiomatization of bC, and their extensions, mCi
(a logic studied under the name Ci in [17]) and so on.  So, if bC was presented as a
quite natural conservative extension of the logic Cmin ([39]), mbC can similarly be
presented as an extension of the logic PI ([10]).  Just keep in mind that starting your
study from mbC, instead of bC, and avoiding the axiom (Min11), you will be al-
lowing for the existence of a few more in principle uninteresting partially explosive
paraconsistent extensions of your logics (THEOREM 3.13), and you may also lose a
series of other results, as for instance 3.14(iii), half of 3.17 and of 3.26, and also 3.20,
3.36, 3.41, 3.51(iii), 3.56, 3.57, 3.66, as well as some derived results and comments.
Notice that we do not say that the loss of some of these results cannot be positive, but
some symmetry certainly seems to be lost if the logic mbC happens to be extendable,
for instance, in such a way as to validate the schematic rule [(A→ B) ￿ (¬ B→¬ A)],
though it can in no way be extended so as to validate the similar rule [(¬ A→ B) ￿
(¬ B→ A)].
What effects can the LFIs have on the study of some general mathematical ques-
tions, such as incompleteness results in Arithmetic?  Indeed, recall that Gödel’s in-
completeness theorems are based on the identification of ‘consistency’ and ‘non-
contradictoriness’ —what then if we start from our present more general notion of
consistency (see (D19), subsection 2.4)?  And what if we integrate these logics with
such modal logics as the logic of provability?  (See [27], where consistency is also
intended as a kind of dual notion to provability —if you cannot prove the negation
of a formula, it is consistent with what you can prove—, and in which the necessary
environment for the study of Gödel’s theorems is provided.)  What effects could that
have (if at all) on the investigation of (set-theoretical) paradoxes?  In fact, the analogy
of the logics of formal inconsistency with the logics of provability is rather striking
and worthy of being further explored; connections with other powerful internalizing-
metatheoretical-notions logics, such as hybrid logics, and labelled deductive sys-
tems in general, are also to be expected.86
We are not trying to escape from da Costa’s requisite dC[iii] (subsection 3.8), ac-
cording to which extensions of our logics to higher-order logics ought to be avail-
able.  But it still seems that most interesting problems related to paraconsistency ap-
pear already at the propositional level!  Moreover, more or less automatic processes
to first-ordify some given propositional paraconsistent logics can be devised, by the
use of combination techniques such as fibring, if only we choose the right abstraction
level to express our logics (see [34], where the logic C1 is given a first-order version
—coinciding with the one it had originally received, in [49] or [50], but richer in ex-
pressibility power— by the use of the notion of non-truth-functional rooms).  One in-
teresting thing about first-order paraconsistent logics is that they might allow for in-
consistencies at the level of its objects, opening a new panorama for ontological in-
vestigations.  Another interesting thing that we can conceive about first-order versions
of paraconsistent logics in general, and especially of first-order LFIs, and that seems
to have been completely neglected in the literature up to this point, is the investi-
gation of consistent yet ω -inconsistent structures, or theories (also related to Gödel’s
theorems).  Again, a point about that is scored by the logics of provability, but stu-
dious of paraconsistency should definitely have something to say about this.
Let us further mention some more palpable specific points to which we have al-
ready drawn attention here and there, and on which more research is still to be done.
For instance, is the logic bC (subsections 3.2 to 3.4) controllably explosive?  Recall
from FACT 3.32 that in the case of its extension Ci, the formulas causing controllable
explosion coincide with the consistent theorems, and that, as it happens, bC does not
have consistent theorems (THEOREM 3.10).  For bC, however, only one side becomes
immediate: consistent theorems cause controllable explosion…  Another question: Does
this logic bC have an intuitive adequate modal interpretation?  And are there also
extensions of Ci in which (IpE) holds (see the end of the subsection 3.7)?  What about
investigating some other extensions of bC which do not extend Ci as well, such as
bCe, obtained by the direct addition to bC of the axiom (ce): A ￿ ¬¬ A, studied in
subsection 3.9?  Remember that we have extended bC to Ci, in the subsection 3.5,
arguing that all paraconsistent logics in the literature do identify inconsistencies and
contradictions, and then all the other logics that we have studied after that in fact ex-
tended Ci.  But the logic bCe also seems interesting in its own right, being able to
accept some simple extensions that can express dual inconsistency, differently of
what had occurred in the subsection 3.4 with some other extensions of bC, and par-
alleling a result obtainable for Ci (subsection 3.6).  bCe would also presumably con-
stitute a step further in the direction of obtaining full (IpE), but in any case the gen-
eral search for interesting C-systems extending bC and not extending Ci can al-
ready be funny enough.  As to other ways of fixing the non-duality of the consistency
and inconsistency operators in bC, alternative to extending this logic into Ci, sugges-
tions have been made, for instance, for the addition to bC of schematic rules such as
◦A, ¬ ◦A ￿ B or else ￿ ◦◦A (perhaps having FACT 3.32 in mind, and trying to carry
it forward into bC).  None of these will work, however, as it is easy to see if one just
considers again the matrices in THEOREM 3.16, noticing that they also validate the
two last rules, while still not validating schemas such as (ci1) or (ci2).  But there may
quite well exist some other way out of this quagmire (perhaps the reader will find it).
Now, this is a quickie: can you find any (grammatical) conservative translation from
eCPL (the extended classical propositional logic obtained by the addition to classical87
logic of the then innocuous consistency operator) into bC (recall the subsection 3.7),
as the one we had for Ci (COROLLARY 3.47)?  And what happens when one con-
siders, in the construction of dC-systems, the addition of more general rules such as
(cg) or (RG) (see the subsection 3.8), which implement more inclusive definitions for
the consistency connective?  Do we obtain interesting logics from that, fixing some
asymmetries observed on the calculi Cn and its relatives?  What effects does this move
have on the semantical counterparts of these logics?  Moving yet farther, we may ask
about the logic CLim, the deductive limit to the hierarchy Cn (see subsection 3.10),
whether it can be proved to be not finitely gently explosive.  For if it is not finitely
gently explosive, given that it is gently explosive lato senso, then it cannot be compact.
Or are we rather obligated to abandon strong completeness, in this case?  Would
there be other interesting LFIs in which consistency is not finitely expressible?
Recall the subsection 3.11, where da Costa’s requisite dC[iv] (subsection 3.8) is
taken very seriously, and we search for maximal paraconsistent fragments of classi-
cal logic, that is, logics having ‘most rules and schemas of classical logic’, and a class
of 8K three-valued logics is presented as a solution to this.  Now, are there other (full)
solutions to this ‘problem of da Costa’?  And are there other interpretations, besides
maximality, of da Costa’s requisite dC[iv] leading to yet some other solutions to that
problem?  Are there non-many-valued (monotonic) solutions to that problem, or per-
haps some other n-valued ones, for n> 3?  And, this is an important first step and
probably an easier problem to solve: are there other interesting C-systems based on
classical logic which are not extended by any of the above 8K three-valued logics?
We must leave these questions open at this moment. It is interesting to notice, at any
rate, that this problem has already been directly addressed here and there, in the litera-
ture.  Besides [78], from which we drew the results in the subsection 3.11, one could
also recall, for instance, the adaptive programme for the confection of paraconsistent
logics aiming to represent (non-monotonically) the dynamics of scientific reasoning
and of argumentation (see [15]).  Roughly speaking, the basic idea behind adaptive
logics is that of working in between two boundary logics, often classical logic con-
stituting one of them and a paraconsistent logic constituting the other one, so that con-
sistency is pressuposed by default and we try to keep on reasoning inside of classi-
cal logic up to the point in which an ‘abnormality’ (an inconsistency?) pops out, a
situation in which we had better descend to the level of the complementary para-
consistent logic, and go on reasoning over there.  Indeed, the ancestral motivations of
this programme seem to have been, as it is reasonable to conceive, yet another attempt
to maintain the most of classical logic as possible (see [10]), so that paraconsistency is
only needed at limit cases, while (most of) classical logic is, in principle, maintained
in ‘normal’ situations.  The difficulty here, as far as da Costa’s requisite dC[iv] is
concerned, seems to be measuring how much some different adaptive logics will
respond to that same requirement of closeness to classical logic (if there is any meas-
urable difference at all).  As it is appealing to think of adaptive logics as situations in
which two logics are combined in order to produce a third one, it seems also inter-
esting to investigate if possible-translations semantics can, after all, be applied to
such an environment as well, or at least stretch the analogies there as far as we can.
Some open questions can also be drawn from the subsection 3.12.  Notice, for in-
stance, that all of Mortensen’s axioms, (M1n) and (M2n), for every n>0, are vali-
dated by the matrices of the three-valued paraconsistent logic P
2 (recall THEO-88
REM 3.69), as that author himself have observed, and the question was left open,
in [84], (and it remains still so, as far as we know) whether the logic C1/2, the stronger
of the logics Cn/(n+1), would in fact coincide with the three-valued logic P
2.  Once
P
2 is known to be a maximal paraconsistent logic (cf. THEOREM 3.72), to show this
coincidence would amount to showing that all axioms of P
2 (and especially axioms
(ca1)–(ca3), in the subsection 3.10, specifying the consistent behavior of binary con-
nectives) are provable from the axioms of C1/2.  Alternatively, using the fundamental
FACT 3.32, one could try to show that C1/2 is controllably explosive (or not, if what
one wants is to disprove the conjectured coincidence) in contact with any formula
involving binary connectives.  In one way or another, it is quite interesting to note that
the 8K maximal three-valued logics in subsection 3.11 show that there are several other
logics different from P
1 and from P
2 that are next to the classical propositional logic ‘in
the same kind of way’ (half of them extending C1, as we point out in FACT 3.73), a
problem that was left open in the closing paragraph of the above mentioned paper.
Now, what about extending our investigations on the algebraizability of C-systems
(again, see the subsection 3.12)?  Can these algebras solve yet some other categories
of logical problems?  Again, notice that the problem of finding extensions of our C-
systems which are algebraizable in the ‘classical sense’ was also left open (though the
plausibility of the existence of such extensions was hinted) in the end of subsection 3.7.
To be precise, what was open was the existence of such extensions as fragments of
some version of classical logic —the reader will have seen in the present section, how-
ever, that modal logics such as Z do extend bC and have no problem on what con-
cerns (IpE) (given that S5 is algebraizable).  And what to say of extending our gen-
eral approach on section 2 to other ‘kinds of logics’ (that is, varying the logic structure
that we defined there) so as to include other kinds of consequence relations, such as
(multiple-conclusion) non-monotonic ones (see [5] and [12])?  Under this new light
shed by C-systems and LFIs, it is also interesting to see how one can also move on to
improve our present (rather poor) proof-theoretical approach.  Indeed, Hilbert-style
systems, such as the ones we present here, often require too much ingenuity to be ap-
plied, leaving intuition or mechanization of proofs far behind.  For some dC-systems
we know that sequent systems have already been proposed (see for instance [97] and
[17]), as well as natural deduction systems (see [58]), and tableau systems (see [38]).
The really interesting cases, however, seem to be those of C-systems that are not
dC-systems, so that the consistency connective is, in a sense, ‘ineliminable’!  A first
step towards such a general treatment of C-systems in terms of tableaux has already
been offered by us in [41], where the logics bC, Ci and LFI1 were all endowed with
sound and complete tableau formulations.
There is so much yet to be done!
5  REFERENCES
  [1]  E. Agazzi.  Il formale e il non formale nella logica.  In: E. Agazzi, editor, Logica
filosofica e logica matematica, pages 1119–1131.  Brescia: La Scuola, 1990.
  [2]  E. Alves.  Logic and Inconsistency (in Portuguese).  Thesis, USP, Brazil, 137p,
1976.
  [3]  A. R. Anderson, N. D. Belnap.  Entailment.  Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1975.89
  [4]  H. Andréka, I. Németi, and I. Sain.  Algebraic logic.  To appear in: D. Gabbay,
editor, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2
nd Edition.
  [5]  O. Arieli, and A. Avron.  General patterns for nonmonotonic reasoning: From
basic entailments to plausible relations.  Logic Journal of the IGPL, 8:119–
148, 2000.
  [6]  A. I. Arruda.  A survey of paraconsistent logic.  In: A. I. Arruda, R. Chuaqui,
and N. C. A. da Costa, editors, Mathematical Logic in Latin America: Proce-
edings of the IV Latin American Symposium on Mathematical Logic, Santiago,
Chile, 1978, pp.1–41.  Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980.
  [7]  A. Avron.  On an implication connective of RM.  Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, 27:201–209, 1986.
  [8]  A. Avron.  Natural 3-valued logics – characterization and proof theory.  The
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 56(1):276–294, 1991.
  [9]  A. Avron.  On negation, completeness and consistency.  To appear in: D. Gab-
bay, editor, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2
nd Edition.
  [10]  D. Batens.  Paraconsistent extensional propositional logics.  Logique et Analyse,
90–91:195–234, 1980.
  [11]  D. Batens.  Dialectical dynamics within formal logics.  Logique et Analyse, 114:
161–173, 1986.
  [12]  D. Batens.  Dynamic dialectical logics.  In: [95], pp.187–217, 1989.
  [13]  D. Batens.  Against global paraconsistency.  Studies in Soviet Thought, 39: 209–
229, 1990.
  [14]  D. Batens.  Paraconsistency and its relation to worldviews.   Foundations of Sci-
ence, 3:259–283, 1999.
  [15]  D. Batens.  A survey of inconsistency-adaptive logics.  In: D. Batens, C. Morten-
sen, G. Priest, and J.-P. van Bendegem, editors, Frontiers in Paraconsistent Lo-
gic: Proceedings of the I World Congress on Paraconsistency, Ghent, 1998, pp.49–
73.  Baldock: Research Studies Press, King’s College Publications, 2000.
  [16]  D. Batens.  On the remarkable correspondence between paraconsistent logics,
modal logics, and ambiguity logics.  This volume.
  [17]  J.-Y. Béziau.  Nouveaux résultats et nouveau regard sur la logique paraconsis-
tante C1.  Logique et Analyse, 141–142:45–58, 1993.
  [18]  J.-Y. Béziau.  Théorie legislative de la négation pure.  Logique et Analyse, 147–
148:209–225, 1994.
  [19]  J.-Y. Béziau.  Research on Universal Logic: Excessivity, negation, sequents
(French).  Thesis, Univérsité Denis Diderot (Paris 7), France, 179p, 1995.
  [20]  J.-Y. Béziau.  Logic may be simple.  Logic, congruence, and algebra.  Logic and
Logical Philosophy, 5:129–147, 1997.
  [21]  J.-Y. Béziau.  De Morgan lattices, paraconsistency and the excluded middle.
Boletim da Sociedade Paranaense de Matemática (2), 18(1/2):169–172, 1998.
  [22]  J.-Y. Béziau.  Idempotent full paraconsistent negations are not algebraizable.
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 39(1):135–139, 1998.90
  [23]  J.-Y. Béziau.  Are paraconsistent negations negations?  This volume.
  [24]  J.-Y. Béziau.  The paraconsistent logic Z (a possible solution to Jaskowski’s
problem).  To appear in: Logic and Logical Philosophy, 7–8 (Proceedings of the
Jaskowski’s Memorial Symposium), 1999/2000.
  [25]  W. J. Blok, and D. Pigozzi.  Algebraizable Logics.  Memoirs of the American
Mathematical Society 396, 1989.
  [26]  A. Bobenrieth-Miserda.  Inconsistencias ¿Por qué no? Un estudio filosófico so-
bre la lógica paraconsistente.  Santafé de Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1996.
  [27]  G. Boolos.  The Logic of Provability.  Cambridge University Press, 1996.
  [28]  O. Bueno.  Truth, quasi-truth and paraconsistency.  In: W. A. Carnielli, and I. M.
L. D’Ottaviano, editors, Advances in Contemporary Logic and Computer Sci-
ence: Proceedings of the XI Brazilian Conference of Mathematical Logic, Sal-
vador, 1996, pp.275–293.  Providence: American Mathematical Society, 1999.
  [29]  M. W. Bunder.  A new hierarchy of paraconsistent logics.  In: A. I. Arruda,
N. C. A. da Costa, and A. M. Sette, editors, Proceedings of the III Brazilian
Conference on Mathematical Logic, Recife, 1979, pp.13–22.  São Paulo: Soc.
Brasil. Lógica, 1980.
  [30]  M. W. Bunder.  Some definitions of negation leading to paraconsistent logics.
Studia Logica, 43(1/2):75–78, 1984.
  [31]  M. W. Bunder.  Some results in some subsystems and in an extension of Cn.
The Journal of Non-Classical Logic, 6(1): 45–56, 1989.
  [32]  M. Bunge.  Racionalidad y Realismo.  Madrid: Alianza, 1995.
  [33]  H. Burkhardt, and B. Smith (editors).  Handbook of metaphysics and ontology
(2v).  Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1991.
  [34]  C. Caleiro, and J. Marcos.  Non-truth-functional fibred semantics.   In: H. R.
Arabnia, editor, Proceedings of the 2001 International Conference on Artifi-
cial Intelligence (IC-AI'2001), v.II, pp.841–847.  CSREA Press, USA, 2001.
  [35]  R. Carnap.  The Logical Syntax of Language.  London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1949.
  [36]  W. A. Carnielli.  Possible-translations semantics for paraconsistent logics. In:
D. Batens, C. Mortensen, G. Priest, and J.-P. van Bendegem, editors, Frontiers
in Paraconsistent Logic: Proceedings of the I World Congress on Paraconsis-
tency, Ghent, 1998, pp.149–163.  Baldock: Research Studies Press, King’s
College Publications, 2000.
  [37]  W. A. Carnielli, and L. P. de Alcantara.  Paraconsistent Algebras.  Studia Logica
43(1/2):79–88, 1984.
  [38]  W. A. Carnielli, and M. Lima-Marques.  Reasoning under inconsistent know l-
edge.  Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 2(1):49–79, 1992.
  [39]  W. A. Carnielli, and J. Marcos.  Limits for paraconsistency calculi.  To appear in:
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 40(3), 1999.
  [40]  W. A. Carnielli, and J. Marcos.  Ex contradictione non sequitur quodlibet.  In:
Proceedings of the Advanced Reasoning Forum Conference, held in Bucharest,91
Rumania, July 2000.  Bulletin of Advanced Reasoning and Knowledge, 1:89–109,
2001.
  [41]  W. A. Carnielli, and J. Marcos.  Tableau systems for logics of formal incon-
sistency.  In: H. R. Arabnia, editor, Proceedings of the 2001 International Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence (IC-AI'2001), v.II, pp.848–852.  CSREA Press,
USA, 2001.
  [42]  W. A. Carnielli, and J. Marcos.  Semantics for C-systems.  Forthcoming.
  [43]  W. A. Carnielli, and J. Marcos.  Possible-translations semantics and dual logics.
Forthcoming.
  [44]  W. A. Carnielli, J. Marcos, and S. de Amo.  Formal inconsistency and evolution-
ary databases.  To appear in: Logic and Logical Philosophy, 7–8 (Proceedings of
the Jaskowski’s Memorial Symposium), 1999/2000.
  [45]  H. Curry.  The inconsistency of certain formal logics.  The Journal of Symbo-
lic Logic, 7(3):115–117, 1942.
  [46]  N. C. A. da Costa.  Nota sobre o conceito de contradição.  Anuário da Sociedade
Paranaense de Matemática (2), 1:6–8, 1958.
  [47]  N. C. A. da Costa.  Observações sobre o conceito de existência em matemática.
Anuário da Sociedade Paranaense de Matemática (2), 2:16–19, 1959.
  [48]  N. C. A. da Costa.  Opérations non monotones dans les treillis. Comptes Ren-
dus de l’Academie de Sciences de Paris (A–B), 263:A429–A423, 1966.
  [49]  N. C. A. da Costa.  Inconsistent Formal Systems (in Portuguese).  Thesis, UFPR,
Brazil, 1963.  Curitiba: Editora UFPR, 68p, 1993.
  [50]  N. C. A. da Costa.  On the theory of inconsistent formal systems.  Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic, 15(4):497–510, 1974.
  [51]  N. C. A. da Costa.  Essay on the Foundations of Logic (in Portuguese).  São
Paulo: Hucitec, 1980.  (Translated into French by J.-Y. Béziau, under the title
Logiques Classiques et Non-Classiques, 1997, Paris: Masson.)
  [52]  N. C. A. da Costa.  The philosophical import of paraconsistent logic.  The Journal
of Non-Classical Logic, 1(1):1–19, 1982.
  [53]  N. C. A. da Costa, and E. Alves.  A semantical analysis of the calculi Cn.  Notre
Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 18(4):621–630, 1977.
  [54]  N. C. A. da Costa, and M. Guillaume.  Sur les calculs Cn.  Anais da Academia
Brasileira de Ciências, 36:379–382, 1964.
  [55]  N. C. A. da Costa, and D. Marconi.  An overview of paraconsistent logic in the
80s.  The Journal of Non-Classical Logic, 6(1):5–32, 1989.
  [56]  N. C. A. da Costa, and R. G. Wolf.  Studies in paraconsistent logic I: The dialec-
tical principle of the unity of opposites.  Philosophia (Philosophical Quarterly
of Israel), 9:189–217, 1980.
  [57]  N. C. A. da Costa, J.-Y. Béziau, and O. A. S. Bueno.  Aspects of paraconsistent
logic.  Bulletin of the IGPL, 3(4):597–614, 1995.
  [58]  M. A. de Castro, and I. M. L. D’Ottaviano.  Natural Deduction for Paraconsistent
Logic.  Logica Trianguli, 4:3–24, 2000.92
  [59]  I. M. L. D’Ottaviano.  On the development of paraconsistent logic and da Costa’s
work. The Journal of Non-Classical Logic, 7(1/2):89–152, 1990.
  [60]  I. M. L. D’Ottaviano, and N. C. A. da Costa.  Sur un problème de Jaskowski.
Comptes Rendus de l’Academie de Sciences de Paris (A–B), 270:1349–1353, 1970.
  [61]  R. L. Epstein.  Propositional Logics: The semantic foundations of logic, with the
assistance and collaboration of W. A. Carnielli, I. M. L. D’Ottaviano, S. Krajewski,
and R. D. Maddux.  Belmont: Wadsworth-Thomson Learning, 2
nd edition, 2000.
  [62]  G. Gentzen.  Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen.  Mathematische
Zeitschrift, 39:176–210/405–431, 1934.
  [63]  H.-J. Glock.  A Wittgenstein Dictionary.  Blackwell, 1996.
  [64]  L. Goldstein.  Wittgenstein and paraconsistency.  In: [95], pp.540–562.
  [65]  G.-G. Granger.  L'irrationnel.  Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998.
  [66]  D. Hilbert.  Mathematische Probleme: Vortrag, gehalten auf dem Internationalen
Mathematiker Kongress zu Paris 1900.  Nachrichten von der Königlichen Ge-
sellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, pages 253–297, 1900.
  [67]  S. Jaskowski.  Propositional calculus for contradictory deductive systems (in
Polish).  Studia Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis, sectio A–I:57–77, 1948.
Translated into English: Studia Logica, 24:143–157, 1967.
  [68]  I. Johánsson.  Der Minimalkalkül, ein reduzierter intuitionistischer Formalismus.
Compositio Mathematica, 4(1):119–136, 1936.
  [69]  A. N. Kolmogorov.  On the principle of excluded middle.  In: Van Heijenoort,
editor, From Frege to Gödel, pp.414–437.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1967.  (Translation from the Russian original, from 1925.)
  [70]  W. Lenzen.  Necessary conditions for negation-operators (with particular ap-
plications to paraconsistent negation).  In: Ph. Besnard, and A. Hunter, Reason-
ing with Actual and Potential Contradictions, pp.211–239.  Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1998.
  [71]  R. A. Lewin, I. F. Mikenberg, and M. G. Schwarze.  Algebraization of para-
consistent logic P
1.  The Journal of Non-Classical Logic, 7(1/2):79–88, 1990.
  [72]  R. A. Lewin, I. F. Mikenberg, and M. G. Schwarze.  C1 is not algebraizable.
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 32(4):609–611, 1991.
  [73]  C. I. Lewis, and C. H. Langford.  Symbolic Logic.  New York: Dover, 1
st edition,
1932.
  [74]  A. Loparic ´, and E. H. Alves.  The semantics of the systems Cn of da Costa.  In:
A. I. Arruda, N. C. A. da Costa, and A. M. Sette, editors, Proceedings of the
III Brazilian Conference on Mathematical Logic, Recife, 1979, pp.161–172.
São Paulo: Soc. Brasil. Lógica, 1980.
  [75]  D. Marconi.  Wittgenstein on contradiction and the philosophy of paraconsis-
tent logic.  History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1(3):333–352, 1984.
  [76]  J. Marcos.  Possible-Translations Semantics (in Portuguese).  Thesis, Unicamp,
Brazil, xxviii+240p, 1999.
URL = ftp://www.cle.unicamp.br/pub/thesis/J.Marcos/93
  [77]  J. Marcos.  (Wittgenstein & Paraconsistência).  Chapter 1 in [76], presented at
the VIII National Meeting on Philosophy (VIII ANPOF Meeting), Caxambu,
Brazil, 1998.  Submitted to publication.
  [78]  J. Marcos.  8K solutions and semi-solutions to a problem of da Costa.  Forth-
coming.
  [79]  A. T. C. Martins.  A Syntactical and Semantical Uniform Treatment for the IDL
& LEI Nonmonotonic System.  Thesis, UFPE, Brazil, xvi+225p, 1997.
URL = http://www.lia.ufc.br/~ana/tese.ps.gz
  [80]  F. Miró Quesada.  Nuestra lógica.  Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 8(1):
3–13, 1982.
  [81]  F. Miró Quesada.  Paraconsistent logic: some philosophical issues.  In: [95],
pp.627–652, 1989.
  [82]  C. Mortensen.  Every quotient algebra for C1 is trivial.  Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic, 21(4):694–700, 1980.
  [83]  C. Mortensen.  Aristotle’s thesis in consistent and inconsistent logics.  Studia
Logica, 43:107–116, 1984.
  [84]  C. Mortensen.  Paraconsistency and C1.  In: [95], pp.289–305, 1989.
  [85]  C. Mortensen.  Inconsistent mathematics, with contributions by P. Lavers, W.
James, and J. Cole.  Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995.
  [86]  D. Nelson.  Negation and separation of concepts in constructive systems.  In:
A. Heyting, editor, Constructivity in Mathematics: Proceedings of the collo-
quium held at Amsterdam, 1957, pp.208–225.  Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1959.
  [87]  J. J. O’Connor, and E. F. Robertson.  Girolamo Cardano.  In: J. J. O’Connor,
and E. F. Robertson, editors, The Mac Tutor History of Mathematics archive
(March 2001 edition).
URL=http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/Mathematicians/Cardan.html
  [88]  L. Peña.  Graham Priest’s ‘dialetheism’: Is it altogether true?  Sorites, 7:28–56,
1996.
  [89]  K. R. Popper.  Conjectures and Refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 3
rd edition, 1969.
  [90]  G. Priest.  In Contradiction.  A Study of the Transconsistent.  Dordrecht: Nijhoff,
1987.
  [91]  G. Priest.  Paraconsistent logic.  To appear in: D. Gabbay, editor, Handbook of
Philosophical Logic, 2
nd Edition.
  [92]  G. Priest, and R. Routley.  Introduction: Paraconsistent logics.  Studia Logica
(special issue on ‘Paraconsistent Logics’), 43:3–16, 1984.
  [93]  G. Priest, and R. Routley.  Systems of paraconsistent logic.  In: [95], pp.151–
186, 1989.
  [94]  G. Priest, and K. Tanaka.  Paraconsistent Logic.  In: Edward N. Zalta, editor,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (August 2000 edition).
URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/
  [95]  G. Priest, R. Routley, and J. Norman (editors).  Paraconsistent Logic: essays on
the inconsistent.  Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1989.94
  [96]  W. V. O. Quine.  From a Logical Point of View.  Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1953.
  [97]  A. R. Raggio.  Propositional sequence-calculi for inconsistent systems.  Notre
Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 9(4):359–366, 1968.
  [98]  N. Rescher, and R. Brandom.  The Logic of Inconsistency.  Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1980.
  [99]  G. Restall.  Laws of non-contradiction, laws of the excluded middle and logics.
Typescript.
URL=ftp://www.phil.mq.edu.au/pub/grestall/lnclem.ps
  [100]  R. Routley, and R. K. Meyer.  Dialectical logic, classical logic and the con-
sistence of the world.  Studies in Soviet Thought, 16:1–25, 1976.
  [101]  K. Schütte.  Proof Theory.  Berlin: Springer, 1977.  (Translated from German
original version, from 1960.)
  [102]  J. Seoane, and L. P. de Alcantara.  On da Costa algebras.  The Journal of Non-
Classical Logic 8(2):41–66, 1991.
  [103]  A. M. Sette.  On the propositional calculus P
1.  Mathematica Japonicae, 18:181–
203, 1973.
  [104]  B. H. Slater.  Paraconsistent Logics?  Journal of Philosophical Logic 24(4):451–
454, 1995.
  [105]  R. Sylvan.  Variations on da Costa C systems and dual-intuitionistic logics. I.
Analyses of Cω  and CCω .  Studia Logica, 49(1):47–65, 1990.
  [106]  A. Tarski.  The semantic conception of truth and the foundation of semantics.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4:341–378, 1944.
  [107]  I. Urbas.  Paraconsistency and the C-systems of da Costa.  Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic, 30(4):583–597, 1989.
  [108]  I. Urbas.  Paraconsistency.  Studies in Soviet Thought, 39:343–354, 1990.
  [109]  L. Wittgenstein.  Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik.  3
rd revised
edition.  Suhrkamp: 1984.  (In English as: Remarks on the Foundations of Ma-
thematics.  G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe, editors, 3
rd re-
vised edition.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978.)
  [110]  L. Wittgenstein.  Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics:
Cambridge, 1939.  C. Diamond, editor.  The University of Chicago Press, 1989.
  [111]  R. Wójcicki.  Theory of logical calculi.  Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988.